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1
INTRODUCT ION
The duality of the major contributions of Adam Smith, the founding
father of modern economic science, is emblematic for the relation-
ship between economics and morality. While in The Wealth of Nations
Smith introduces his idea of the invisible hand, laying the founda-
tions of modern economic theory, in his other major work, The The-
ory of Moral Sentiments, he provides a theoretical framework for the
moral underpinnings of human behavior. The interaction between
economic institutions and morality has been controversially debated
across the social sciences for centuries. Some scholars have argued
that moral virtues such as responsibility, trust, integrity, and justice
are prerequisites for a proper functioning of free market institutions
or can be fostered by market exchange (Montesquieu, 1989/1748;
Paine, 1969/1792; Smith, 1979/1776). Smith (1896/1763) notes that
“whenever commerce is introduced into any country, probity [. . . ]
always accompanied it. [. . . ] Where people seldom deal with one
another, we find that they are somewhat disposed to cheat because
they can gain more by a smart trick than they can lose by the injury
which it does to their character” (pp. 253-254). Others have stressed
the destructive role of markets, which have been blamed for prior-
itizing self-interest over the public good, destroying moral author-
ity, and corroding traditional non-market institutions (Hirsch, 1976;
Marx, 1957/1867; Schumpeter, 1994/1942). According to Hirsch (1976)
“the social morality that has served as an understructure for economic
individualism [. . . ] has diminished with time and with the corrosive
contact of the active capitalist values” (pp. 117-118).
Despite being historically entwined with the discipline of econom-
ics, the subject of morality has been largely ignored by mainstream
neoclassical economics, which typically rests on the assumption of
self-regarding individuals, who derive utility only from their own fi-
nancial and non-financial payoffs. However, discovering patterns in
moral decision making, understanding the influence of economic in-
stitutions on moral values, and studying the emergence of moral prin-
ciples potentially have important implications for economic theory.
Incorporating morality into economic analysis can lead to a more
complete account of human behavior and thus help to improve pre-
dictions about prevailing market outcomes. Moreover, studying the
effects of economic institutions on moral values might change our
approach to classical welfare analysis, which takes preferences as
given. Furthermore, understanding moral behavior can contribute to
engineer more efficient norm enforcement mechanisms, taking into
1
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account the internal moral constraints of agents. Finally, promoting
moral values can possibly be a more efficient method to achieve co-
operation than relying solely on external constraints such as punish-
ment, since “in a complex world the government is not likely to be in
a good position to calculate and charge the optimal vector of prices
to eliminate unwanted behavior” (Stringham, 2011, p.100). With the
dawn of behavioral and experimental economics, the profession has
developed methodological tools that enable us to study questions of
morals and cooperation using a more data-driven approach.
This dissertation consists of three independent research papers,
which – taking such a data-driven approach – use experimental meth-
ods to study morals and cooperation from the perspective of eco-
nomic science. Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 study whether and through
which channels market institutions affect morality. Chapter 4 focuses
on the relative performance of different norm enforcement institu-
tions in resolving social dilemmas.
In Chapter 2 we reassess the claim, put forward in the pioneer-
ing experimental study of Falk and Szech (2013), that markets erode
moral values. Our study provides three major findings, which taken
together draw a more optimistic picture of markets with respect to
their influence on morality than suggested by the study of Falk and
Szech (2013). First, inherent features of market institutions are not re-
sponsible for the erosion of morality in the market treatments of Falk
and Szech (2013). The erosion of morality can instead be explained
by an experimental confound in their treatment comparison. Second,
morality remains robust even in competitive market environments
where agents cannot enforce prosocial outcomes by refraining from
immoral transactions. Third, the availability of social information in
markets leads to an improvement of moral standards over time. By
providing evidence not only for the robustness but also for the poten-
tial improvement of moral behavior in markets, our results call for a
reconsideration of the conclusions drawn from the study of Falk and
Szech (2013).
The resilience of moral behavior against competitive forces is partic-
ularly intriguing. Intuitively, competition allows for the replacement
excuse, the argument that "if I don’t do it, someone else will". Un-
der competition, the decision of a single market participant to refrain
from trade does not necessarily prevent the negative consequences of
the transaction. If a market participant decides not to engage in an
immoral transaction, the negative externality might be triggered by a
competitor who steps in and concludes the trade nonetheless. From
the normative standpoint of utilitarian ethics, the replacement excuse
provides justification for any action because only outcomes matter for
ethical assessment. Deontological ethics, in contrast, judges an action
with respect to its adherence to a principle, irrespective of outcomes.
introduction 3
Economic theory is predominantly based on the assumption of con-
sequentialist agents who focus only on expected outcomes.
To test this assumption we take an experimental approach in Chap-
ter 3 and address the question under which conditions the replace-
ment excuse leads to the erosion of moral behavior in competitive
markets. We show in a series of laboratory and online experiments
that the force of the replacement excuse depends on the social norm
associated with the underlying action. We find that subjects do not
follow the replacement excuse if the prevailing social norm classifies
the underlying action as inconsistent with moral behavior. In these
cases many subjects do not take the action, even if its omission will
probably be replaced by someone else, so that the immoral outcome
will be induced nevertheless. However, many subjects who would not
take the action if its omission could not be replaced take the action
under the shadow of replacement if no mutual understanding ex-
ists whether the underlying action is consistent or inconsistent with
moral behavior. Our results enhance our understanding of the effects
of competitive institutions on moral behavior by providing insights
into the power and the limits of the replacement excuse.
Chapter 4 shifts the focus from the effects of markets on morals
to the resolution of social dilemmas, which arise whenever it is a
dominant strategy for agents to make a socially defective choice, but
everyone is better off if all agents choose the socially cooperative al-
ternative. Understanding how cooperation can be sustained in social
dilemmas is important because "social dilemmas are found in all as-
pects of life, leading to momentous decisions affecting war and peace
as well as the mundane relationships of keeping promises in everyday
life” (Ostrom, 1998, p.1).
In particular, Chapter 4 studies the relative performance of dif-
ferent norm enforcement institutions in sustaining cooperation un-
der monitoring environments that are more realistic than those con-
sidered in the previous literature. Specifically, we introduce private
imperfect monitoring and information acquisition to public goods
games with punishment. A comparison between centralized and de-
centralized social norm enforcement reveals a tradeoff between Type I
errors of punishment (sanctioning a cooperator) and Type II errors of
punishment (failing to sanction a defector). Decentralization achieves
significantly higher cooperation rates than centralization, suggesting
that centralized social norm enforcement institutions per se, without
being associated with other performance-enhancing features, are not
as effective as peer-to-peer punishment institutions in resolving social
dilemmas. Moreover, we find substantial demand for additional infor-
mation about the contribution decisions of other group members. By
establishing a "standard of proof" before exerting punishment, sub-
jects reduce Type I errors of punishment, boosting cooperation rates
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as compared to an environment where costly information acquisition
is not possible.
The findings of the three independent research projects are all re-
lated to the broader research agenda on prosocial behavior. A large
body of empirical evidence on prosocial behavior suggests that the
predictions of neoclassical economic models can sometimes be sub-
stantially misguided if they rest on the assumption of purely self-
regarding behavior, as the following examples show. In ultimatum
games, offers perceived as unfair are frequently rejected (Oosterbeek,
Sloof, and Van De Kuilen, 2004), and bargaining processes often stall,
because agents do not always follow the actions that are in their best
pecuniary interest (Babcock and Loewenstein, 1997). In one-shot dic-
tator games subjects tend to give a substantial portion of their endow-
ment to the receiver (Engel, 2011). Instead of focusing only on actual
prices of products, subjects also consider whether reasons for price
changes have been fair (Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler, 1986). Unjus-
tified wage reductions cause lower effort levels, giving rise to the phe-
nomenon of downwards wage rigidity (Bewley, 1999; Fehr and Falk,
1999; Fehr, Kirchsteiger, and Riedl, 1993). In social dilemma situations
subjects are willing to cooperate if other group members are also will-
ing to do so, although defection represents a strictly dominant strat-
egy in financial terms. Costly punishment toward norm violators is
frequently exercised, even in one-shot situations (Fehr and Gächter,
2000). Cheap talk promises and threats can be highly effective in prac-
tice (Ellingsen and Johannesson, 2004), and many individuals feature
an aversion to payoff-increasing lies, even though anonymity is guar-
anteed and punishment is impossible (Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi,
2013; Gneezy, Rockenbach, and Serra-Garcia, 2013).
Prosocial behavior has been predominantly studied based on some
notion of consequentialist preferences. However, the results of Chap-
ter 2 and Chapter 3 demonstrate the importance of understanding
norm-based moral behavior that is focused on actions and insensi-
tive to changes in expected outcomes. How can moral behavior be
distinguished from other types of prosocial behavior? A consensual
definition of morality does not exist. In contrast to moral philosophy,
where morality is considered from a normative point of view, the
social sciences typically consider morality in a positivist sense, de-
scribing certain codes of conduct put forward by society, groups, or
individuals. While morality rests on a certain code of conduct, other
types of prosocial behavior, such as altruism1, are not necessarily re-
lated to underlying norms. Several typologies of norms have been
proposed to distinguish moral norms from other types of norms, in-
cluding most notably the typologies of Turiel (1983), Elster (2006),
and Bicchieri (2006).
1 Prosocial behavior is called altruistic if it is based on a utility function that is increas-
ing in the well-being of other individuals.
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Turiel (1983) proposed an influential typology based on a distinc-
tion between moral and conventional norms. According to Turiel
(1983) a defining feature of moral norms is the intrinsic effects of the
underlying actions on the well-being of other persons. Hence, moral-
ity is centered around concepts of harm, welfare, and fairness. On
the other hand, conventions do not have intrinsic interpersonal con-
sequences and only provide means of efficient social exchange. The
transgression of conventional norms is deemed less serious than the
transgression of moral norms.
Elster (2006) distinguishes moral, quasi-moral, and social norms
based on the emotional reaction that is triggered by a violation of
the norm. The violation of moral norms simultaneously trigger guilt
in the violator and anger in the observer of the norm violation. In
contrast to moral norms, social norms do not trigger any response in
the norm violator if the norm violation is not observed. Social norms
instead trigger contempt in the observer of the norm violation, and
the observation of the contempt in turn triggers shame in the norm
violator. According to Elster (2006) moral norms include for example
"the norm to share equally, the norm to keep promises, the norm to
discover the truth when it matters to do so, the norm to tell the truth
or at least not to lie, the norm to help others in distress" (p. 371).
Besides moral and social norms, Elster (2006) defines a third category
of norms, quasi-moral norms, which are followed even in the absence
of any observers, but are conditional on the behavior of other agents.
Examples for quasi-moral norms include the norm of reciprocity and
the norm of conditional cooperation, which is studied in Chapter 4.
Bicchieri (2006) considers conventions as equilibria of coordination
games, which do not involve any conflict between compliance with
the norm and self-interest. In contrast, compliance with social norms
often clashes with self-interest. According to her theory, the willing-
ness to comply with social norms is conditional on both a shared be-
lief that compliance is expected and the compliance of other group
members. Because of the preference for conditional norm compli-
ance social dilemma type situations are transformed into coordina-
tion games. While compliance with social norms is conditional on
normative and empirical expectations about the beliefs and actions
of other group members, moral norms are followed unconditionally.
In the typology of Bicchieri (2006), norms of cooperation, reciprocity,
and fairness are classified as social norms, because they do not trigger
sufficiently strong emotional responses of repugnance to be followed
unconditionally.
More research is needed to identify proper natural kinds in the con-
text of behavioral norms and prosocial behavior in general. In this
manuscript the terms moral and social norms are used interchange-
ably – while the term moral norms is used to emphasize the severity
of the norm violation, the term social norm is used to emphasize
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the shared understanding of proper behavior. Many open questions
remain about the nature of norms, especially about the relation be-
tween norms and preferences, the emergence of behavioral norms,
and their evolution. Future research in this field will certainly benefit
from sophisticated tools for measuring social norms that have been
developed recently (Krupka and Weber, 2013). Ultimately, a better
understanding of norm-based behavior will not only improve predic-
tions about behavior and outcomes in economically relevant settings,
but also help to design interventions that can establish new behav-
ioral norms or affect the dynamics of existing ones in desirable ways.
2
DO MARKETS UNDERMINE MORAL ITY ?
abstract
In a pioneering study Falk and Szech (2013) show that sub-
jects interacting in a market environment are substantially
more likely to accept an immoral act for a given payment
than subjects in an individual decision context. In this pa-
per we reassess the claim that markets undermine morality
by examining several potential causes for the deterioration
of moral values in the market. We provide three major find-
ings, which call for a reconsideration of the conclusions
drawn from the study of Falk and Szech (2013). First, in-
herent features of market institutions are not responsible
for the erosion of morality in the market treatments of Falk
and Szech (2013). The erosion of morality can instead be
explained by the unequal number of decision periods be-
tween treatments. Second, morality remains robust even in
competitive market environments where agents cannot en-
force prosocial outcomes by refraining from immoral trans-
actions. Third, the availability of social information in mar-
kets leads to an improvement of moral standards over time.
This chapter is based on joint work with Ernst Fehr. Please cite as Fehr, Ernst and
Yagiz Özdemir (2016). "Do Markets Undermine Morality?" Working Paper.
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[Once capitalism] convinces
everyone that it can dispense with
morality and public spirit, the
universal pursuit of self-interest
being all that is needed for
satisfactory performance, the system
will undermine its own viability
which is in fact premised on civic
behavior and on the respect of
certain moral norms.
Hirschman (1984) on Hirsch (1976)
Commerce is a cure for the most
destructive prejudices; for it is
almost a general rule that wherever
we find agreeable manners, there
commerce flourishes; and that
wherever there is commerce, there
we meet with agreeable manners.
Montesquieu (1989/1748)
2.1 introduction
The quotes in the epigraph reflect two conflicting perspectives on a
long-lasting question that has been controversially debated across a
variety of disciplines in the social sciences – how do market insti-
tutions affect moral values? On the one hand, scholars have consid-
ered markets as moralizing institutions, which cordialize mankind
by civilizing manners and enhancing moral virtues (Montesquieu,
1989/1748; Paine, 1969/1792; Smith, 1979/1776). On the other hand,
markets have been blamed for their tendency to prioritize self-interest
over the public good, destroy moral authority, and corrode traditional
non-market institutions (Hirsch, 1976; Marx, 1957/1867; Schumpeter,
1994/1942). This fundamental discussion about the effects of markets
on moral values has been revived recently in both philosophical de-
bate (Sandel, 2012) and experimental work (Bartling, Weber, and Yao,
2015; Falk and Szech, 2013; Kirchler et al., 2015). In a pioneering study
Falk and Szech (2013, henceforth F&S) show that subjects interacting
in a double auction market are substantially more likely to accept an
immoral act for a given payment than subjects in an individual de-
cision context. However, the underlying mechanisms for the erosion
of moral values in the market treatment of F&S remain unknown. In
this paper we reassess the claim that markets undermine morality by
examining several potential causes for the deterioration of moral val-
ues in the market treatment of F&S. We are in particular interested
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in the question whether features that are intrinsically and inevitably
associated with markets are responsible for the deterioration of moral
values or whether the result in F&S is due to the specific way in which
they have set up their experiment.
Empirical evidence on the relationship between markets and moral
preferences is essential for gaining more comprehensive insights into
the implications of an institution that is dominating economic life. If
markets crowd out moral values, then traditional economic welfare
analysis, which focuses on allocative efficiency under exogenously
given (moral) preferences, is possibly incomplete. However, only the
revelation of specific causal mechanisms will allow us to formulate
useful predictions about the circumstances under which markets will
exert their influence on moral preferences, how the effects of mar-
kets will compare to those of alternative institutions, and which pol-
icy measures are most likely to succeed with respect to desired out-
comes.1
Our study provides three major findings, which taken together
draw a more optimistic picture of markets with respect to their in-
fluence on morality than suggested by the study of F&S. First, the
erosion of moral values in the market treatments of F&S is caused
by an experimental confound that is not related to markets – the un-
equal number of decision periods between the individual and the
market treatments. If the number of decision periods is held constant
between treatments, the seemingly destructive effects of the market
treatments on moral values cease to exist, suggesting that inherent
features of market institutions are not responsible for the erosion of
morality in the market treatments of F&S. Second, moral values of
market participants remain robust against competition. The presence
of competitors, who can replace the decision of a market participant
to refrain from an unethical transaction, does not increase the propen-
sity of subjects to engage in immoral trade. Our results highlight the
resilience of morality in markets, even in environments where mar-
ket participants cannot enforce prosocial outcomes by refraining from
immoral transactions. Third, the availability of social information in
markets leads to an improvement of moral standards over time. Ob-
serving the decisions taken by other agents in the market induces
subjects to demand a higher price for accepting harm imposed on a
third party. Since market interaction is inevitably associated with the
transmission of information about the actions of other market partici-
pants, studying the influence of social information is important for a
better understanding of morality in markets. By providing evidence
not only for the robustness but also for the potential improvement of
1 Correlational evidence based on cross-cultural studies shows that the level of market
integration, measured as the share of calorie intake acquired through the market,
positively co-varies with prevailing fairness concerns in a society (Henrich et al.,
2010); however, the direction of causality remains unclear.
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moral behavior in markets, our results call for a reconsideration of
the conclusions drawn from the study of F&S.
Why does morality erode in the market treatments of F&S? The
key results of F&S are based on two treatments, a baseline condition,
in which subjects make moral decisions individually, and a market
condition, in which two subjects bargain over the split of a given sur-
plus and make implicit moral decisions through their actions in the
market, where an externality is imposed if subjects reach an agree-
ment. While the individual treatment consists of a single period that
determines the outcome with certainty, the market treatment is re-
peated for 10 periods, of which only one randomly selected period
is implemented. However, there is little justification for introducing a
potential confound by changing the elicitation method between treat-
ments.2 We show that markets do not affect morality if the number
of decision periods is controlled for – reservation prices for accept-
ing harm imposed on a third party neither differ between a single-
period market treatment and a single-period individual treatment
nor between a 10-period market treatment and a 10-period individ-
ual treatment. Specifically, by implementing a 2x2 between subject
design, comprising a single- and a 10-period version of both the indi-
vidual and the market treatments, we disentangle the potential effects
of the elicitation method on reservation prices from those of the mar-
ket institution. We confront subjects with the moral decision of either
taking a payment for themselves or financing the surgery of a leprosy
patient in India. Our findings suggest that reservation prices for ac-
cepting harm imposed on a third party are significantly lower in the
repeated treatments than in the respective single-period variants, irre-
spective of the underlying context. Hence, the deterioration of moral
values in the 10-period market treatment as compared to the single-
period individual treatment is not related to the market institution,
but can be fully explained by the unequal number of decision peri-
ods. Why does a multi-period interaction involving the random pay
method lead to different moral decisions than a one-shot decision sit-
uation? In the individual treatment, a subject, who faces the choice
between receiving a payment p or implementing the moral outcome
M, compares the utility from the payment p, u(p), to the utility from
the moral outcome M, u(M). In the repeated market treatment, sub-
jects are likely to view each period as a separate decision task, instead
of mentally integrating all 10 periods to form a reduced problem
(Starmer and Sugden, 1991). If subjects focus only on a given market
period, but take the implementation probability of 10% into account,
then a subject in the repeated market treatment compares u(p, 10%)
to u(M, 10%). Exley (2016) shows experimentally that under risk the
2 Although we started the study with the initial hypothesis that multi-period decision
making with random pay will not substantially affect reservation prices for harm
imposed on a third party as compared to a single-period decision situation, we
controlled for the elicitation method to rule out a potential confound.
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value of a donation is discounted disproportionately more than the
value of an own financial gain. Hence, according to Exley’s (2016)
findings, if u(p) = u(M), then u(p, 10%) > u(M, 10%) on average.3
Based on the preceding reasoning, reservation prices for accepting
harm imposed on a third party are expected to be lower in a repeated
interaction with random pay than in a one-shot decision treatment,
independent of the underlying institution.4
A plain bilateral bargaining environment rules out competition
among market participants and therefore disregards a market fea-
ture that has been identified as a potential cause for the erosion of
morals in markets (Falk and Szech, 2013; Shleifer, 2004). Since com-
petition is characteristic of market institutions, the bilateral market
treatment alone might lead to incomplete conclusions about the ef-
fects of markets on morality. To test whether competition crowds
out moral values, we run competition treatments, where a monop-
olist, who can reach at most one agreement, bargains simultaneously
with several competitors. We find that reservation prices for accept-
ing harm imposed on a third party remain unaffected by competition;
hence, moral values prove to be robust against competitive forces in
markets. Our results appear surprising, because under competition
the decision of a single market participant to refrain from trade does
not necessarily prevent the externality induced by the transaction. If
a market participant decides not to engage in a transaction, the nega-
tive externality might be triggered by a competitor who steps in and
concludes the trade nonetheless. Therefore, competition generally re-
duces the expected social benefit of forgoing a profitable but immoral
market transaction. If market participants use the replacement argu-
ment, “if I don’t do it, someone else will”, as an excuse for selfish
behavior, competition might undermine moral behavior in markets.
Such a replacement argument seems to have substantial impact on
behavior in ultimatum games with responder competition. Research
on ultimatum games has shown that responders are more likely to ac-
cept an unfair offer if competing responders exist who can “replace”
the rejection decision of another responder (e. g. Fischbacher, Fong,
and Fehr, 2009; Grosskopf, 2003).5 Why does competition affect re-
3 Exley (2016) suggests that subjects use risk as an excuse for choosing the selfish
option, because the asymmetric response to risk occurs only if subjects face a tradeoff
with respect to a payment to themselves. Moreover, selfish subjects are more likely
to take excuse-driven choices in risky decisions than prosocial subjects and there is
a correlation between excuse-driven behavior in risky decisions and in moral wiggle
room tasks introduced by Dana, Weber, and Kuang (2007).
4 To the best of our knowledge no study exists that directly compares the two methods
in the context of moral decision making. In a meta study Engel (2011) finds that
repetition has a clear negative effect on giving in dictator games, but random pay
has a negative effect only in one specification of the regression analysis.
5 In the ultimatum game with responder competition a proposer is matched with at
least two responders. After the proposer makes an offer about how to split a surplus,
the responders decide simultaneously whether to accept or reject the offer. If only
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sponder behavior in ultimatum games, but not the willingness to en-
gage in a transaction that harms a leprosy patient? The ultimatum
game with responder competition differs from our experiment in at
least one important aspect. While accepting an unfair offer in the ul-
timatum game is not considered as morally inappropriate, imposing
harm on a leprosy patient by taking money for oneself constitutes
an immoral act (Bartling and Özdemir, 2016). Therefore, responders
who accept an unfair offer in the ultimatum game do not bear any
moral costs as a consequence of their decision. If the expected benefit
of rejecting an unfair offer – i.e., reducing the payoff of the proposer
– decreases due to competition, responders react by increasing their
willingness to accept. In contrast, subjects who break the norm of not
harming a leprosy patient in India have to bear the moral costs of
their action independent of the expected outcome. If subjects derive
sufficient disutility form taking actions that do not comply with so-
cial norms of proper behavior (Krupka and Weber, 2013; Lindbeck,
1997; López-Pérez, 2008), the pecuniary benefits from immoral trade
might be offset by the moral cost of breaking the social norm, and,
hence, the possibility of being “replaced” by a competitor in the mar-
ket might not affect the decision whether to refrain from an immoral
transaction. Such moral costs might be triggered by self-image and
identity concerns (Akerlof and Kranton, 2000, 2005; Bénabou and Ti-
role, 2004, 2006; Bodner and Prelec, 2003; Köszegi, 2006; Mazar, Amir,
and Ariely, 2008), social image concerns (Akerlof, 1980; Andreoni and
Bernheim, 2009; Ariely, Bracha, and Meier, 2009; Bernheim, 1994), or
a desire for "warm glow" (Andreoni, 1989, 1990).
Bartling and Özdemir (2016) study experimentally the force of the
replacement excuse in moral decisions, and show that if the under-
lying action is considered as socially and morally inappropriate, the
prospect of being replaced by another agent does not affect the propen-
sity of subjects to take a prosocial action. Our results add to Bartling
and Özdemir (2016), because Bartling and Özdemir (2016) study the
replacement logic in a simple non-market setting, raising the ques-
tion whether their findings will carry over to more complex market
environments. F&S introduce competition in a multilateral bargain-
ing treatment, where nine sellers bargain simultaneously with seven
buyers and each market participant can reach at most one agreement.
F&S argue that “in markets with many buyers and sellers, diffusion
of being pivotal for outcomes adds to moral decay” (p. 710), but the
fraction of sellers willing to accept the immoral act for 10 EUR or less
is only insignificantly larger in their multilateral bargaining treatment
than in their bilateral market condition. However, there are potential
one responder accepts the offer, the proposer and the accepting responder receive
their respective shares. If more than one responder accepts the offer, the responder
who receives the share is randomly determined among the responders who have
accepted the offer. Only if all responders reject the offer, all players receive a payoff
of zero.
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ceiling effects, because more than 70% of subjects accept the immoral
act for 10 EUR or less already in the bilateral market treatment. More-
over, F&S do not control for the additional social information that is
transmitted in the multilateral bargaining treatment as compared to
the bilateral bargaining setting. In contrast, we isolate the effects of
competition by holding social information transmitted through the
market constant between treatments.
Agents interacting in markets are usually exposed to information
about the actions taken by other market participants, because either
aggregate information is available, such as prices and market shares,
or offers and decisions to buy or sell are directly observable. Accord-
ing to F&S, “observing others trading and ignoring moral standards
may make the pursuit of self-interest ethically permissible, leading
further individuals to engage in trade” (p. 708). We study how social
information in markets affects morality by implementing a social in-
formation treatment, where the amount of information that subjects
receive about the actions of other market participants is expanded.
Reservation prices for accepting harm imposed on a third party in the
social information treatment increase substantially over time and, de-
spite competition, eventually reach significantly higher levels than in
a comparable individual decision context. Descriptive social norms,
i.e., expectations about the actual behavior of others, can explain
substantial variation in other-regarding behavior (Bicchieri and Xiao,
2009; Cialdini and Goldstein, 2004; Krupka and Weber, 2009). By dis-
seminating shared understandings of proper behavior in markets, the
transmission of social information can improve morality in markets.
F&S stress the potential detrimental effects of social information in
markets on morality, but our results reveal a converse effect – agents
who observe ethical behavior of other market participants are encour-
aged to take moral actions themselves.
Our paper is related to two experimental studies that examine
moral behavior in markets, Bartling, Weber, and Yao (2015) and Kirch-
ler et al. (2015). Bartling, Weber, and Yao (2015) study socially respon-
sible behavior in posted-offer markets, where firms and consumers
exchange either a low-cost product that creates a negative externality
for another subject in the lab or a high-cost product that mitigates
the externality. The more expensive, but socially responsible prod-
uct attains a significant and stable market share. Moreover, concerns
for social impact within a western subject pool are, if at all, only
slightly lower in the market treatment than in a comparable individ-
ual benchmark – a result that stands in contrast to the substantial ero-
sion of moral values reported by F&S.6 In contrast, markets seem to
6 While in Bartling, Weber, and Yao (2015) the frequencies of fair product choices in
the market and fair choices in a comparable non-market context differ by 14%-points,
a difference that is significant in only some specifications of the analysis, in F&S the
fraction of subjects willing to accept harm imposed on a third party for 10 EUR or
less differs by around 30%-points between the individual and market treatments.
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have significantly detrimental effects on social concerns in a Chinese
subject pool, raising the question how cultural factors interact with
the effects of markets on moral values. However, due to fundamen-
tal differences in the underlying experimental designs, the results of
Bartling, Weber, and Yao (2015) are not directly comparable to those
of F&S. Kirchler et al. (2015) study the effects of different interven-
tions on moral preferences, identifying two interventions that have
beneficial effects on moral behavior, the threat of punishment and the
removal of anonymity. However, because of their different research
focus, Kirchler et al. (2015) do not compare moral behavior between
an individual and a market context.7
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2.2
describes our experimental design that disentangles the effects of
the underlying institution from those of the elicitation method; Sec-
tion 2.3 reports the respective results. Section 2.4 presents the com-
petition and social information treatments and the respective results.
Section 2.5 concludes.
2.2 experimental design
We implement the moral decision in a novel way that provides both
a morally charged decision context and simple administrative proce-
dures. Subjects are told that their decisions will have consequences
for a third party – a leprosy patient in India. If the moral outcome
occurs, we donate CHF 60 (1 CHF ⇡ 1.02 USD) to the Switzerland-
based charity FAIRMED to finance the surgery of a leprosy patient.
If the selfish outcome occurs, the funding for the surgery is not pro-
vided. We inform subjects that persons affected with leprosy suffer
from disfigurements caused by the infection and that medical surg-
eries mitigate the mutilations, which are often associated with social
stigmas. Moreover, subjects are informed that a basic surgery can be
financed for around CHF 60 on average and that the donations will
be used for this specific purpose.8
F&S compare a single-period individual treatment with a 10-period
market interaction. This treatment comparison allows to identify only
7 Kirchler et al. (2015) study interventions in both a market and an individual context,
but since key parameters are not held constant between treatments, the results are
not comparable.
8 In the study of F&S, subjects face a choice between saving the life of a mouse or tak-
ing a payment for themselves. We use the leprosy paradigm, because i) its implemen-
tation is simpler to administrate and easier to replicate than the mouse paradigm,
ii) since the study of F&S has received public attention, subjects might already be
familiar with the mouse paradigm and the underlying research question, and iii) we
can test whether the results of F&S transfer to a different domain of moral decision
making. Bartling and Özdemir (2016) verify that the leprosy task provides a morally
charged decision context – the decision to impose harm on a leprosy patient by tak-
ing a payment to oneself is rated as socially and morally inappropriate by 96.7% of
subjects.
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the combined effect of the market institution and the change in the
number of periods. Hence, if behavior is affected by the repetition of
the interaction, the unequal number of periods constitutes a potential
confound. Focusing on the first period of the repeated market treat-
ment does not sufficiently address this problem, because the reduced
implementation probability of any given period or the ex-ante knowl-
edge of the multi-period interaction might affect behavior. Therefore,
to isolate the effect of markets we control for the number of decision
periods by implementing a 2x2 between subject design (see Table 2.1),
combining the underlying institutional environment (market or in-
dividual) with the number of periods (one-shot or 10 periods with
random pay).
One-shot 10 times repeated
Individual treatment Individual (F&S) Individual10
Market treatment Market Market10 (F&S)
Table 2.1: Overview of treatments
In the Market treatment, two randomly matched subjects bargain
over the split of CHF 20 following the rules of a continuous double
auction. If the two subjects agree on how to split the CHF 20, the
agreement is implemented, but the transaction imposes a negative
externality on a third party – the funding for the surgery of a lep-
rosy patient in India will not be provided. If subjects do not reach an
agreement within three minutes, the market closes, both participants
receive no additional payment, and CHF 60 will be donated for the
surgery of a leprosy patient. Note that each subject can unilaterally
enforce the moral outcome by neither posting nor accepting an of-
fer. Both subjects can continuously make binding offers by posting
how much of the CHF 20 they demand, while demands can consist
of any integer between 0 and 20. To make a new offer subjects have to
reduce their previously posted demand, and only the current (best)
offer of a participant can be accepted. Subjects can observe their cur-
rent demand, the history of their demands, the current offer of the
other participant, and the history of the other participant’s offers on
their computer screens. After an agreement is reached, subjects have
to wait until the three minutes have elapsed before being able to pro-
ceed with the experiment; this design feature rules out that subjects
can reduce waiting time by accepting an offer. Our procedures differ
from those of F&S with respect to the trial round that subjects play to
get familiar with the rules of the continuous double auction and the
graphical user interface. Due of a trial period in the market treatment,
the timespan between the introduction of the externality to subjects
and actual decision making is larger in the market treatment of F&S
than in their individual treatment; hence, the emotional salience of
the harm imposed on a third party might be lower in the market
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treatment. In contrast to F&S, we distribute separate instructions for
the trial round that include only information on how the continuous
double auction works and the way offers are entered and accepted,
but not on the externality. Only after the trial period is finished, sub-
jects receive detailed instructions about the experiment, including a
description of the externality. Since there is no trial period in the in-
dividual condition, this sequential introduction of instructions keeps
the timespan between the exposure to the externality and subjects’
decisions constant across treatments, and, thus, rules out that differ-
ences in the salience of the externality confound the results.
In the Individual treatment, the baseline to which moral behavior in
the market is compared to, we use a price list to measure the reser-
vation prices of subjects for accepting harm imposed on a third party.
In the individual treatment of F&S there is only one subject, who
can either take or not take 10 EUR, whereas in their bilateral mar-
ket treatment there are two subjects, who bargain over the split of
20 EUR. Therefore, the set of possible distributions, the total surplus,
and the number of players differ between the two treatments of F&S.9
To keep these factors constant between treatments, we introduce two
types of participants in the Individual treatment, an active decision
maker and a passive recipient. Each active decision maker is matched
with a passive recipient, who does not have any influence on the out-
come, but can receive a share of the CHF 20. Since the two parties in
the Market treatment can agree on one of 21 different distributions of
the CHF 20, active decision makers in the Individual treatment face
a list of all the 21 distributions that can emerge in the Market treat-
ment and decide for each distribution whether to take the payment
and thereby impose harm on a third party or to reject the payment.
Afterwards, one of the 21 distributions is chosen at random and the
decision for the selected distribution is implemented. If a subject has
decided to take the payment for the randomly chosen distribution,
the two participants receive their respective shares and the funding
for the surgery is not provided. If, however, the payment has been re-
jected for the randomly chosen distribution, both participants receive
no additional payment and the surgery is financed. Analogous to
the procedures in the Market treatment, subjects have three minutes
to make their decisions and must wait, in any case, until the three
minutes have elapsed before being able to proceed with the experi-
ment. Our approach has four advantages compared to the individual
treatment of F&S. First, by introducing a passive participant we hold
the financial surplus of subjects (20 CHF), and thus their combined
costs of funding the surgery, constant between treatments. Second,
the price list reflects the set of possible distributions that can emerge
9 In two separate control treatments, F&S either use a price list or control for the
existence of another participant, but they do not combine both features within a
single treatment. Moreover, the set of possible distributions that can emerge in the
market is not matched in any of their individual treatments.
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in the market. Third, the number of involved individuals is constant
between treatments. Forth, by using a price list we can determine the
reservation prices of subjects more accurately than in a binary choice
task.
In theMarket10 treatment, the 10-period version of the Market treat-
ment, the procedures follow the same rules as in the Market treat-
ment, except that subjects repeat the market interaction for 10 peri-
ods. Similarly, in the Individual10 treatment, the 10-period version of
the Individual treatment, subjects repeat the individual decision task
for 10 periods. In both the Market10 and the Individual10 treatments,
subjects are randomly matched with a new partner in each period;
i.e., any two given subjects are never in the same group more than
once. At the end of the experiment one of the 10 periods is randomly
chosen and the result of the selected period is implemented.
Materials and Methods
All sessions took place at the computer laboratory of the Department
of Economics at the University of Zurich between May 2014 and June
2015. Subjects were mainly students from the University of Zurich
and the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology (ETH) in Zurich. The
study was conducted using the software z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007).
Before entering the lab, each subject randomly drew a place card that
allocated subjects to computer terminals. If a treatment involved dif-
ferent roles, the terminal number determined the role of each subject.
Subjects received written instructions, including comprehension ques-
tions that had to be answered correctly before a session could begin.
Sessions with single-period treatments lasted about 1 hour and ses-
sions with 10-period treatments lasted about 1.5 hours. Each subject
received a show-up fee of CHF 15 and an additional payment de-
pending on the decisions made in the experiment. Subjects did not
participate more than once in this experiment – 97 subjects partici-
pated as active decision makers in the Individual treatment, 98 sub-
jects participated in the Market treatment, 106 subjects participated
in the Market10 treatment, and 97 subjects participated in the Indi-
vidual10 treatment.10
2.3 results
Measuring morality
We operationalize moral behavior by measuring a subject’s reserva-
tion price (RP) for accepting harm imposed on a third party, i.e.,
thwarting the donation for the surgery of a leprosy patient in India.
10 Table A.1 (see Appendix) provides an overview of all treatments, the respective num-
ber of sessions, and sample sizes.
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First, consider the individual treatments, Individual and Individual10.
We define the reservation price of subject i in period t, denoted by
RPi,t, as the minimum payoff for which the subject prefers the own
financial gain over the donation. If a subject prefers the donation in
all lines of the price list, then RPi,t > 20. In contrast to the individual
treatments, reservation prices cannot be directly observed in the mar-
ket treatments; instead, they have to be derived from the actions taken
in the market. We approximate the reservation price of a subject in
the market treatments by measuring the lowest payoff for which the
subject signals a willingness to reach an agreement.11 Let ai,t denote
the amount that subject i accepts in period t (if subject i does not
accept an offer, then ai,t > 20), and let si,t denote the lowest share
that subject i demands in period t (if subject i does not post any
demand in period t, then si,t > 20). In the market treatments, our
measure of the reservation price of subject i in period t is given by
RPi,t = min (si,t,ai,t). If a subject neither posts a demand nor accepts
an offer, then RPi,t > 20.
Unlike the Individual treatment and the Market treatments, which
consist of only a single period, the Market10 and Individual10 treat-
ments provides 10 reservation prices for each subject – one in each
period. Therefore, to make single-period and 10-period treatments
comparable, the 10 measures in the Market10 and Individual10 treat-
ments need to be translated into a single reservation price RPi. In
order to relate our results to those in F&S we follow their analysis
by focusing on the minimum of these reservation prices as the mea-
sure of moral behavior (i.e., in the Market10 and the Individual10
treatment RPi = mint RPi,t).
F&S use the fraction of subjects with RPi 6 10 as the key outcome
variable that is compared between treatments. However, this measure
might overestimate morality in the market treatments if subjects re-
alize gains from trade – i.e., if an agreement leads to a payoff that
is larger than the underlying reservation price of the subject. For ex-
ample, a subject with a true reservation price of 8 might conclude
a trade that secures the subject a payoff of 12. This subject would
count as RPi > 10 in the Market treatment, but as RPi 6 10 in the
Individual treatment, where reservation prices are measured directly.
One way to address potential measurement problems associated with
gains from trade is to focus the analysis on the fraction of subjects
with RPi 6 20. Since subjects with RPi > 20 enforce the moral out-
come by neither posting nor accepting a demand within a market
period, they cannot possibly realize gains from trade and therefore
cannot be falsely categorized as subjects with RPi 6 20. To avoid po-
tential measurement problems associated with gains from trade we
11 F&S focus only on the amount of money received from a concluded trade. However,
this measure might overestimate moral behavior in markets, since it ignores the
information contained in demands that were posted, but not accepted by the other
market participant.
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compare treatments based on the fraction of subjects with RPi 6 20.
When we relate our results directly to those of F&S, we report the
fraction of subjects with RPi 6 10 as the main outcome variable and
use the fraction of subjects with RPi 6 20 as a robustness check.
Reproducing the erosion of morality in the market treatment
We first focus on reservation prices in the Individual and the Mar-
ket10 treatment, following the treatment comparison in F&S. If we
find similar treatment effects to those reported by F&S, we can con-
clude that the erosion of moral values in the market treatment i) is
not confined to the mouse paradigm used by F&S, but extents to our
leprosy paradigm as well and ii) cannot be explained by treatments
differences in F&S that we control for, including the number of play-
ers, the set of possible distributions, the total surplus of subjects, and
the timespan between introducing the externality to subjects and ac-
tual decision making.
result 1 : Controlling for the number of players, the set of possible dis-
tributions, the total surplus, and the timespan between introducing the ex-
ternality to subjects and actual decision making, we reproduce the results
of F&S using a different moral decision domain. Subjects’ reservation prices
for accepting harm imposed on a third party are significantly lower in the
Market10 treatment than in the Individual treatment.
As shown in Figure 2.1a, the fraction of subjects with RPi 6 10 in-
creases significantly from 41.2% in the Individual treatment to 75.5%
in the Market10 treatment (Probit regression, p<0.001)12, an effect size
that is comparable to the one in F&S (see Figure 2.1b). However, the
minimum reservation price across all 10 periods might represent a
distorted measure of moral behavior in the market, because any vari-
ation in behavior over time, for instance due a stochastic element in
the decision-making process, would affect the results only in one di-
rection – more immoral behavior in the market. Yet, we find, similar
to F&S, that moral values are undermined right from the start of the
Market10 treatment. The fraction of subjects with RPi,1 6 10 (focus-
ing on the first period only) is significantly larger in the Market10
12 We compare the fraction of subjects with RPi 6 RP between treatments based on a
Probit regression of the form Pr(yi = 1|x) =  ( 0 +  1xi), where   is the cumula-
tive density function of the standard normal distribution, x is a treatment dummy,
and yi =
8<:1 if RPi 6 RP
0 if RPi > RP
.
Depending on the outcome variable used, RP is either 10 or 20. Standard errors are
clustered at the individual level in individual treatments, at the group level in single-
period market treatments, and at the session level in repeated market treatments.
If reservation prices are based on the first period of a repeated market treatment,
standard errors are clustered at the first-period group level.
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treatment (56.6%) than in the Individual treatment (41.2%; Probit re-
gression, p=0.026).
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Figure 2.1: Moral values in single-period individual and repeated market
treatments
Note: Figure 2.1a shows the fraction of subjects with a reservation price smaller or
equal to CHF 10 for accepting harm imposed on a third party in our Individual
and our Market10 treatment. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals with
standard errors adjusted for clustering at the session level in the Market10 treatment.
Figure 2.1b depicts the results obtained by F&S.
Controlling for the number of periods
The previous analysis is based on a treatment comparison that in-
volves an unequal number of decision periods and, therefore, allows
us to measure only the combined effect of the market institution and
the number of decision periods. To disentangle the institutional effect
from a potential period effect, we now compare behavior between the
individual decision context and the market institution while holding
the underlying decision periods constant across treatments.
result 2 : The erosion of moral values in the Market10 treatment as com-
pared to the Individual treatment can be explained by the different number of
underlying decision periods and is not driven by the market institution itself.
Moral behavior does not differ between individual and market treatments if
the number of decision periods is held constant.
As Figure 2.2 illustrates, the fraction of subjects with RPi 6 10 is
virtually identical between the Individual and the Market treatment
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(Probit regression, p=0.93). If both treatments consist of a single pe-
riod only, moral behavior remains unaffected by the market. However,
the deterioration of moral values in the Market10 treatment might be
caused by an expected repeated market experience and not by the
expected repetition per se; therefore, we conducted the Individual10
treatment, which – like the Market10 treatment – repeats the task for
10 periods.
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Figure 2.2: Moral values in single-period individual and single-period mar-
ket treatment
Note: This figure compares the fraction of subjects with a reservation price smaller or
equal to CHF 10 for accepting harm imposed on a third party between the Individual
and the Market treatment, both consisting of a single period. Error bars represent
95% confidence intervals with standard errors adjusted for clustering at the group
level in the Market treatment.
In Figure 2.3 subjects’ behavior is compared between the Individ-
ual10 and the Market10 treatment using different approaches to de-
termine the relevant reservation price. In particular, we consider the
reservation price in the first period (RPi,1), the minimum reservation
price across all 10 periods (mint RPi,t), and the median reservation
price across all 10 periods (mediant RPi,t). Moral behavior does not
differ between the two treatments based on any of the three mea-
sures: RPi,1 (Probit regression, p=0.663), mint RPi,t (Probit regression:
p=0.13), and mediant RPi,t (Probit regression, p=0.987). The increase
in the number of periods leads to an erosion of moral behavior in both
the market and the individual decision contexts. The fraction of sub-
jects with mint RPi,t 6 10 is significantly larger in the Individual10
treatment (67.0%) than in the Individual treatment (41.2%; Probit re-
gression, p<0.001). The negative impact of the increased number of
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periods on moral behavior seems to materialize already in the first
period of the Individual10 treatment, an effect that is significant at
the 10%-level (Probit regression, p=0.085). Moreover, moral behavior
remains relatively stable over the 10 periods in both the Individual10
and the Market10 treatment (see Section 2.4, where we discuss the
results of the social information treatment).
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Figure 2.3: Moral values in repeated individual and repeated market treat-
ment
Note: This figure compares the fraction of subjects with a reservation price smaller
or equal to CHF 10 for accepting harm imposed on a third party between the Indi-
vidual10 and the Market10 treatment, based on different specifications of the reser-
vation price of a given subject. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals with
standard errors adjusted for clustering at the individual level in the Individual10
treatment, at the session level in the Market10 treatment for the minimum and me-
dian RP measures, and at the level of first-period groups in the Market10 treatment
for the first-period RP measure.
Next we compare treatments based on the fraction of subjects with
RPi 6 20 to address potential measurement problems that might arise
from realized gains from trade, as discussed above. None of the re-
ported results based on the fraction of subjects with RPi 6 10 changes
qualitatively if we use the fraction of subjects with RPi 6 20 instead.
Table 2.2 shows the key treatment comparisons using the fraction of
subjects with RPi 6 20. The second column denotes the difference in
the fraction of subjects with RPi 6 20 between the individual and the
comparable market treatment. The p-values in the third column refer
to the Probit regression that compares the fraction of subjects with
RPi 6 20 between the market and the respective individual treatment.
The fraction of subjects with RPi 6 20 differs neither between the In-
dividual and the Market treatment nor between the Individual10 and
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treatment comparison   fraction RPi 6 20 p-value
Ind - Market +6.76 0.353
Ind10 - Market10 (1st period) -6.14 0.292
Ind10 - Market10 (minimum) -8.53 0.121
Ind10 - Market10 (median) -1.33 0.839
Table 2.2: Key treatment comparisons based on RPi 6 20
Note: This table compares the individual and market treatments based on the frac-
tion of subjects with a reservation price smaller or equal to CHF 20 for accepting
harm imposed on a third party. The second column denotes the difference in this
fraction (in percentage points) between the individual and the comparable market
treatment. The p-values in the third column refer to the respective Probit regres-
sion, comparing the fraction of subjects with a reservation price smaller or equal to
CHF 20 for accepting harm imposed on a third party between the market and the
respective individual treatment.
the Market10 treatment. Hence, reservation prices for accepting harm
imposed on a third party do not erode in the market treatments, even
if potential gains from trade are taken account of. The analyses in
the remainder of the paper will be focused on the fraction of subjects
with RPi 6 20 to avoid overestimating moral behavior in the market.
2.4 moral behavior in markets under competition and
social information
Moral behavior in markets under competition
The bilateral bargaining setting considered so far in the market treat-
ments rules out competition among market participants and, hence,
disregards the potential impact of an inherent features of many mar-
kets on moral behavior.
As discussed in Section 2.1, introducing competition among respon-
ders in ultimatum games substantially increases the propensity of re-
sponders to accept unfair offers. For example, Fischbacher, Fong, and
Fehr (2009) show that an offer of 10% of the total surplus gets re-
jected by around 80% of responders in the ultimatum game without
responder competition, whereas the same offer gets rejected by only
around 25% of responders in the ultimatum game with five compet-
ing responders. If the reaction to competition is similar in markets
and ultimatum games, competition would be expected to have sub-
stantially detrimental effects on morality in markets.
Following the setup of our Market treatment we introduce com-
petition on one side of the market to test whether competition un-
dermines moral values. In the Market1vs2 treatment one participant,
henceforth the “monopolist”, bargains simultaneously with two other
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participants, henceforth the “competitors”, over the split of CHF 20.
In each group at most one agreement can be reached. The monopo-
list can choose among the demands of the two competitors and the
competitors can accept a demand of the monopolist. If one of the
three participants accepts a demand within three minutes, both par-
ticipants receive their respective share, the surgery is not funded, and
the remaining competitor does not receive any additional payment.
Note that the surgery is financed only if none of the three participants
accepts a demand. Competitors cannot observe the posted demands
of each other. Since competitors observe the demands of only a single
other participant, the monopolist, the amount of social information
transmitted to the competitors in the Market1vs2 treatment is compa-
rable to the available social information in the Market treatment. By
holding social information comparable to the Market treatment, we
isolate the effects of competition on moral values and study the ef-
fects of social information in another treatment, which is reported in
the next section. After an agreement has been reached, the competitor
who is not part of the agreement can continue posting or accepting
demands until the three minutes have elapsed, but those actions re-
main irrelevant for the outcome. Only after the three minutes have
elapsed competitors learn whether the other competitor has already
concluded the trade and, if a subject has accepted a demand during
the market period, whether this decision will count or not. This proce-
dure ensures that the time available for competitors to take an action
in the Market1vs2 treatment is not truncated as compared to the Mar-
ket and the Individual treatment. The Market1vs2 treatment, like the
Market treatment, consists of a single period.
In the Market1vs4 treatment we further increase the potential of
competition to affect moral behavior as compared to the Market1vs2
treatment. The Market1vs4 is identical to the Market1vs2 treatment,
except that the monopolist bargains simultaneously with four com-
petitors. Now the surgery is only financed if none of the five partic-
ipants accepts a demand. Therefore, competitors who refrain from
trade in the Market1vs4 face a higher likelihood of being “replaced”
by another competitor than competitors in the Market1vs2 treatment.
result 3 : Moral values remain robust against competition in markets.
Reservation prices for accepting harm imposed on a third party in the Mar-
ket1vs4 and Market1vs2 treatments are similar to those in the Individual
and the Market treatment.
Only subjects in the role of competitors are included in the analysis
of the competition treatments. There are three reasons for excluding
monopolists from the analysis. First, we are interested in the effects
of competition on morality, and only subjects in the role of competi-
tors face competition. Second, on average monopolist will receive a
greater share of the surplus than competitors, because monopolists
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have greater bargaining power. Hence, reservation prices of monop-
olists will appear higher than those of competitors. By focusing on
competitors only, we increase the chances to find a negative effect of
markets on reservation prices. Third, monopolists, who bargain with
more than one other market participant, necessarily receive more so-
cial information than subjects in the Market treatment.
Figure 2.4 depicts the fraction of subjects with RPi 6 20 in the Indi-
vidual, Market1vs2 and Market1vs4 treatments. Moral values do not
differ between the competition treatments and the Individual treat-
ment (Market1vs2: Probit regression, p=0.795; Market1vs4: Probit re-
gression, p=0.726). Moreover, we do not find a difference in moral-
ity between the competition treatments and the Market treatment,
where the fraction of subjects with RPi 6 20 is 56.1% (Market1vs2:
Probit regression, p=0.441; Market1vs4: Probit regression, p=0.456).
Compared to a situation where market participants can unilaterally
enforce the prosocial outcome, subjects are not more likely to engage
in trade when they face the prospect of being “replaced” by a com-
peting trader.
Our results differ from those in ultimatum games with responder
competition, because the reaction of a responder to an unfair offer is
not subject to prevailing social norms, and no shared understanding
exists that a responder should punish the proposer by rejecting an
unfair offer. While accepting an unfair offer in the ultimatum game
is not considered inappropriate, imposing harm on a leprosy patient
is clearly deemed an immoral act (Bartling and Özdemir, 2016). Due
to the moral costs associated with taking an immoral action, moral
behavior can remain robust against competitive forces in markets.
Moral behavior in markets under social information
The market treatments that we considered so far offer only limited
scope for social learning. Although monopolists in the Market1vs2
and the Market1vs4 treatment observe the posted demands of two
or four other market participants respectively, the received social in-
formation remains relatively scarce. Moreover, subjects do not have
sufficient time to adjust their behavior after a learning experience,
because the interaction is one-shot. The Market10 treatment, on the
other hand, is repeated for 10 periods, but subjects observe the behav-
ior of only a single participant in each period.
To study how social information in markets affects moral values
we increase the amount of information that subjects receive about ac-
tions taken by other market participants. The Market10SI treatment is
identical to the Market1vs4 treatment, except that all group members
observe the posted demands of each other and the interaction is re-
peated for 10 periods. Roles (monopolist or competitor) remain fixed
throughout the 10 periods, but subjects are randomly matched with
26 do markets undermine morality?
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
Fr
ac
tio
n 
of
 S
ub
jec
ts 
wi
th
 R
P 
≤ 
20
 (i
n 
%
)
 
Individual Market1vs2 Market1vs4
Figure 2.4: Moral values in the competition treatments
Note: This figure shows the fraction of subjects with a reservation price smaller or
equal to CHF 20 for accepting harm imposed on a third party in the competition
treatments and in the Individual treatment. Error bars represent 95% confidence
intervals with standard errors adjusted for clustering at the group level in the Mar-
ket1vs2 and the Market1vs4 treatment.
four other participants in each period following a stranger match-
ing design. After each market period, subjects are informed about
whether an agreement has been reached in their group. At the end
of the experiment, one of the 10 periods is randomly chosen, and the
result of the selected period is implemented for all participants in the
session.
result 4 : Increased opportunities for social learning in the market have
significantly positive effects on moral behavior over time. In the first period
of the interaction, the fraction of subjects with RPi 6 20 is similar among the
Individual10, Market10, and Market10SI treatments. However, while moral
values remain relatively constant in the Individual10 and Market10 condi-
tions, they improve substantially over time in the Market10SI treatment,
where competition prevails and social learning opportunities are highest.
In Figure 2.5, the fraction of subjects with RPi 6 20 is plotted over
the 10 periods of the Individual10, Market10, and Market10SI treat-
ments. In the first period, moral values in the Market10SI treatment
differ neither from those in the Market10 treatment (Probit regres-
sion, p=0.846) nor from those in the Individual10 treatment (Probit
regression, p=0.541). The fraction of subjects with RPi 6 20 remains
relatively constant in the Market10 and the Individual10 treatment,
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Figure 2.5: The evolution of moral values over time
Note: This figure shows the fraction of subjects with a reservation price smaller or
equal to CHF 20 for accepting harm imposed on a third party across the 10 periods
of the repeated treatments.
converging to around 70% in both treatments. However, moral values
improve substantially in the Market10SI treatment, where the frac-
tion of subjects with RPi 6 20 drops from 76.9% in the first period
to 55.4% in the last period (Probit regression, p<0.001). In the last pe-
riod, after having been exposed to competition and social information
for nine rounds, subjects in the Market10SI treatment behave signifi-
cantly more morally than subjects in both the Individual10 treatment
(Probit regression, p=0.026) and the Market10 treatment (Probit re-
gression, p=0.042).
2.5 conclusion
The recent experimental findings of F&S have been interpreted as
causal evidence for the destructive effects of markets on moral val-
ues. In this paper we show that this interpretation needs to be recon-
sidered, because the results of F&S can be traced back to a procedural
confound that is not related to markets. Specifically, F&S compare a
repeated market treatment with a single-period individual treatment,
but we show that subjects are significantly more likely to behave self-
ishly in repeated experimental settings with random pay than in one-
shot decision contexts, independent of the underlying institution. If
the number of periods is controlled for, markets do not affect morality.
Moreover, moral values remain robust against competition in markets,
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and if the actions of other market participants are observable, moral
values improve over time.
Our results cast doubt on the view that markets erode moral val-
ues. Moral behavior not only appears robust against various market
features but even improves in markets that provide social informa-
tion. However, the experimental methods employed in this paper
can only measure the immediate effects of a simulated market on
moral behavior; evidence on the long-term effects of markets on pref-
erences is still lacking. Moreover, it remains an open question how
cultural factors interact with the influence of markets on moral behav-
ior (see Bartling, Weber, and Yao, 2015). For example, the maturity of
market institutions in a society might affect prevailing social norms
about proper behavior in market environments. Finally, our results
also have methodological implications, suggesting that in the context
of moral decision-making repeated measurements with random pay
might lead to different results than one-shot elicitations.
3
THE L IM ITS TO MORAL EROS ION IN MARKETS :
SOC IAL NORMS AND THE REPLACEMENT EXCUSE
abstract
This paper studies the conditions under which the replace-
ment excuse, the argument that “if I don’t do it, someone
else will,” leads to the erosion of moral behavior in compet-
itive markets. We show in a series of laboratory and online
experiments that the force of the replacement excuse de-
pends on the social norm associated with the underlying
action. We find that subjects do not follow the replacement
excuse if the prevailing social norm classifies the under-
lying action as inconsistent with moral behavior. In these
cases many subjects do not take the action, even if its omis-
sion will probably be replaced by someone else, so that
the immoral outcome will be induced nevertheless. How-
ever, many subjects who would not take the action if its
omission could not be replaced take the action under the
shadow of replacement if no mutual understanding exists
whether the underlying action is consistent or inconsistent
with moral behavior. Our results enhance our understand-
ing of the effects of competitive institutions on moral be-
havior by providing insights into the power and the limits
of the replacement excuse.
This chapter is based on joint work with Björn Bartling. Please cite as Bartling, Björn
and Yagiz Özdemir (2016). "The Limits to Moral Erosion in Markets: Social Norms
and the Replacement Excuse." Working Paper.
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If we want to stop the defence
industry operating in this country
we can do so, and the result
incidentally will be that someone
else supplies the arms that we
supply.
Tony Blair (2002)
3.1 introduction
One of the founders of the Chicago school, Frank H. Knight (1923),
wrote in an early paper that “it must be conceded that the lines along
which a competitive economic order tends to form character are of-
ten far from being ethically ideal” (p. 591). The possibility that com-
petitive markets erode moral standards is debated ever since (e. g.
Bartling, Weber, and Yao, 2015; Bowles, 1998; Falk and Szech, 2013;
Sandel, 2012; Shleifer, 2004), but evidence on the causal effect of be-
ing in a competitive environment on moral behavior is still scarce. In
this paper, we study a key feature of competitive markets: the possi-
ble replacement of the omission of a profitable but unethical business
transaction by a less scrupulous competitor. The replacement excuse,
that is, the argument that “if I don’t do it, someone else will,” has
intuitive appeal and it might lead market actors to leave behind their
moral standards. Tony Blair for instance, then UK’s prime minister,
justified controversial arms exports in the above quotation by saying
(probably correctly) that someone else would have stepped in, had
not the UK supplied the arms.
From the point of view of consequentialist or utilitarian ethics, the
replacement argument provides justification for any action because it
is only outcomes that matter for ethical assessment. Given that some
outcome is going to result anyway (say, an authoritarian regime re-
ceives arms), taking the action leading to it (delivering the arms) does
not change or worsen the outcome; hence, it is not ethically wrong.
Deontological ethics, in contrast, judges an action with respect to its
adherence to a rule or principle. The fact that an undesirable outcome
will come about anyway (the regime in possession of the arms) does
not render the action that actually implements the outcome ethically
right: “If we accept this as a justification, it is hard to see what acts,
however otherwise wicked, could not be defended in the same way”
(Glover and Scott-Taggart, 1975). In this paper, we take an empirical
approach – looking at actual behavior of economic actors instead of
making normative statements – and study experimentally when the
replacement excuse undermines moral behavior and when it does
not.
Studying if inherent features of competitive markets, such as the
possible replacement of one firm’s ethical course of action by a less
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conscientious competitor, lead all market participants to abandon
their moral behaviors is of increasing importance because the “reach
of markets, and market-oriented thinking, into aspects of life tradi-
tionally governed by nonmarket norms is one of the most significant
developments of our time” (Sandel, 2012, p. 7). If competitive mar-
kets do not only efficiently (at best) allocate goods and services but
also, as a side effect, crowd out morals, then the traditional economic
analysis of the welfare properties of market mechanisms – focusing
on allocative efficiency under the assumption of given preferences –
will be incomplete and prone to resulting in misguided policy advice.
Our leading example on arms trade might suggest that competition
generally undermines ethical behavior because a single ruthless com-
petitor (or latent market entry of such a competitor) suffices to trigger
the replacement excuse. But behavior consistent with ethical conduct
is often observed in competitive markets. Financial services firms that
are dedicated to ethical investment strategies – thereby foregoing po-
tentially more profitable investments in, say, arms manufacturers, to-
bacco, or fracking – can serve as example (e. g. Sparkes and Cowton,
2004). However, with field data it is difficult to separate true corpo-
rate social concern from reputational incentives or from being driven
by consumer demand. Observed ethical business practices can thus
be compatible with the goal of profit-maximization (e. g. Aupperle,
Carroll, and Hatfield, 1985; Porter and Kramer, 2006; Sauer, 1997).
Likewise, consumers investing in ethical funds might hold the belief
that these investments are more sustainable and perform better in the
long-run. This renders it difficult to identify moral behaviors with nat-
urally occurring field data and to study when the replacement excuse
weakens or eliminates moral behaviors and when it does not. An ex-
perimental approach allows studying this question while controlling
for confounding factors.
In this paper, we seek to identify one fundamental mechanism that
determines when people use the replacement excuse, i.e. when they
take actions (such as selling arms to an authoritarian regime) that
they would not take absent possible replacement by a competitor and
when they refrain from these actions, even if it is likely that a com-
petitor will step in (and sell the arms instead). In particular, we test
the hypothesis that not only outcomes matter for a player’s utility but
also her actions. If only outcomes mattered, an economic actor would
always prefer to make a profitable but unethical business transaction
himself rather than let someone else make that transaction. Clearly,
own profits are higher, while other dimensions of the outcome space
(the regime in possession of the arms) are unchanged. But if peo-
ple also derive (dis)utility from their actions (being the person who
sells the arms), then an economic actor will not necessarily make the
transaction, even if refraining from it will make no difference – ex-
cept that someone else is enjoying the monetary gains from trans-
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acting. More specifically, we test the hypothesis that people incur a
utility loss from taking an action that does not conform to the pre-
vailing social norms of acceptable and moral behavior (e. g. Krupka
and Weber, 2013; Lindbeck, 1997; López-Pérez, 2008). The source of
this utility cost can be driven by self-image or identity concerns (e. g.
Akerlof and Kranton, 2000, 2005; Bénabou and Tirole, 2004, 2006; Bod-
ner and Prelec, 2003; Köszegi, 2006; Mazar, Amir, and Ariely, 2008),
social image concerns (e. g. Akerlof, 1980; Andreoni and Bernheim,
2009; Ariely, Bracha, and Meier, 2009; Bernheim, 1994), or the “cold
prickle,” rather than the “warm glow,” of taking an action that does
not conform the prevailing social norms (Andreoni, 1989, 1990, 1995).
Hence, even if an unethical outcome is likely to come about anyway,
a “principled” economic actor might not want to be the person who
actually implements the unethical outcome – provided the applicable
social norm is strong. Principled economic actors thus do not neces-
sarily fall prey to the replacement “logic”. The possibility that peo-
ple experience a disutility from breaking social norms of proper and
moral behavior thus constitutes a potentially powerful mechanism
that limits the extent to which the replacement excuse undermines
moral behavior in competitive environments.
We find that subjects do not follow the replacement excuse if the
prevailing social norm classifies the underlying action as inconsistent
with moral behavior. In these cases many subjects do not take the
action, even if its omission will probably be replaced by someone else,
so that the immoral outcome will be induced nevertheless. However,
many subjects who would not take the action if its omission could
not be replaced take the action under the shadow of replacement
if no mutual understanding exists whether the underlying action is
consistent or inconsistent with moral behavior. Our results enhance
our understanding of the effects of competitive institutions on moral
behavior by providing insights into the power and the limits of the
replacement excuse.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 de-
scribes the experimental design of our donation games and presents
the main result on the absence of the replacement effect when a clear
social norm regarding appropriate moral behavior exists. Section 3.3
reports data from a series of simple take games and provides repli-
cations of our main result. Section 3.4 analyzes data from ultimatum
games with responder competition and shows that the replacement
excuse is effective in this class of games, where no social norm exists
with respect to responder behavior. Section 3.5 concludes.
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3.2 donation game
Experimental Design
We study the effect of the availability of the replacement excuse on
moral behavior in a simple donation game. Subjects make a binary
choice between either receiving a payment of 20 CHF (about 21 USD)
or having the experimenter transfer 60 CHF to FAIRMED, a Swiss
charity, to finance the surgery of a leprosy patient in India. The ex-
perimental instructions provided basic facts about the donation. Sub-
jects were informed that leprosy is an infectious disease that causes
damage of nerve cells and blockage of arteries and veins, which can
lead to bodily disfigurement. Although the disease can be cured with
medical treatment, many leprosy victims suffer from a high degree
of stigmatization due to disfigurement. Often small surgical interven-
tions can significantly reduce the scope of disfigurement. Almost 60
percent of the global leprosy cases occur in India. Due to the preva-
lence of poverty, funding an operation – which would allow for a life
in dignity – is not possible for most of the victims with disfigurement.
We conducted two experimental conditions of the donation game.
The baseline condition is an individual decision task. A subject (player
1) makes the individual decision to either take 20 CHF or having
the experimenter finance the surgery. The replacement condition is a
three-player game. Subjects are randomly placed into groups of three
and assigned the role of either player 1, 2, or 3. At most one player
can take the 20 CHF and at most one surgery is financed per group.
Players decide sequentially whether to take the 20 CHF or not. If a
player decides to take the 20 CHF, the surgery is not financed and the
game ends. The surgery is thus financed only if first player 1, then
player 2, and finally player 3 forgo to take the 20 CHF.1 Figure 3.1
shows the extensive form of the two conditions.
We also checked whether subjects perceived the decision between
money and surgery as a moral decision – after all, we are interested
in studying the effect of the replacement excuse on moral behavior.
To measure if the donation game has a moral dimension, we elicited
the social norm that applies to the decision to take the money, using a
coordination game as measurement tool (e. g. Houser and Xiao, 2011;
Krupka and Weber, 2013). We implemented a between-subjects de-
sign and asked subjects, either for the baseline condition or for the
replacement condition, whether player 1’s choice to take the 20 CHF
would be rated by most people as “socially appropriate” and “con-
sistent with moral or proper social behavior,” or as “socially inappro-
priate” and “inconsistent with moral or proper social behavior,” or
1 We used the strategy method for players 2 and 3 and asked them to indicate whether
they would take the money if they could make a choice, that is, if the preceding
player(s) has not taken the money already.
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Figure 3.1: Donation game
as “neutral”.2 We asked subjects to rate the appropriateness of the
choice to take the money on a five-point scale ranging from “very
socially inappropriate” and “somewhat socially inappropriate,” over
“neutral”, to “somewhat socially inappropriate” and “very socially
inappropriate”.3 Importantly, we did not ask subjects to provide the
rating they believe to be “right” but the rating they believe will be the
most frequently chosen one by the other subjects in the session. Sub-
jects received the instructions and control questions for the respective
condition of the donation game. But instead of making the choice be-
tween money and surgery, we asked subjects to provide their guesses
about the most frequently given response. Subjects received a bonus
of 10 CHF if their guesses matched the modal response.
Procedural Details
All sessions took place at the decision laboratory of the Department
of Economics at the University of Zurich. We implemented the study
with z-Tree and h-Root (Bock, Baetge, and Nicklisch, 2014; Fisch-
bacher, 2007). In total 432 subjects participated in the study. Subjects
were mainly students from the University of Zurich and the ETH
Zurich. We conducted eight sessions of the donation game, with 67
subjects in the baseline condition and 177 subjects, i.e., 59 in each role,
in the replacement condition. Sessions lasted about 45 minutes and
subjects earned on average CHF 19.75, including a show-up fee of 15
2 Since our main interest is the choices of players 1, we only measure the norm that
applies to player 1’s decision.
3 The design follows closely the study by Krupka and Weber (2013), except that we
added the neutral response option.
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CHF. We elicited beliefs and norms at the end of other unrelated ex-
perimental sessions. No subject participated in our study more than
once. We have 62 observations for the measurement of the social norm
for each of the two conditions and elicited beliefs in the replacement
condition from 64 subjects. These measurements took about 15 min-
utes and subjects earned on average 4.10 CHF. The experimental in-
structions for all games and measurements are in the appendix.
Hypothesis
The key feature of the experimental design is that player 1’s decision
to forgo the 20 CHF cannot be replaced in the baseline condition but it
can be replaced by either player 2 or, if not by player 2, then by player
3 in the replacement condition. The design thus allows studying the
effect of the replacement excuse by comparing the fraction of players
1 who take the money (“take-rate”) in the baseline condition to the
fraction of players 1who take the money in the replacement condition.
This gives rise to our main hypothesis:
hypothesis 1 (replacement excuse erodes morality in the
donation game): The fraction of players 1 who take the money is
higher in the replacement condition than in the baseline condition.
Results
Panel a of Figure 3.2 shows that the take-rates of players 1 are al-
most identical in the baseline condition and in the replacement con-
dition, 23.9 percent (16 of 67) and 25.4 percent (15 of 59), respectively
(p=0.502, Fischer exact test, one-sided). We observe these data despite
the fact the replacement probability increases from 0 (by design) in
the baseline condition to 0.51 in the replacement condition. The take-
rates of players 2 and 3 in the replacement condition are of the same
size, 30.5 percent (18 of 59) and 28.8 percent (17 of 59), respectively. A
Pearson’s chi squared test confirms that we cannot reject that the take-
rate is identical across both conditions and all player types (p=0.832).
Note that players 2 could make use of the replacement excuse as well,
as their choice to forgo the 20 CHF can be replaced by player 3. In
contrast, the choice of players 3 to forgo taking the money cannot be
replaced – as is the case for players 1 in the baseline condition.
To exclude the possibility that our experimental treatment is inef-
fective, we provide a manipulation check and measure whether sub-
jects in the replacement condition indeed believe that the replacement
probability for player 1 is positive. We find that at least 75 percent
of subjects state a strictly positive belief.4 Hence, the large majority
4 25 percent of subjects stated belief of 5 percent, which could reflect a true belief of 0
percent because subjects receive a bonus of 10 CHF if their stated belief is within 5
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Figure 3.2: Take rates and social norms in the donation game
Note: a) The bars show the fraction of first movers in the donation game who took
the money in the baseline and the replacement condition. B1/1 denotes player 1
in the baseline condition, and B1/3 denotes player 1 in the replacement condition.
Error bars depict 95% confidence intervals. The dotted line shows the empirical
probability that at least one of the subsequent players takes the money if the first
mover does not take it. b) This figure shows the distribution of norm ratings for
the decision of a first mover to take the money. The ratings are pooled across the
baseline and the replacement condition. The ratings are coded as follows: -2 “very
socially inappropriate”, -1 “somewhat socially inappropriate”, 0 “neutral: neither
socially inappropriate nor socially appropriate, 1 “somewhat socially appropriate”,
2 “very socially appropriate”.
of subjects in our belief elicitation task expect that player 1’s deci-
sion to forgo taking the money will be replaced with strictly positive
probability. Subjects however tend to underestimate the replacement
probability; the average belief is 0.23, while the true value is 0.51. We
summarize our findings in our first result.
result 1 (moral steadfastness in the donation game):
Subjects do not use the replacement excuse in the donation game. The pos-
sibility that a player’s decision to forgo taking the money can be replaced
by subsequent players in the replacement condition does not result in take-
percentage points of the true value. The observation that none of the subjects stated
a belief of 0 indicates that subjects understood the incentive structure.
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rates that are different from the baseline condition, where replacement is not
possible.
We finally verify that the choice between taking 20 CHF and en-
abling a leprosy surgery in India is indeed perceived as a moral de-
cision. Panel b of Figure 3.2 displays the results of the elicitation of
the social norm that applies to taking the money, pooled across both
conditions. The rating ranges from “very socially inappropriate” over
“neutral” to “very social appropriate.” Averaged over both conditions,
97.6 percent of the subjects rate the decision to take the money as
either “somewhat socially inappropriate” or “very socially inappro-
priate.” The latter is the modal choice in both conditions. No subject
chose “somewhat” or “very socially appropriate” in either condition.
The distribution of the ratings is virtually identical in both conditions
(p=0.7951, Mann Whitney U test). We summarize the measurement
of the social norm in the following.
result 2 (donation game has moral dimension): A strong
social norm exists that taking 20 CHF, instead of enabling a leprosy surgery
in India, is inconsistent with moral and proper behavior. Almost all subjects
rate the decision to take the money as either “somewhat socially inappropri-
ate” or “very socially inappropriate” in both experimental conditions.
In summary, our data show that subjects do not make use of the
replacement excuse in our donation game, where a strong social norm
exists that taking the 20 CHF is inconsistent with proper and moral
behavior. The replacement excuse – that is, the argument that taking
the money does not make a difference because a subsequent player is
likely to take the money anyway – does not affect the subjects’ take-
rate. These data show that competitive institutions and the associated
replacement excuse do not necessarily lead to moral erosion.
3.3 take games with and without punishment
Our Result 1, the nonexistence of the replacement effect in the do-
nation game, challenges often-held intuitions. For example, Falk and
Szech (2013) write: “This ‘replacement’ logic is a common feature of
markets, and it is therefore not surprising that the rhetoric of traders
often appeals to the phrase that ‘if I don’t buy or sell, someone else
will’” (p. 710). In the following, we analyze behavior in a different
game, with a different subject pool and with different stake sizes to
provide robustness checks of our main finding as summarized in Re-
sult 1. We want to rule out the possibility that behavior in the dona-
tion game is an exception, driven, for instance, by an exceptionally
strong social norm that taking the 20 CHF and thereby defeating the
leprosy surgery is inconsistent with moral behavior.
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Experimental Design
We conducted a series of simple take games to revisit the question
whether the replacement excuse affects moral behavior.
• Take Game 1 (TG-1) consists of two players: A and B1, who both
start with an endowment of 0.5 USD. Player B1 makes the bi-
nary choice to either take away 0.4 USD from player A or to re-
frain from doing so. Player A cannot take an action. If B1 takes
the money, player A’s payoff is 0.1 USD and player B1’s payoff
is 0.9 USD. If B1 does not take the money both players receive
their endowments of 0.5 USD.
• Take Game 2 (TG-2) is identical to TG-1 but consists of three
players: A, B1, and B2, who all have endowments of 0.5 USD.
First, B1 can take away 0.4 USD from A. If B1 does not take the
0.4 USD, then B2 can do so.
• Take Game 3 (TG-3) is different only in that it consists of four
players: A, B1, B2, and B3. If neither B1 nor B2 takes the money,
B3 can finally do so.
The important feature of the experimental manipulation of the take
game is the variation of the number of players who can replace player
B1’s decision to forgo taking the money from player A, i.e., the varia-
tion of the replacement probability. Studying the take-rates of players
B1 in conditions TG-1, TG-2, and TG-3 thus allow for a first robust-
ness check of Result 1.
Moreover, we ran three additional conditions of the take games
that feature a punishment option for player A. The take games with
punishment, TGwP-1, TGwP-2, and TGwP-3, are identical to TG-1, TG-
2, and TG-3, respectively, except that player A can spend up to 0.05
USD of her payoff to punish a player B, if that player B took away
the money. For each 0.01 UDS spent by player A, the payoff of the
targeted player B decreases by 0.1 USD. Players B who do not take
away money from player A cannot be punished.5
Adding a punishment option for player A serves two goals. First,
the take games with punishment provide for a second robustness
check of Result 1, in a design where taking the money from player
A is less attractive in expectation. Second, the punishment data al-
low studying whether the replacement excuse provides “moral abso-
lution” from the viewpoint of the victim. In TGwP-3, for example,
do players A consider B1 less worthy of punishment for taking the
5 We used the strategy method for players B2 and B3, in both the conditions with
and without punishment, and asked them to indicate whether they would take the
money if they could make a choice. We also used the strategy method for players
A in the treatments with punishment. For instance, player A in TGwP-3 made three
punishment decisions, one for each player B who could take away the money.
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money than players B3 because the possibility of replacement excuses
players B1?
As a manipulation check of the effectiveness of our experimental
conditions in the take game, we measured the beliefs that B1’s deci-
sion to forgo taking the money will be replaced by B2 in TG-2 or by
B2 or B3 in TG-3, respectively. Furthermore, to verify that behavior
in the take game has a moral dimension, we elicited the social norms
that apply to B1’s decision to take the money from A in each of the
three conditions TG-1, TG-2, and TG-3 separately. We used the same
methods as in the donation game to measure these beliefs and social
norms.6
Procedural Details
Subjects were recruited on Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk), an on-
line marketplace for tasks requiring human intelligence (see, e. g.,
Buhrmester, Kwang, and Gosling, 2011; Horton, Rand, and Zeck-
hauser, 2011). Participation was restricted to U.S. MTurkers with at
least 500 completed assignments and minimum approval rating of 95
percent. We implemented the study with the software o-Tree (Chen,
Schonger, and Wickens, 2016). MTurkers who clicked the link to our
study were randomized into a condition and role of the take game or
into one of the other measurement tasks. We controlled the subjects’
understanding of the instructions by asking a set of test questions.
Subjects were excluded if they could not provide correct answers
within two attempts. All experimental instructions and test questions
are in the appendix. Overall, 2’486MTurkers participated, i.e., passed
the test questions. Table 3.1 shows the number of observations for
all conditions and measurement tasks separately. Subject could par-
ticipate only once. Each subject received a fixed payment of 0.50 USD
and earned a variable payoff on top. The variable payment in the take
games depends on the choices of players B and, if applicable, the pun-
ishment behavior of players A. Subjects in the belief or norm measure-
ment tasks earned 3 USD on top if their guesses of the norm matched
the modal response or if their guesses of the replacement probability
were not further away than 5 percentage points from the true value,
respectively. On average, the MTurkers received a total payment of
1.07 USD and took about 6minutes to complete the study, translating
to an average hourly rate of about 10.70 USD.
6 We did not measure beliefs and social norms in the conditions with punishment
to economize on subjects. No apparent reason exists why a different social norm
applies in the treatments with punishment or why the experimental manipulation of
adding additional players B works differently when a punishment option for player
A is present.
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condition role additional measures
A B1 B2 B3 Norms Beliefs
TG-1 126 126 - - 126 -
TG-2 108 108 108 - 110 104
TG-3 108 108 108 108 100 104
TGwP-1 101 101 - - - -
TGwP-2 112 112 112 - - -
TGwP-3 100 100 100 100 - -
Table 3.1: Number of observations in take game
Hypotheses
Equivalent to the donation games, the key feature of the take games
is that player B1’s decision not to take the 0.4 USD from player A
cannot be replaced in TG-1 and TGwP-1, while it can be replaced
by players B2, or B3, in the conditions with replacement. The design
thus allows for two separate tests of the effect of the replacement
excuse by comparing the take-rate of players B1 in TG-1 and TGwP-1
to the take-rates of players B1 in the conditions with replacement.7
This gives rise to the following hypothesis:
hypothesis 2 (replacement excuse erodes morality in the
take games): The fraction of players B1 who take the money from
player A, both with and without punishment, is higher in the conditions
with replacement than in the conditions without replacement.
The punishment pattern allows for a second, complementary test of
whether individuals apply the replacement excuse. Players B might
be the less worthy of punishment for taking money from player A
the larger the probability that the alternative choice to not take the
money will be replaced by a subsequent player B. This gives rise to
the next hypothesis:
hypothesis 3 (replacement excuse deflects punishment):
Players B1 are punished less by players A for taking the money than players
B2, or B3, in the respective conditions with replacement.
7 In the appendix we show that the outcome-based, i.e., consequentialist, social pref-
erence model of Fehr and Schmidt (1999) predicts that the take-rate of players B1 is
higher in conditions TG-2 and TG-3 than in condition TG-1.
3.3 take games with and without punishment 41
Results
We report the data from the take games without punishment first.
Panel a of Figure 3.3 shows that the take-rates of players B1 are very
similar in all three conditions, 68.3 percent (86 of 126) in TG-1, 63.9
percent (69 of 108) in TG-2, and 60.2 percent (65 of 108) in TG-3. If
anything, the take-rates are lower in TG-2 and TG-3 than in TG-1,
but these differences are not significant (p=0.435, Pearson’s chi-square
test). These take-rates arise even though the replacement probability
increases from 0 (by design) in TG-1 to 0.69 in TG-2 and 0.89 in TG-3.
The take-rates of players B2 in TG-2 and of players B2 and B3 in TG-3
are equally similar, 68.5 percent (74 of 108), 67.6 percent (73 of 108),
and 64.8 percent (70 of 108), respectively. We cannot reject that the
decisions of players B in all conditions without punishment and in
all roles originate from the same distribution (p=0.355, Pearson’s chi
square test).
The manipulation check reveals that 98.1 percent (102 of 104) and
96.0 percent (96 of 100) of the subjects believe that the replacement
probability for player B1 is strictly positive in TG-2 and TG-3, respec-
tively.8 The average belief in TG-2, 0.61, is relatively close to the true
value, 0.69. However, as in the replacement condition of the donation
game, on average subjects underestimate the replacement probability
in TG-3. The average belief in TG-3 is 0.65, while the true value is
0.89. Condition TG-3 and the replacement condition of the donation
game have in common that two subjects can replace the first-mover’s
decision and it appears more challenging, both for students in the
subject pool in Zurich and for MTurkers in the U.S., to estimate the
replacement probability in these cases. Nevertheless, our manipula-
tion checks clearly show that the absence of the replacement effect is
not driven by unreasonable beliefs about the replacement probability.
In particular, even though replacement beliefs are much higher in the
take-games than in the donation game, the result that subjects do not
make use of the replacement excuse, first generated in the donation
8 Only 2 of 204 subjects stated a belief of less than 5 percent, which indicates that
the vast majority of MTurkers understood the incentive structure. 4 subjects stated a
belief of 5 percent, which could reflect a true belief of 0 percent.
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Figure 3.3: Take rates and social norms in the take game
Note: a) The bars show the fraction of first movers in TG-1, TG-2, and TG3 who
took the money. B1/1 denotes player 1 in TG-1, B1/2 player 1 in TG-2, and B1/3
player 1 in TG-3. Error bars depict 95% confidence intervals. The dotted line shows
the empirical probability that at least one of the subsequent players takes the money
if the first mover does not take it. b) This figure shows the distribution of norm
ratings for the decision of a first mover to take the money. The ratings are pooled
across TG-1, TG-2, and TG-3. The ratings are coded as follows: -2 “very socially
inappropriate”, -1 “somewhat socially inappropriate”, 0 “neutral: neither socially
inappropriate nor socially appropriate, 1 “somewhat socially appropriate”, 2 “very
socially appropriate”.
game, is replicated in the take-games.9 We summarize this finding in
the following.
9 Note that the number of players is not constant between our conditions with and
without replacement. In our take games, for example, B1 might take the money
from A in TG-1, where no other B can observe her choice, but not in TG-2 or TG-3,
where her choice is observed by one or two other Bs. If B1 is sensitive to the size
of the “audience,” this could lead to lower take-rates in TG-2 or TG-3 than in TG-1.
However, interactions on MTurk are highly anonymous, rendering it unreasonable
that MTurkers care about their “social image” given that the identities of the interact-
ing MTurkers are unknown and subjects are geographically dispersed across the U.S.
Nevertheless, to exclude the existence of an “audience effect” we conducted a control
condition that is identical to TG-1, except that two passive “spectators” are added,
each receiving 0.5 USD and getting informed about B1’s decision. We collected 107
novel observations for B1 in TG-1 and 109 observations for B1 in the condition with
spectators, thus 650 MTurkers participated in the control study in total. The exper-
imental instructions are in the appendix. We find that the take-rates of B1s are not
significantly different with and without spectators, 56.9 percent (62 of 109) and 61.7
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result 3 (moral steadfastness in the take games with-
out punishment): Subjects do not use the replacement excuse in the
take game. The possibility that subsequent players B can replace an earlier
player B’s decision not to take the money from player A does not affect take-
rates.
Next we validate that players B face a moral decision in the take
games. Panel b of Figure 3.3 shows the distribution of the social
norm evaluations pooled across the three conditions of the take game
without punishment. In total, 82 percent of the subjects thought that
player B’s decision to take the money from player A is either “very
socially inappropriate” or “somewhat socially inappropriate”. The
modal response is “somewhat socially inappropriate,” chosen by 46
percent of subjects. There is no significant difference in the norm rat-
ings between TG-1, TG-2, and TG-3 (Kruskal-Wallis test, H(2)=3.911,
p=0.141). Hence, as in the donation game, the possibility that the al-
ternative choice of not taking the money can be replaced in TG-2 and
TG-3 does not decrease the social inappropriateness of the decision
to take the money. This is summarized in the following.
result 4 (take games have moral dimension): There is a
clear social norm that taking away money from player A in the take games
is inconsistent with proper and moral behavior. More than 80 percent of
subjects rate the decision to take the money as either “somewhat socially
inappropriate” or “very socially inappropriate”.
Finally, we report the data from the take games with punishment.
First, the take-rates of players B1 are very similar in all three condi-
tions, 36.6 percent (37 of 101) in TGwP-1, 32.1 percent (36 of 112) in
TGwP-2, and 25.0 percent (25 of 100) in TGwP-3. Again, if anything,
the take-rates are lower in conditions TGwP-2 and TGwP-3 than in
TGwP-1, but these differences are not significant (p=0.200, Pearson’s
chi-square test). We obtain this result even though the replacement
probability increases from 0 (by design) in TGwP-1 to 0.29 in TGwP-
2, and to 0.47 in TGwP-3. The take-rates of players B2 in TGwP-2 and
of players B2 and B3 in TGwP-3 are very similar, 29.5 percent (33 of
112), 28.0 percent (28 of 100), and 27.0 percent (27 of 100), respectively.
We cannot reject that the decisions of players B in all three conditions
with punishment and in all roles originate from the same distribu-
tion (p=0.235, Pearson’s chi square test). We summarize the second
replication of Result 1 as follows.
result 5 (moral steadfastness in the take games with
punishment): Subjects do not use the replacement excuse in the take
game with punishment.
percent (66 of 107), respectively (p=0.281, Fischer exact test, one-sided). We conclude
that audience effects do not affect our results.
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The second observation that can be made is that the threat of pun-
ishment significantly reduces the take-rate compared to the treat-
ments without punishment (p<0.001 for all possible bilateral compar-
isons, Fisher exact test, one sided). While this finding is not surpris-
ing as such, it proofs that the MTurkers react sensibly to incentives.
Hence, the absence of the replacement effect in our take games is
not driven by a general insensitivity of MTurkers to our experimental
variations.
We finally analyze the punishment behavior of players A, which
allows for a different test of whether individuals use the replacement
excuse. Specifically, do players A accept possible replacement as an
excuse for selfish behavior by players B? The data show that this is not
the case. In condition TGwP-2, B1 and B2 were punished at almost
identical levels, leading to an average punishment spending of 0.026
USD for both types of players B. In condition TGwP-2, the average
amount spent for the punishment of B1, B2, and B3 amounts to 0.019,
0.019, and 0.021 USD, respectively (p=0.827, Friedman test). That is,
within the different conditions, players A do not account for the re-
placement excuse when they make their punishment choices. This
finding is consistent with our previous results showing that the pos-
sibility of replacement does neither affect take-rates nor social norms.
We summarize the punishment data in the following.10
result 6 (replacement excuse does not deflect punish-
ment): All players B are punished equally for taking away the money
from player A within our experimental conditions. That is, taking away the
money is not excused by the argument that the alternative choice not to take
away the money might be replaced.
3.4 ultimatum games with responder competition
Research on ultimatum games has shown that responders are more
likely to accept an unfair offer if there are other responders who could
replace the decision to reject the offer (Fischbacher, Fong, and Fehr,
2009; Grosskopf, 2003). Hence, the force of the replacement excuse
seems to apply for responder behavior in ultimatum games. How-
ever, ultimatum games with responder competition are only appro-
priate to study moral behavior in markets if responders actually face
a moral decision. In this section we show empirically that actions of
responders who respond to unfair offers are not subject to prevailing
social norms. We replicate the reaction of responders to competition
in a version of the ultimatum game with responder competition that
10 The average spending for punishment of selfish players B1 in TGwP-1 is 0.029 USD.
Average punishment thus appears to be lower in conditions with a larger number of
players B, but averaged over all players B only the difference between punishment
spending in TGwP-1 and TGwP-3 is significant (p=0.007, Mann-Whitney U test).
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is comparable to the take game with respect to its structure, complex-
ity, and underlying subject pool, and measure the social norm for a
responder’s decision to accept an unequal offer.
Experimental Design
To approximate the complexity of the take game, we consider a sim-
ple ultimatum game, where a pie of 1 USD can be split between a
proposer, player A, and a responder, player B. We manipulate the
probability that a responder´s decision to reject an unfair offer is re-
placed by another responder in a series of three conditions.
• In the Ultimatum Game 1 (UG-1) there is only a single responder,
player B. First, player A decides whether to implement the equal
split or to offer an unequal split, keeping 90 percent of the share.
If player A chooses the equal split, the game ends and both
player A and player B receive 0.5USD each. If player A offers the
unequal split, player B decides whether to accept or to reject the
offer. If player B accepts the offer, the two players receive their
respective shares; i.e., player B receives 10 percent and player
A receives 90 percent. If player B rejects the offer, both players
receive a payoff of zero.
• In theUltimatum Game 2 (UG-2), there are two responders, player
B1 and player B2. If player A chooses the equal split, the game
ends, player A and player B receive 0.5 USD each and player
B2 receives nothing. If player A offers the unequal split, player
B1 moves first and can either reject or accept the offer. If player
B1 rejects the unequal offer player B2 can accept the offer and
thereby replace the decision of player B1 to reject. If both player
B1 and player B2 reject the unequal offer, all players receive a
payoff of zero and the equal distribution is implemented. If one
of the responders, player B1 or player B2, accepts the unequal
offer, player A receives 90 percent of the share, the accepting
responder receives 10 percent of the share, and the other re-
sponder receives nothing.
• In the Ultimatum Game 3 (UG-3), the chain of players B1 and B2
is extended by player B3, who can accept the unequal offer if
both player B1 and player B2 reject it.
For each treatment we measure the social norm associated with
B1’s decision to accept an unequal offer. Moreover, we measure the
social norm for A’s decision to offer the unequal split and the beliefs
about the probability that B1will be replaced (i.e. one of the following
responders accepts the offer) in UG-2 and UG-3. We use the same
tools for measuring social norms and beliefs as we used in the take
game and the donation game.
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To rule out that social norms elicited on MTurk are unique to the
particular subject pool, we also measure social norms for responder
behavior in the lab, based on a version of the ultimatum game with
responder competition that has already been studied in previous re-
search. In the experimental setup of Fischbacher, Fong, and Fehr
(2009) a proposer offers an integer share of total surplus of 100money
units. In the baseline condition there is only a single responder who
can either accept or reject the offer. If the offer is accepted, both play-
ers receive their respective shares. If the offer is rejected, both players
receive a payoff of zero. In the competition treatments at least two
responders decide simultaneously whether to accept or reject the of-
fer. If more than one responder accepts the offer, the responder who
receives the share is randomly determined. If only one responder
accepts the offer, the proposer and the accepting responder receive
their respective shares. If all responders reject the offer, all players
end up with a payoff of zero. Fischbacher, Fong, and Fehr (2009) find
that acceptance rates of unfair offers are significantly higher in the
competition treatments than in the baseline condition without com-
petition. For example, if a proposer offers 10 percent of the total sur-
plus, 80 percent of responders in the baseline condition reject the of-
fer. However, in the competition treatment with two responders, only
55 percent of responders reject the same offer. Following the same
procedures as in the other treatments, we elicit social norms in both
the ultimatum game without competition and the ultimatum game
with two competing responders for accepting an offer of 10 percent.
Moreover, we measure the social norms for offering 10 percent as a
proposer in the baseline condition and the beliefs that a responder
will be replaced (i.e. the other responder decides to accept) given an
offer of 10 percent in the competition treatment. Subjects are always
presented the original instructions used by Fischbacher, Fong, and
Fehr (2009).
Procedural Details
General procedures for the ultimatum game closely follow those for
the take game. In total 1’784 subjects on MTurk participated and
earned on average 1.13 USD. Subjects participated only once in treat-
ments involving the ultimatum game.
The lab measures were taken at the decision laboratory of the De-
partment of Economics at the University of Zurich, as was the case
in the original study of Fischbacher, Fong, and Fehr (2009). The data
were collected within 15 minutes at the end of other experiments
that were unrelated to the ultimatum game. Subjects participated only
once in the treatments involving the ultimatum game and earned on
average 3.27 CHF in addition to their show-up fee and payoffs earned
from other parts of the respective session.
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Hypotheses
The treatment manipulation in the ultimatum game is centered on
the number of players who can replace the decision of B1 to reject
an unfair offer. UG-1 resembles a standard mini ultimatum game,
where the decision of B1 leads to a certain outcome. However, in UG-
2 (and UG-3) the decision of B1 to reject an unfair offer does not
necessarily reduce the payoff of A, since B2 (or B3) can accept the
unfair offer if B1 rejects it. Previous research has shown that in this
class of games responders react to competition by being more likely to
accept an unfair offer (Fischbacher, Fong, and Fehr, 2009; Grosskopf,
2003). Hence, we expect the following result:
hypothesis 4 (replaceability increases the acceptance
of unfair offers in the ultimatum game): The fraction of
players B1 who accept an unfair offer is higher in the conditions with replace-
ment, UG-2 and UG-3, than in the condition without replacement, UG-1.
In contrast to taking the money in the donation game or the take
game, the decision to accept an unfair offer in the ultimatum game
does not impose harm on another person. On the contrary, accepting
the offer maximizes the payoff of both player B1 and player A. More-
over, since there is no repeated public good setting, where the whole
group would potentially benefit from punishing a defector, we do not
expect to find a social norm that prescribes to punish a proposer who
offers an unequal split.
hypothesis 5 (accepting an unfair offer in the ultima-
tum game is not socially inappropriate): The modal re-
sponse to our social norm measure for the decision to accept an unfair offer
is "neutral: neither socially appropriate nor inappropriate".
Results
Panel a of Figure 3.4 compares the acceptance rate of unfair offers
and the respective replacement probabilities among the first movers
in UG-1, UG-2, and UG-3. Without competition, only 51.4 percent of
first mover responders accept an unfair offer; however, 73.6 percent of
such offers are accepted if another responder can replace the decision
of the first mover to reject the unfair offer (p=0.001, Fisher’s exact
test). The acceptance rate of unfair offers increases even further to
85.2 percent if there are two potential "replacers", an increase that
is significant with respect to responders in UG-1 (p<0.001, Fisher’s
exact test) and first mover responders in UG-2 (p=0.03, Fisher’s exact
test).
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Figure 3.4: Acceptance rates and social norms in the ultimatum game
Note: a) The bars show the fraction of first movers in UG-1, UG-2, and UG3 who
rejected the offer. B1/1 denotes player 1 in UG-1, B1/2 player 1 in UG-2, and B1/3
player 1 in UG-3. Error bars depict 95% confidence intervals. The dotted line shows
the empirical probability that at least one of the subsequent players accepts the offer
if the first mover rejects it. b) This figure shows the distribution of norm ratings for
the decision of a first mover to accept the offer. The ratings are pooled across UG-1,
UG-2, and UG-3. The ratings are coded as follows: -2 “very socially inappropriate”,
-1 “somewhat socially inappropriate”, 0 “neutral: neither socially inappropriate nor
socially appropriate, 1 “somewhat socially appropriate”, 2 “very socially appropri-
ate”.
result 7 : In the ultimatum game with responder competition, respon-
ders react to an increase in the replacement probability. The possibility that
subsequent responders can replace the decision to reject an unfair offer sig-
nificantly increases the rate at which unfair offers are accepted.
Panel b of Figure 3.4 shows the distribution of social norm eval-
uations for a responder’s decision to accept a 10 percent offer on
MTurk. Consistent with our findings in the donation game and the
take game, the social norms differ neither among UG-1, UG-2, and
UG-3 (H(2)=1.032, p=0.5968, Kruskal-Wallis test) nor between the ul-
timatum game without competition and the ultimatum game with
two competing responders in the lab (p=0.6904, Mann Whitney U
test). The distributions of the evaluations reveal that there is no mu-
tual understanding about what constitutes right conduct if someone
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has to respond to an unfair offer in the ultimatum game. In total,
71.6 percent of subjects on MTurk and 72.7 percent of subjects in the
lab choose either the neutral option or one of the options that eval-
uate the action as socially appropriate. The neutral option, chosen
by 33.6 percent of subjects on MTurk and 31.1 percent of subjects in
the lab, is the modal choice in both subject pools. The normalized
average ratings of 0.14 on MTurk and 0.25 in the lab are both close
to zero. The social norms on MTurk for responder behavior in the
ultimatum game do not differ from those in the lab (p=0.425, Mann
Whitney U test); however, the social norms on MTurk for responder
behavior are significantly different from those for dictator behavior
in the take game (p<0.0001, Mann Whitney U test). We can conclude
that responders do not seem to face a moral decision when they have
to respond to an unfair offer. Our results cast doubt on the hypothe-
sis that a meta-norm to punish norm violators causes costly punish-
ment behavior (e. g. Axelrod, 1986). However, our results are in line
with empirical evidence suggesting that the main motivation underly-
ing costly punishment behavior is a desire for retribution (Carlsmith,
2006; Crockett, Özdemir, and Fehr, 2014) or negative emotions, such
as anger, in general (Fehr and Gächter, 2002; Yamagishi et al., 2009).
However, unlike responder behavior, proposer behavior is subject
to prevailing social norms. 81.9 percent of subjects on MTurk and 69.5
percent of subjects in the lab rate the decision to make the unequal
offer as either very socially inappropriate or somewhat socially inap-
propriate. The modal response is “somewhat socially inappropriate”,
with 48.6 percent of subjects on MTurk and 45.8 percent of subjects in
the lab choosing this option. The evaluation of a proposer’s decision
to make an unequal offer does not depend on the number of respon-
ders (MTurk: H(2)=2.007, p=0.3665, Kruskal-Wallis test; Lab: p=0.816,
Mann Whitney U test), but differs significantly from the evaluation
of a responder’s decision to accept such an offer, both on MTurk
(p<0.0001, Mann Whitney U test) and in the lab (p<0.0001, Mann
Whitney U test).
result 8 : A social norm exists that proposing the unequal split in the
ultimatum game is inappropriate. However, there is no social norm that a
responder should reject an unfair offer. Only 28.4 percent of subjects on
MTurk and 27.3 percent of subjects in the lab evaluate the decision to accept
an unfair offer as either somewhat or very socially inappropriate, while the
modal choice in both subject pools is “neutral: neither socially appropriate
nor inappropriate”.
Like the beliefs in the take game, the beliefs in the ultimatum game
are highly dispersed and lead to an average belief of around 60 per-
cent in both treatments. The beliefs on MTurk are not significantly
different between the take game and ultimatum game in both TG-
2 with UG-2 (p=0.144, Mann Whitney U test) and TG-3 with UG-3
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(p=0.822, Mann Whitney U test). Hence, different beliefs are unlikely
to explain the different effects of the replacement probability on be-
havior between the take game and the ultimatum game.
3.5 conclusion
The replacement excuse, the argument that “if I don’t do it, someone
else will,” is a potentially powerful force leading to the erosion of
moral behavior in competitive markets. In this paper, we study the
replacement excuse in a large-scale series of laboratory and online
experiments with more than 5’800 subjects.
We find that the force of the replacement excuse depends on the
social norm associated with the underlying action, which we measure
by use of coordination games (Krupka and Weber, 2013). Subjects are
insensitive to the replacement excuse if a clear norm exists that the
underlying action is inconsistent with moral behavior. In these cases,
subjects behave as if they focus only on their own actions, not on
the ultimate outcomes. But if no mutual understanding exists about
what constitutes moral conduct, then subjects follow the replacement
argument. In these cases, subjects appear to be driven by the expected
outcome of an interaction, but not by their own actions, which can be
replaced. Our results provide novel insights into the effects of market
institutions on moral behaviors by showing the power but also the
limits of the replacement excuse.
It remains an open question whether social norms systematically
change when an action is taken in a market context as compared to
other institutions. Furthermore, we have not investigated the dynam-
ics of social norms when the replacement argument takes on extreme
values. Social norms might change discontinuously when replace-
ment becomes a certainty – for example because a possible “replacer”
has already made a binding decision. Some models of norm compli-
ance, like the one in López-Pérez (2008), predict a sudden change
in the social evaluation of an action once the replacement probability
reaches unity, since a decision path that leads to a fair outcome would
cease to exist. Further studying the impact of the replacement argu-
ment on moral behavior in markets, and more generally, studying
the impact of market institutions on moral behavior is an important
frontier in economics.
4
THE SUPER IOR ITY OF DECENTRAL IZAT ION IN
SOC IAL NORM ENFORCEMENT
abstract
In this paper we introduce private imperfect monitoring
and information acquisition to public goods games with
punishment and study the relative performance of differ-
ent social norm enforcement institutions in sustaining co-
operation. A comparison between centralized and decen-
tralized social norm enforcement reveals a tradeoff be-
tween Type I errors of punishment (sanctioning a cooper-
ator) and Type II errors of punishment (failing to sanction
a defector). Decentralization achieves significantly higher
cooperation rates than centralization, suggesting that cen-
tralized social norm enforcement institutions per se, with-
out being associated with other performance-enhancing
features, are not as effective as peer-to-peer punishment in-
stitutions in resolving social dilemmas. Moreover, we find
substantial demand for additional information about the
contribution decisions of other group members. By estab-
lishing a "standard of proof" before exerting punishment,
subjects reduce Type I errors of punishment, boosting coop-
eration rates as compared to an environment where costly
information acquisition is not possible.
This chapter is based on joint work with Ernst Fehr and Ivo Schurtenberger. Please
cite as Fehr, Ernst, Yagiz Özdemir, and Ivo Schurtenberger (2016). "The Superiority
of Decentralization in Social Norm Enforcement." Working Paper.
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4.1 introduction
Social dilemmas constitute one of the fundamental problems that so-
cieties need to solve to achieve efficient outcomes. According to Os-
trom (1998) “social dilemmas are found in all aspects of life, leading
to momentous decisions affecting war and peace as well as the mun-
dane relationships of keeping promises in everyday life” (p. 1). So-
cial dilemmas arise whenever it is a dominant strategy for agents to
make a socially defective choice, but everyone is better off if all agents
choose the socially cooperative alternative. A canonical example for a
social dilemma is the public goods game, where the social optimum
is achieved if all agents contribute to the public good, but each agent
has an incentive to free ride on the contributions of other group mem-
bers. Empirical research has shown that cooperation in public goods
games can be sustained if punishment options exist, even if they are
costly, since subjects are willing to bear costs to punish group mem-
bers who violate the social norm of conditional cooperation, whereas
cooperation typically breaks down if sanctioning mechanisms are not
available (Fehr and Gächter, 2000; Ostrom, Walker, and Gardner, 1992;
Yamagishi, 1986). The literature on social norm enforcement in pub-
lic goods games has largely been based on a simplifying assump-
tion about the underlying monitoring technology – the assumption
that all actions of other group members are perfectly observable be-
fore punishment decisions are made. Recently, this assumption has
been relaxed to allow for imperfect public signals about the contribu-
tion decisions of other subjects, leading to monitoring environments
where all agents receive identical noisy signals (Ambrus and Greiner,
2012, 2015; Fischer, Grechenig, and Meier, 2013; Grechenig, Nicklisch,
and Thöni, 2010; Nicklisch, Grechenig, and Thöni, 2015). However, a
single public record of an agent, providing identical information to
all observers, rarely exists in reality. Instead, monitoring is often pri-
vate in nature such that signals possibly differ among observers. In
this paper we experimentally study social norm enforcement in social
dilemma situations in a more realistic imperfect monitoring environ-
ment, where agents receive noisy private signals about the actions of
other group members.
In particular, we are interested in the implications of private imper-
fect monitoring for the relative effectiveness of different social norm
enforcement institutions in sustaining cooperation. Understanding
the effects of different punishment institutions on cooperation is im-
portant to better explain the emergence of particular sanctioning mech-
anisms and to help design effective social norm enforcement institu-
tions. For example, organizations can prioritize vertical control, where
superiors monitor the behavior of employees, or horizontal control,
where compliance with productivity targets and behavioral norms
is monitored by peers (e. g. McAllister, 1995). Using a public goods
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game, we compare a decentralized peer-to-peer punishment institu-
tion with a centralized punishment regime, where all sanctioning
power is concentrated in the hands of a single, randomly selected au-
thority. All group members, including the authority, receive a private
signal about the binary contribution decisions of each group member,
a signal that is with 90% probability true and with 10% probability
false. In the exogenous monitoring condition the amount of infor-
mation about the contribution decisions of other group members is
exogenously imposed, whereas in the endogenous monitoring treat-
ment agents can acquire additional pieces of information. To the best
of our knowledge, this paper is the first that introduces imperfect pri-
vate monitoring and the possibility to acquire further information in
the public goods game with punishment.
Our results suggest that an imperfect monitoring environment with
private signals has important implications for the relative perform-
ance of different social norm enforcement institutions. Decentraliza-
tion of punishment induces higher cooperation rates than centraliza-
tion, under both exogenous and endogenous private imperfect moni-
toring. The literature has suggested that centralization of punishment
might mitigate potential disadvantages of peer-to-peer punishment
regimes. First, decentralized punishment institutions can be prone
to antisocial punishment, i.e. the intentional punishment of coopera-
tors, rendering it difficult to sustain cooperation (Cinyabuguma, Page,
and Putterman, 2006; Gächter and Herrmann, 2009, 2011; Herrmann,
Thöni, and Gächter, 2008). Second, since agents in the decentralized
system have incentives to free-ride on the altruistic punishment deci-
sions of other agents (Fehr and Gächter, 2002), centralization might
mitigate the second order public good problem of punishment. Third,
coordinating the appropriate severity of sanctions might prove more
difficult in a decentralized than in a centralized regime. However,
empirical studies comparing decentralized and centralized punish-
ment institutions do not find evidence for a superior performance of
centralization in terms of cooperation rates (Fischer, Grechenig, and
Meier, 2013; O’Gorman, Henrich, and Van Vugt, 2009). We contribute
to the literature by showing that in a more realistic monitoring en-
vironment cooperation rates are higher when sanctioning power is
decentralized. Our findings imply that in order to achieve similar co-
operation rates as in a peer-to-peer punishment setting, centralized
punishment institutions need to be associated with additional fea-
tures that are potentially beneficial for cooperation, such as a com-
mitment to sanctioning rules (Andreoni and Gee, 2012; Putterman,
Tyran, and Kamei, 2011; Tyran and Feld, 2006) or the election of the
authority by group members (Baldassarri and Grossman, 2011).
Why does the decentralization of social norm enforcement lead to
higher cooperation rates than centralization in private imperfect mon-
itoring environments? Under private imperfect monitoring agents
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have to make punishment decisions based on noisy signals; hence,
punishment decisions are more susceptible to errors than in an en-
vironment with perfect information. We find that the choice of the
punishment institution involves a tradeoff between different types of
punishment error, the punishment of a cooperator (Type I error of
punishment) and the failure to punish a defector (Type II error of
punishment; see Dickson, Gordon, and Huber, 2009). While the cen-
tralized regime performs better at avoiding punishment of coopera-
tors, the decentralized institution is superior in sanctioning defectors.
In the decentralized institution both defectors and cooperators face
a higher probability of receiving punishment, but the punishment of
cooperators remains almost always mild. Our results show that the
benefits of reduced Type I error rates in the centralized punishment
institution on cooperation rates are outweighed by the benefits of
lower Type II error rates in the decentralized setting. The differing
relative advantages of the decentralized and the centralized sanction-
ing regimes with respect to the two types of punishment error are a
consequence of the underlying monitoring structure. To see how pri-
vate imperfect monitoring affects punishment error rates in the two
institutions, consider the simple case of exogenous imperfect moni-
toring, where each agent receives a single informative signal about
the contribution decision of each group member. Suppose agents are
only willing to exert punishment if they receive the signal “defector”.
Then, a given defector remains unpunished if all agents who have
punishment power and who are willing to punish norm violators re-
ceive a false signal about the defector. In the decentralized setting
there are potentially several agents who are willing punish a defector
and each of those agents must receive a false signal to let a defector es-
cape punishment. In contrast, a false signal received by the authority
about a defector is sufficient to induce a Type II error of punishment
in the centralized punishment institution. On the other hand, in the
decentralized institution cooperators face a higher likelihood of re-
ceiving punishment, because a cooperator remains unpunished only
if all peers receive a true signal about the action of the cooperator,
whereas in the centralized regime, a true signal received by the au-
thority suffices to avoid a Type I error of punishment. However, if
monitoring is public, the monitoring technology does not lead to an
asymmetry in the prevalence of Type I and Type II errors of punish-
ment between centralized and decentralized punishment institutions,
because all agents receive an identical public record.
In reality there are often possibilities to seek further information
about the actions of other group members before making punishment
decisions. Hence, we ask how the possibility to improve monitoring
accuracy by acquiring additional signals affects outcomes and behav-
ior. Understanding information acquisition behavior and its implica-
tions for cooperation in different social norm enforcement institutions
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is important, because the design of institutions not only shapes how
punishment is exerted, but also whether and at which costs it is pos-
sible to acquire further information about the actions of other group
members. For example, organizations can increase workflow trans-
parency, making it easier for employees to monitor the behavior of
peers. If monitoring is endogenous, we find substantial demand for
additional information about the actions of other group members. In
particular, there is a behavioral tendency to focus information acquisi-
tion primarily on agents who are signaled to be defectors. Therefore,
subjects are willing to bear additional costs to reduce the risk of sanc-
tioning a cooperator. By establishing a “standard of proof” before ex-
erting punishment agents significantly reduce the rate of Type I pun-
ishment errors under endogenous monitoring, boosting cooperation
rates as compared to an environment where additional information
cannot be acquired. The reduction in Type I error rates counteracts a
main weakness of the decentralized punishment institution, leading
to stable cooperation rates of around 90%.1
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 4.2
describes the experimental design, Section 4.3 shows the results of
the experiment, and Section 4.4 concludes.
4.2 experimental design
All treatments are based on a linear public goods game with punish-
ment, which is repeated for 25 periods. At the beginning of the exper-
iment subjects are randomly allocated into groups of five, each group
consisting of four Peers (P1-P4) and one Authority (A). Groups and
roles remain fixed throughout the experiment, but the identification
number of Ps is randomly assigned in each period to avoid reputation
effects.
1 The focus of information acquisition behavior on reducing Type I punishment errors
is consistent with the findings of Dickson, Gordon, and Huber (2009), who study
behavior in public goods games with centralized punishment in different monitoring
conditions. In their False Positives treatment, signals can only be inaccurate if the
underlying true decision is to cooperate, whereas in their False Negatives treatment,
signals can only be inaccurate if the true underlying decision is to defect. Dickson,
Gordon, and Huber (2009) find that, unlike in the False Negatives treatment, in
the False Positives Treatment authorities are reluctant to use punishment, because
they want to avoid the risk of punishing a cooperator. The reluctance to punish in
the False Positives treatment is highly detrimental for cooperation, since defectors
remain unpunished, leading to a so called "false positives trap". However, with a
signal accuracy of only 60%, the monitoring technology used in Dickson, Gordon,
and Huber (2009) delivers only very limited information to the authority, causing
high error probabilities of punishment. In our study, where the signal accuracy is
90%, subjects do not fall into a "false positives trap". Instead, they are willing to take
the risk of punishing a cooperator in order enforce cooperation. However, subjects
use opportunities to reduce the risk of Type I errors by acquiring further information
before punishing an alleged defector.
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institution
Decentralized Centralized
monitoring
Exogenous EX-DEC EX-CEN
Endogenous END-DEC END-CEN
Table 4.1: Overview of treatments
Every period has three stages: Contribution (Stage 1), Monitoring
(Stage 2), and Punishment (Stage 3). While the contribution stage re-
mains the same across all treatments, the other two stages differ de-
pending on the treatment. We implement a 2x2 factorial between sub-
ject design by varying both the monitoring technology (exogenous vs
endogenous) and the punishment institution (decentralized vs cen-
tralized), which defines who holds the power to acquire new signals
and to exert punishment. In the contribution stage Ps make a binary
choice whether or not to contribute their endowment to the public
good. Contributions are doubled and then redistributed to all group
members. In all treatments, each group member, including player A,
receives one initial imperfect private signal about the contribution
decisions of other Ps. Specifically, with 90% probability the signal cor-
responds to the actual contribution of the respective P and with 10%
probability the signal provides false information. In the treatments
with exogenous monitoring (treatments EX-DEC and EX-CEN) the
initial signal is the only signal that group members have access to. In
the treatments with endogenous monitoring (treatments END-DEC
and END-CEN) it is possible to acquire further signals at a cost. In the
decentralized institutions (treatments EX-DEC and END-DEC) Ps can
punish each other with a punishment technology of 1:4 and, if avail-
able, acquire further signals (treatment END-DEC), while A plays
only a passive role in these treatments. In the centralized institutions
(treatments Ex-CEN and END-CEN) punishment and, if available, in-
formation acquisition power is delegated to A. To hold endowments
and total costs constant across treatments, A and Ps share the costs
of punishment and monitoring (if applicable) in all treatments. Table
4.1 provides an overview of the treatments and the respective labels.
The following section describes the three stages and the differences
between the treatments in more detail. Table 4.2 lists the implemented
values of all parameters (1 Token = 0.05 CHF ⇡ 0.052 USD).
Stage I: Contribution
In the contribution stage, which remains the same across all treat-
ments, each peer Pi receives an endowment of ePG and has to de-
cide whether to contribute the whole endowment to the public good
(ci = 1) or not (ci = 0). We use a binary choice set to keep this stage
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and the interpretation of a false signal as simple as possible. Since
players A are passive in this stage and cannot contribute to the pub-
lic good, they do not receive any endowment. Contributions to the
public good are multiplied by M and distributed back equally to all
five group members; hence, marginal per capita return of a contri-
bution is given by M/5. Players A are included as beneficiaries of
the public good, because otherwise the incentives for exerting pun-
ishment would not be comparable between the decentralized and the
centralized punishment treatments. Parameter M is chosen such that
the game constitutes a social dilemma – it is strictly dominant not
to contribute to the public good, but if all peers defect, the resulting
outcome is Pareto inferior as compared to the case where all peers
cooperate. The monetary payoff of Pi from stage I is given by
⇡IPi = e
PG(1- ci) +
M
5
4X
j=1
ePGcj.
A’s payoff is given by
⇡IA =
M
5
4X
j=1
ePGcj.
Stage II: Monitoring
In the monitoring stage subjects receive information about the con-
tribution decisions of other group members. Each group member i
receives an individual (private) signal s1i,Pj about the contribution of
Pj (j 6= i) to the public good; hence A receives four signals, one for
each P, and each P receives three signals, one for each of the other
three Ps. The signal is given by
s1i,Pj =
8<:ePGcj with probability  
ePGc˜j with probability 1-  
where c˜j = 1 if cj = 0 and c˜j = 0 if cj = 1. With probability   the sig-
nal reflects the true underlying contribution decision of the respective
peer, and with probability 1-   the signal states the opposite of the
true underlying contribution decision of the respective peer. Since
signals are private, s1i,Pj is not necessarily the same for all i; hence,
while some subjects might receive a false signal about a given peer,
others might receive a true signal. In this stage subjects receive new
endowments, which can be used for information acquisition or pun-
ishment, depending on the treatment. Endowments are kept constant
across treatments – Ps are endowed with eMP, and A receives 4eMP
in all treatments. In treatments with exogenous monitoring, i.e. EX-
DEC and EX-CEN, stage II ends after subjects have received their ini-
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tial signals. In the treatments with exogenous monitoring, Pi’s profit
from stage II, ⇡IIPi,T , is given by
⇡IIPi,EX-DEC = ⇡
II
Pi,EX-CEN = e
MP.
A’s profit from stage II, ⇡IIA,T , is given by
⇡IIA,EX-DEC = ⇡
II
A,EX-CEN = 4e
MP.
end-dec only If monitoring is endogenous and punishment is
decentralized, Ps have the option to acquire further signals about
the contribution decisions of other group members. Pi can acquire
at most two additional signals, s2i,Pj and s
3
i,Pj , about the contribution
decision of each Pj(j 6= i). Additional signals share the same prop-
erties as the first signal s1i,Pj . Buying a second (b
2
i,Pj = 1 if acquired,
and b2i,Pj = 0 if not) or third (b
3
i,Pj = 1 if acquired, and b
3
i,Pj = 0 if
not) signal generates costs of pM for Pi, and for each signal that is
acquired by a player P, player A also has to bear costs of pM. In the
END-DEC treatment, Pi’s profit from stage II, ⇡IIPi,END-DEC, is given
by
⇡IIPi,END-DEC = e
MP - pM
3X
k=2
4X
j 6=i
bki,Pj .
A’s profit from stage II, ⇡IIA,T , is given by
⇡IIA,END-DEC = 4e
MP - pM
3X
k=2
4X
i=1
4X
j 6=i
bki,Pj .
end-cen only If monitoring is endogenous and punishment is
decentralized, A has the option to acquire further signals about the
contribution decisions of players P. A can acquire at most two addi-
tional signals, s2A,Pj and s
3
A,Pj , about the contribution decision of each
Pj. Additional signals share the same properties as the first signal
s1i,Pj . The signals acquired by A are visible to Ps as well, except for sig-
nals related to the own contribution decision. Formally, s2i,Pj = s
2
A,Pj
and s3i,Pj = s
3
A,Pj , unless i = j. Acquiring a further signal generates
costs of 3pM for A, and for each signal acquired by A, each Pi also
bears costs of pM. Let b2A,Pj = 1 and b
3
A,Pj = 1 if the respective sig-
nal is acquired, and b2A,Pj = 0 and b
3
A,Pj = 0 if the respective signal
is not acquired. In the END-CEN treatment, Pi’s profit from stage II,
⇡IIPi,END-CEN, is given by
⇡IIPi,END-CEN = e
MP - pM
3X
k=2
4X
j 6=i
bkA,Pj .
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A’s profit from stage II, ⇡IIA,T , is given by
⇡IIA,END-CEN = e
MP - 3pM
3X
k=2
4X
j6=i
bkA,Pj .
Stage III: Punishment
ex-dec and end-dec When punishment is decentralized, Ps have
the possibility to punish each other. All the signals received in stage
II remain available on the screen while the punishment decisions are
made. Each Pi has to decide whether to punish (qi,Pj = 1) or not to
punish (qi,Pj = 0) other group members Pj. For each positive punish-
ment decision, Pi has to bear costs of pS. Similar to the case in stage
II, A has to bear the costs of pS for each punishment decision. For
each Pi who punishes Pj the period profit of Pj is reduced by S. In
the decentralized settings, Pi’s profit from stage III, ⇡IIIPi,T , is given by
⇡IIIPi,EX-DEC = ⇡
III
Pi,END-DEC = -p
S
4X
j 6=i
qi,Pj - S
4X
j 6=i
qj,Pi .
A’s profit from stage II, ⇡IIA,T , is given by
⇡IIIA,EX-DEC = ⇡
III
A,END-DEC = -p
S
4X
i=1
4X
j 6=i
qi,Pj .
ex-cen and end-cen When punishment is centralized, the whole
punishment power is concentrated in the hands of A, who has the
possibility to punish each Pi buy choosing one of three punishment
levels; the punishment choice set is given by qA,Pj✏{0, 1, 2, 3}. A bears
costs of qA,Pjp
S for each Pj, and Pj’s profit is reduced by qA,PjS.
Hence, the set of potential punishment levels that Ps can receive is
identical between the decentralized and the centralized punishment
institutions. For example, if the authority chooses punishment level
qA,Pj = 3, then Pj receives the same punishment as Pj would have
received in the decentralized treatment if all three other Ps had cho-
sen to punish Pj. For each qA,Pj , each Pi bears costs of
pS
3 . In the
centralized settings, Pi’s profit from stage III, ⇡IIIPi,T , is given by
⇡IIIPi,EX-CEN = ⇡
III
Pi,END-CEN = -
pS
3
4X
j 6=i
qA,Pj - SqA,Pi .
A’s profit from stage III, ⇡IIIA,T , is given by
⇡IIIA,EX-CEN = ⇡
III
A,END-CEN = -p
S
4X
i=1
qA,Pi .
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The total period profit is the sum of profits from stage I, II and III.
The profit of Pi in treatment T is given by
⇡Pi,T = ⇡
I
Pi,T + ⇡
II
Pi,T + ⇡
III
Pi,T ,
and the profit of A is given by
⇡A,T = ⇡
I
A,T + ⇡
II
A,T + ⇡
III
A,T .
Parameter Value Description
ePG 15 Token Endowment for public good
eMP 6 Token Endowment for monitoring and punish-
ment
pM 1 Token Price of acquiring one signal
pS 2 Token Price of punishment
M 2 Public good multiplier
S 8 Token Severity of punishment
  0.9 Accuracy of signal
Table 4.2: Overview of parameters
Subjects were paid the sum of period profits over all 25 periods. Pe-
riod profits could be negative, but total profits were capped at zero.2
Methods and Procedures
We conducted the experiment in March and June 2015 at the deci-
sion laboratory of the Department of Economics of the University of
Zurich using the software z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). Subjects, mainly
students from the University of Zurich or the Swiss Federal Institute
of Technology in Zurich, were recruited using the software “hroot”
(Bock, Baetge, and Nicklisch, 2014). Subjects participated only once
in this experiment. In total we ran 12 sessions, each lasting around 90
minutes; 130 subjects participated in the EX-DEC treatment, 125 sub-
jects in the EX-CEN treatment, 60 subjects in the END-DEC treatment,
and 70 subjects in the END-CEN treatment. Subjects were seated at
computer terminals located in separate carrels. After subjects took
their randomly assigned seats, they read the printed instructions and
answered control questions. Subjects received an average total payoff
of 48.5 CHF (⇡ 50.2 USD), including the show-up fee of 15 CHF (⇡
15.5 USD).
2 Since all subjects finished the experiment with positive total profits, we did not have
to enforce the non-negative payoff restriction.
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4.3 results
Cooperation Rates
To analyze the impact of the underlying social norm enforcement
institution and monitoring structure on cooperation levels, we use
the cooperation rate as the key outcome variable – i.e. the fraction of
subjects who contributed to the public good.
result 1 : Under private imperfect monitoring, decentralization of so-
cial norm enforcement is more effective in sustaining cooperation than cen-
tralization. Cooperation rates in the decentralized punishment institution
are significantly higher than in the centralized punishment institution, un-
der both exogenous and endogenous monitoring.
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Figure 4.1: Cooperation rates
Note: This figure shows, for each treatment, the fraction of subjects who decided
to contribute to the public good, pooled across all 25 periods. Error bars denote
standard errors.
Figure 4.1 shows the cooperation rates in each of the four treat-
ments, pooled across the 25 periods of interaction. Under exogenous
monitoring, the cooperation rate decreases from 80.1% in the EX-
DEC treatment to 67.3% in the EX-CEN treatment (Probit regression,
p=0.007).3 Similarly, under endogenous monitoring, the cooperation
rate of 90.7% in the END-DEC treatment is significantly larger than
3 We compare binary outcome variables between treatments based on a Probit regres-
sion of the form Pr(yi = 1|x) =  ( 0 +  1xi), where   is the cumulative density
function of the standard normal distribution, x is a treatment dummy, and yi is a
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the cooperation rate of 83% in the END-CEN treatment (Probit re-
gression, p=0.017). Figure 4.2 shows the evolution of cooperation
over time in each for the four treatments. In all treatments cooper-
ation rates start at comparable levels, suggesting that the initial con-
tribution decision remains unaffected by the underlying social norm
enforcement institution or monitoring structure. However, while co-
operation rates deteriorate over time in centralized institutions, they
remain relatively stable and show a slight downward trend only to-
wards the end of the interaction in decentralized institutions.
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Figure 4.2: Cooperation rates over time
Note: This figure shows, for each treatment, the fraction of subjects who decided to
contribute to the public good over all 25 periods.
result 2 : The possibility to improve the quality of monitoring by paying
for information leads to higher cooperation rates in both decentralized and
centralized punishment institutions.
With a contribution rate of 90.7%, decentralization achieves almost
full contribution under endogenous monitoring, performing signifi-
cantly better than the decentralization under exogenous monitoring
(80.1%, Probit regression, p=0.002). Similarly, when punishment is
centralized, cooperation rates are significantly larger under endoge-
nous monitoring (83%) than under exogenous monitoring (67.6%, Pro-
bit regression, p<0.001). Hence, the possibility to acquire costly infor-
mation about the actions taken by other group members enhances
cooperation independent of the underlying punishment institution.
dummy for the outcome variable. Standard errors are always clustered at the group
level.
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Punishment Errors and Information Acquisition
To understand the underlying mechanisms for the varying coopera-
tion rates, we next analyze the punishment error rates that are pro-
duced in the different social norm enforcement institutions. A Type I
error of punishment occurs if a subject who contributed to the public
good in period t receives a positive amount of punishment in pe-
riod t. A Type II error of punishment occurs if a subject who did
not contribute to the public good in period t does not receive any
punishment in period t.
result 3 : Under private imperfect monitoring, social norm enforcement
institutions differ with respect to their relative performance in avoiding Type
I and Type II errors of punishment. While decentralization is superior in
reducing Type I errors of punishment, centralization is more successful in
reducing Type II errors of punishment. However, under decentralized social
norm enforcement, Type I errors almost never involve strong sanctions.
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
Er
ro
r R
at
e 
(in
 %
)
 
Decentralized  
 
Type I Error
Centralized Decentralized  
 
Type II Error
Centralized
Figure 4.3: Punishment errors under exogenous monitoring
Note: This figure shows the fraction of cooperators who received punishment (Type I
error) and the fraction of defectors who remained unpunished (Type II error) in the
treatments with exogenous monitoring (i.e. treatments EX-DEC and EX-CEN). Error
bars denote standard errors.
Figure 4.3 compares Type I and Type II error rates between the cen-
tralized and decentralized punishment institutions under exogenous
monitoring. The Type I error rate denotes the fraction of coopera-
tors who receive punishment and the Type II error rate denotes the
fraction of defectors who remain unpunished. With a Type I error
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rate of 28.2%, the decentralized institution produces a significantly
larger probability of false positive punishment than the centralized
institution, where only 10.5% of cooperators are punished (Probit re-
gression, p<0.001). However, while 55.8% of defectors escape punish-
ment in the centralized institution, only 19.1% of defectors remain un-
punished in the decentralized institution (Probit regression, p<0.001).
A similar picture emerges under endogenous monitoring (see Fig-
ure 4.4); the probability of a Type I error of punishment increases
from 2.5% in the centralized setting to 10.7% in the decentralized pun-
ishment institution, but the difference is only significant at the 10%-
level (Probit regression, p=0.063). On the other hand, centralization
produces a Type II error rate of 43.3%, whereas under decentraliza-
tion the probability that a defector remains unpunished is only 18.7%
(Probit regression, p=0.02). Hence, consistent with our hypothesis, de-
centralization of social norm enforcement is more prone to Type I
errors of punishment than centralization if monitoring is based on
private and imperfect information; however, decentralization leads to
superior results with respect to a key condition for effective social
norm enforcement – the punishment of defectors.4
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Figure 4.4: Punishment errors under endogenous monitoring
Note: This figure shows the fraction of cooperators who received punishment (Type I
error) and the fraction of defectors who remained unpunished (Type II error) in the
treatments with endogenous monitoring (i.e. treatments END-DEC and END-CEN).
Error bars denote standard errors.
4 In Appendix C we show that differences in cooperation rates between centralized
and decentralized institutions cannot be explained by different reactions to punish-
ment or different punishment decisions given initial signals.
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The previous analysis of punishment errors does not discriminate
between different punishment levels. In all treatments, there are three
levels of punishment that subjects can receive in a given period, lead-
ing to a reduction of 8 points, 16 points or 24 points. Table 4.3 pro-
vides an overview of the punishment probabilities that defectors and
cooperators face in the four treatments, distinguishing two categories
of punishment, "low" (8 points) and "high" (16 points or 24 points).
Since the probability that more than one peer receives a false signal
about a cooperator is relatively low, Type I errors in the decentral-
ized punishment institution consist of almost only the lowest level of
punishment, under both exogenous and endogenous monitoring. If
social norm enforcement is decentralized, 87% of Type I errors under
exogenous monitoring and 93.9% of Type I errors under endogenous
monitoring comprise low punishment.
defectors
EX-DEC EX-CEN END-DEC END-CEN
Low punishment 43.9 18.8 34.8 19.7
High punishment 36.9 25.3 46.4 37.0
Total 80.9 44.2 81.3 56.7
cooperators
EX-DEC EX-CEN END-DEC END-CEN
Low punishment 24.6 3.6 10.7 2.5
High punishment 3.6 7.0 0.7 1.8
Total 28.2 10.5 11.4 4.3
Table 4.3: Overview of punishment rates (in %) by punishment severity
Note: This table shows, for each treatment, the fraction (in %) of defectors and the
fraction of cooperators who receive punishment, distinguishing between "low" (8
reduction points) and "high" (16 or 24 reduction points) punishment.
result 4 : Under endogenous monitoring, substantial demand for addi-
tional information about the actions of other group members who appear as
defectors significantly reduces Type I errors of punishment in both decentral-
ized and centralized social norm enforcement institutions.
The probability of a Type I error is significantly lower under en-
dogenous monitoring than under exogenous monitoring, in both de-
centralized (Probit regression, p=0.011) and centralized (Probit regres-
sion, p=0.022) punishment institutions. However, the possibility to ob-
tain additional information about the contribution decisions of other
group members does not reduce the Type II error rate, neither in the
decentralized (Probit regression, p=0.96) nor in the centralized (Pro-
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bit regression, p=0.15) punishment institution. Unlike Type II error
rates, Type I error rates improve under endogenous monitoring, be-
cause subjects focus the acquisition of additional signals on group
members who appear as defectors. Figure 4.5 shows the fraction of
cases in which a second signal was acquired in the endogenous mon-
itoring treatments, depending on the first signal. While a second sig-
nal was acquired in over 50% of the cases in which the first signal
stated "Defector", a second signal was acquired in less than 10% of
cases in which the first signal stated "Cooperator" (END-DEC: Pro-
bit regression, p<0.001; END-CEN: Probit regression, p<0.001). Sig-
nal acquisition behavior does not differ between the decentralized
and centralized settings, neither after a first signal "Defector" (Probit
regression, p=0.676) nor after a first signal "Cooperator" (Probit re-
gression, p=0.903). While a third signal was acquired in only 5.9% of
the cases in which the first two signals stated "Cooperator", a third
signal was acquired in 27% of the cases in which the first two signals
stated "Defector" (Probit regression, p=0.007). If the first two pieces of
information revealed conflicting signals, a third signal was acquired
in 36.6% of the cases.
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Figure 4.5: Acquisition of second signal depending on first signal
Note: This figure shows the fraction of cases in which subjects acquired a second
signal in the endogenous monitoring treatments (i.e. END-DEC and END-CEN) de-
pending on the first signal.
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4.4 conclusion
In this paper we introduce private imperfect monitoring and informa-
tion acquisition to public goods games with punishment. By imple-
menting a monitoring technology that provides subjects with private
signals about the contribution decisions of other group members, we
study the relative performance of different social norm enforcement
institutions in resolving social dilemmas under more realistic infor-
mation environments than those considered in the previous literature.
Specifically, we compare a decentralized peer-to-peer punishment in-
stitution with a centralized setting, where all punishment power is
delegated to a randomly selected authority. Our results show that
under private imperfect monitoring decentralization achieves signifi-
cantly higher cooperation rates than centralization, because defectors
are more likely to receive punishment when punishment is decen-
tralized. The two punishment institutions involve a tradeoff between
lower Type II punishment error rates (not punishing a defector) in
the decentralized setting and lower Type I punishment error rates
(punishing a cooperator) in the centralized setting, but the benefits
of the lower probability that defectors remain unpunished in the de-
centralized punishment institution outweigh the disadvantages of the
higher likelihood of sanctioning cooperators. Moreover, we find sub-
stantial demand for additional signals about the contribution deci-
sions of other group members. In the endogenous monitoring treat-
ments, where subjects can acquire information in addition to the ini-
tial signals, subjects are willing to incur costs to improve their infor-
mation base before exerting punishment. In particular, subjects focus
information acquisition on other group members who appear as de-
fectors. By establishing a "standard of proof" before exerting punish-
ment subjects significantly reduce Type I errors of punishment under
endogenous monitoring, boosting cooperation rates as compared to
an environment where costly information acquisition is not possible.
Our results suggest that under private imperfect monitoring central-
ization of social norm enforcement per se leads to inferior coopera-
tion levels in public goods games as compared to a peer-to-peer pun-
ishment environment and that centralization needs to be associated
with other performance-enhancing features – such as commitment to
punishment rules or election of authorities – to become as effective as
peer-to-peer punishment institutions in resolving social dilemmas.

A
APPENDIX – DO MARKETS UNDERMINE
MORAL ITY ?
a.1 sessions and sample sizes
Table A.1 provides an overview of all treatments and the respective
samples sizes. Six subjects who did not understand the experiment
were excluded from the analysis and are not included in Table A.1.
Including those subjects does not have any material effect on the re-
sults reported in this paper. In the Individual and Individual10 treat-
ments, there were an equal number of active decision makers and
passive recipients. Passive recipients could not affect the outcome of
the experiment, but were present in the lab.
Treatment Sessions Decision
Makers
Monopolists Competitors
Single Period
Individual 6 97 - -
Market 3 - 98 -
Market1vs2 5 - 43 86
Market1vs4 4 - 25 100
10 Periods
Individual10 6 97 - -
Market10 4 - 106 -
Market10SI 2 - 13 52
Table A.1: Sessions and sample sizes
a.2 instructions
In the following section we present English translations of all written
instructions used in this study. Subjects were provided with instruc-
tions in German.
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OVE RVIE W OF INSTRUC TIONS 
 
INDI VI DUAL TREATMEN T.............................................................................. 71 
INDI VI DUAL10 TREAT ME NT......................................................................... 75 
MARK ET TREATMEN T ..................................................................................... 80 
MARK ET10 TREATMENT ................................................................................ 86 
MARK ET1VS2 TREA TME NT 
Instructions for subjects in the role of competitors ....................................... 90 
Instructions for subjects in the role of monopolists ....................................... 98 
MARK ET1VS4 TREA TME NT 
Instructions for subjects in the role of competitors ..................................... 106 
Instructions for subjects in the role of monopolists ..................................... 114 
MARK ET10SI  TREAT MENT 
Instructions for subjects in the role of competitors ..................................... 122 
Instructions for subjects in the role of monopolists ..................................... 130 
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INDIVIDUAL  TRE ATME NT 
Welcome to the Econ-Lab! 
Please read the following instructions carefully. If you have questions, 
please raise your hand; an assistant will come immediately to you at your 
desk. 
General Information 
You are participating in a study at the Department of Economics at the 
University of Zurich. You will receive a fix payment of CHF 15 for your 
participation; you can earn additional monetary amounts depending on 
how the study runs. You will receive your payment at the end of the study 
in cash. 
Please note that these instructions are only for your private information, 
and that communication is absolutely forbidden during the study. If you 
have questions, please address them to us. Violation of this rule leads to 
exclusion from the study and all payments. 
The data collected in this study will never be associated with your name. 
Your name will only be used in signing the receipt for your payment, 
meaning that your anonymity is guaranteed at all times. 
What is this about? 
In this experiment, you will be assigned anonymously to another partici-
pant, participant 2. Participant 2 is in the role of a passive participant who 
can make no decisions and whose payment depends on your decisions. 
You will see a list of 21 scenarios on your monitor. You must decide for 
one of two alternatives in each scenario, alternative A or alternative B. 
Alternative A is the same in all 21 scenarios: If alternative A is realized, 
we will fund a necessary operation for a person suffering from leprosy 
in India, who otherwise would have no opportunity to have this opera-
tion. In this case, you and participant 2 will not receive any further mone-
tary payment, meaning that you will receive your fixed payment of CHF 
15 at the end of the study. 
If, however, alternative B is realized, we will not fund the operation for 
the person suffering from leprosy. In this case, you and the passive par-
ticipant will receive a combined additional monetary payment in the 
amount of CHF 20. The exact distribution of the CHF 20 varies between 
the individual scenarios. 
At the end of the experiment, one scenario will be chosen randomly and 
your decision from the chosen round will be implemented. 
We will explain the consequences of the two alternatives in more detail 
below. 
You have a total of three minutes of time to reach your decisions. After 
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three minutes have expired, the study will continue with responses to a 
short questionnaire. 
The consequences of your actions 
Leprosy is a chronic infectious disease caused by the bacteria Mycobacte-
rium Leprae; it is spread from person to person. The pathogen causes death 
of nerve cells and blockage of arteries and veins. As a result, there is a 
long-term danger of bodily disfigurement, blindness, or other permanent 
disabilities. 
 
        
 
Although the disease can be cured with medical treatment, many leprosy 
victims suffer from the consequences of disfigurement from the sickness 
even after the pathogen has been eradicated. Disfigurement from leprosy 
leads to a very high degree of ostracism and stigmatization, a situation 
that victims suffer from for their entire lives. However, even small surgical 
interventions can significantly reduce the scope of disfigurement. 
Almost 60% of the world’s new leprosy cases occur in India. Due to the 
prevalence of poverty, funding an operation – which would allow for a life 
in dignity – is not possible for most of the victims with disfigurement. 
If you select alternative A in the chosen scenario, we (the Department of 
Economics of the University of Zurich in cooperation with the Swiss relief 
organization FAIRMED) will fund the operation for a victim of leprosy in 
India. The cost of the operation depends on the extent of disfigurement. A 
simple procedure in India costs approximately CHF 60; the Department of 
Economics will cover this amount in full. 
If you select alternative B in the chosen scenario, we will not provide the 
funding. This means that if an agreement is reached, the leprosy patient 
will not receive the operation. 
  
72 appendix – do markets undermine morality?
  
Summary of possible results 
Result 
Your additional 
payment 
Participant 2’s 
additional 
payment 
Consequence for 
the person suffer-
ing from leprosy 
Alternative A CHF 0 CHF 0 
Operation will be 
done 
Alternative B CHF X 20 – CHF X 
Operation will not 
be done 
 
Each of the 21 scenarios only varies with the value of X that applies in 
Alternative B. X varies between CHF 0 and CHF 20. If, for example, X has 
the value of CHF 10, you and participant 2 will both earn an additional 
CHF 10, and an operation for a person suffering from leprosy will not be 
done if you select alternative B (= no operation) in the chosen round. In the 
same way, if X has the value of CHF 15, then you will earn an additional 
CHF 15 and participant 2 will earn CHF 5 if you selected alternative B (= 
no operation) in the chosen scenario. 
If you select alternative A in the chosen scenario, you and participant 2 
will each receive the fix payment of CHF 15, will not earn any additional 
payment, and the value X plays no role in your payment. 
How you make your decision 
You must decide in each of the 21 scenarios, i.e. for each value of X, 
whether you select alternative A (= operation for patient suffering from 
leprosy) or alternative B (= no operation for the patient suffering from 
leprosy). You will first be asked on the decision monitor how you decide 
for X = 0. After you have made your decision for X = 0, please make a deci-
sion for X = 1, then for X = 2, etc. 
• If you always select alternative A (i.e. for all values of X beginning 
with X = 0), then you must always click on alternative A on the deci-
sion monitor. 
• If you wish to choose alternative A for smaller values of X and want 
to change to B for higher values of X, then always click on alterna-
tive B beginning at that value of X where you wish to change. Please 
note in this case that you cannot switch back from B to A. This 
means that if you change from A to B for a certain value of X, then 
all higher values of X must also remain with alternative B. 
• If you always select alternative B (i.e. for all values of X beginning 
with X = 0), then you must always click on alternative B on the deci-
sion monitor. 
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Control questions 
Please now answer the questions below to examine your understanding of 
the experiment. If you have any questions, please raise your hand. 
1) Assume that X = 8 in the scenario chosen at the end. What happens if 
you selected alternative B in this scenario? Please mark the correct an-
swer. 
 
• You and participant 2 each earn a total of CHF 15 (fixed payment) 
and an operation will be performed on a patient suffering from 
leprosy. 
• You earn a total of CHF 23 (fixed payment of CHF 15 plus CHF 8), 
participant 2 earns a total of CHF 27 (fixed payment of CHF 15 
plus CHF 12), and an operation will not be performed on a patient 
suffering from leprosy. 
 
2) Assume that X = 17 in the scenario chosen at the end. What happens if 
you selected alternative A in this scenario? Please mark the correct an-
swer. 
 
• You and participant 2 each earn a total of CHF 15 (fixed payment) 
and an operation will be performed on a patient suffering from 
leprosy. 
• You earn a total of CHF 32 (fixed payment of CHF 15 plus CHF 
17), participant 2 earns a total of CHF 18 (fixed payment of CHF 15 
plus CHF 3), and an operation will not be performed on a patient 
suffering from leprosy. 
 
3) Assume that X = 0 in the scenario chosen at the end. 
 
• How much do you and participant 2 earn in addition to the fixed 
payment of CHF 15 if you select alternative A (= Operation)? 
Participant 2’s additional income: ____  Your additional in-
come: ____ 
• How much do you and participant 2 earn in addition to the fixed 
payment of CHF 15 if you select alternative B (= No operation)? 
Participant 2’s additional income: ____  Your additional in-
come: ____ 
 
4) The operation on a leprosy patient has the objective of  
 
• Destroying the pathogen that causes leprosy. 
• Strongly relieving the consequences of disfigurement due to lep-
rosy.  
74 appendix – do markets undermine morality?
  
INDIVIDUAL10 TRE ATME NT 
Welcome to the Econ-Lab! 
Please read the following instructions carefully. If you have questions, 
please raise your hand; an assistant will come immediately to you at your 
desk. 
General Information 
You are participating in a study at the Department of Economics at the 
University of Zurich. You will receive a fix payment of CHF 15 for your 
participation; you can earn additional monetary amounts depending on 
how the study runs. You will receive your payment at the end of the study 
in cash. 
Please note that these instructions are only for your private information, 
and that communication is absolutely forbidden during the study. If you 
have questions, please address them to us. Violation of this rule leads to 
exclusion from the study and all payments. 
The data collected in this study will never be associated with your name. 
Your name will only be used in signing the receipt for your payment, 
meaning that your anonymity is guaranteed at all times. 
What is this about? 
In this experiment, you will be assigned anonymously to another partici-
pant, participant 2, in each of ten rounds. After each round, you will be 
randomly assigned to a new participant 2, and you will never be assigned 
to the same person twice. Participant 2 is in the role of a passive partici-
pant who can make no decisions and whose payment depends on your 
decisions. In each round, you will see a list of 21 scenarios on your moni-
tor; the list is the same in all ten rounds. In each round, you must decide 
for one of two alternatives in each scenario, alternative A or alternative B. 
Alternative A is the same in all 21 scenarios: If alternative A is realized, 
we will fund a necessary operation for a person suffering from leprosy 
in India, who otherwise would have no opportunity to have this opera-
tion. In this case, you and participant 2 will not receive any further mone-
tary payment, meaning that you will receive your fixed payment of CHF 
15 at the end of the study. 
If, however, alternative B is realized, we will not fund the operation for 
the person suffering from leprosy. In this case, you and the passive par-
ticipant will receive a combined additional monetary payment in the 
amount of CHF 20. The exact distribution of the CHF 20 varies between 
the individual scenarios. 
After each round, one scenario will be chosen randomly and your decision 
will be the result of that round. At the end of the experiment, one of the 
A.2 instructions 75
  
ten rounds will be chosen randomly and the result of the chosen round 
will be implemented. 
We will explain the consequences of the two alternatives in more detail 
below. 
You have a total of three minutes of time in each round to make your 
decisions. The next round begins after three minutes have expired. The 
study will continue with responses to a short questionnaire after the tenth 
round. 
The consequences of your actions 
Leprosy is a chronic infectious disease caused by the bacteria Mycobacte-
rium Leprae; it is spread from person to person. The pathogen causes death 
of nerve cells and blockage of arteries and veins. As a result, there is a 
long-term danger of bodily disfigurement, blindness, or other permanent 
disabilities. 
 
        
 
Although the disease can be cured with medical treatment, many leprosy 
victims suffer from the consequences of disfigurement from the sickness 
even after the pathogen has been eradicated. Disfigurement from leprosy 
leads to a very high degree of ostracism and stigmatization, a situation 
that victims suffer from for their entire lives. However, even small surgical 
interventions can significantly reduce the scope of disfigurement. 
Almost 60% of the world’s new leprosy cases occur in India. Due to the 
prevalence of poverty, funding an operation – which would allow for a life 
in dignity – is not possible for most of the victims with disfigurement. 
If you select alternative A in the chosen scenario of the round chosen at 
the end, we (the Department of Economics of the University of Zurich in 
cooperation with the Swiss relief organization FAIRMED) will fund the 
operation for a victim of leprosy in India. The cost of the operation de-
pends on the extent of disfigurement. A simple procedure in India costs 
approximately CHF 60; the Department of Economics will cover this 
amount in full. 
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If you select alternative B in the chosen scenario of the round chosen at 
the end, we will not provide the funding. This means that if an agreement 
is reached, the leprosy patient will not receive the operation. 
Summary of possible results 
Result 
Your additional 
payment 
Participant 2’s 
additional pay-
ment 
Consequence for 
the person suf-
fering from lep-
rosy 
Alternative A CHF 0 CHF 0 
Operation will 
be done 
Alternative B CHF X 20 – CHF X 
Operation will 
not be done 
 
Each of the 21 scenarios only varies with the value of X that applies in 
Alternative B. X varies between CHF 0 and CHF 20. If, for example, X has 
the value of CHF 10, you and participant 2 will both earn an additional 
CHF 10, and an operation for a person suffering from leprosy will not be 
done if you select alternative B (= no operation) in the chosen scenario of 
the round chosen at the end. In the same way, if X has the value of CHF 
15, then you will earn an additional CHF 15 and participant 2 will earn 
CHF 5 if you selected alternative B (= no operation) in the chosen scenario 
of the round chosen at the end. 
If you select alternative A in the chosen scenario of the round chosen at the 
end, you and participant 2 will each receive the fix payment of CHF 15, 
will not earn any additional payment, and the value X plays no role in 
your payment. 
How you make your  decision 
You must decide in each of the 21 scenarios, i.e. for each value of X, 
whether you select alternative A  
(= operation for patient suffering from leprosy) or alternative B (= no oper-
ation for the patient suffering from leprosy). You will first be asked on the 
decision monitor how you decide for X = 0. After you have made your 
decision for X = 0, please make a decision for X = 1, then for X = 2, etc. 
• If you always select alternative A (i.e. for all values of X beginning 
with X = 0), then you must always click on alternative A on the deci-
sion monitor. 
• If you wish to choose alternative A for smaller values of X and want 
to change to B for higher values of X, then always click on alterna-
tive B beginning at that value of X where you wish to change. Please 
note in this case that you cannot switch back from B to A. This 
means that if you change from A to B for a certain value of X, then 
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all higher values of X must also remain with alternative B. 
• If you always select alternative B (i.e. for all values of X beginning 
with X = 0), then you must always click on alternative B on the deci-
sion monitor. 
Control questions 
Please now answer the questions below to examine your understanding of 
the experiment. If you have any questions, please raise your hand. 
1) Assume that X = 8 in the chosen scenario of the round chosen at the 
end. What happens if you selected alternative B in this scenario? 
Please mark the correct answer. 
 
• You and participant 2 each earn a total of CHF 15 (fixed payment) 
and an operation will be performed on a patient suffering from 
leprosy. 
• You earn a total of CHF 23 (fixed payment of CHF 15 plus CHF 8), 
participant 2 earns a total of CHF 27 (fixed payment of CHF 15 
plus CHF 12), and an operation will not be performed on a patient 
suffering from leprosy. 
 
2) Assume that X = 17 in the chosen scenario of the round chosen at the 
end. What happens if you selected alternative A in this scenario? 
Please mark the correct answer. 
 
• You and participant 2 each earn a total of CHF 15 (fixed payment) 
and an operation will be performed on a patient suffering from 
leprosy. 
• You earn a total of CHF 32 (fixed payment of CHF 15 plus CHF 
17), participant 2 earns a total of CHF 18 (fixed payment of CHF 15 
plus CHF 3), and an operation will not be performed on a patient 
suffering from leprosy. 
 
3) Assume that X = 0 in the chosen scenario of the round chosen at the 
end. 
 
• How much do you and participant 2 earn in addition to the fixed 
payment of CHF 15 if you select alternative A (= Operation)? 
Participant 2’s additional income: ____  Your additional in-
come: ____ 
• How much do you and participant 2 earn in addition to the fixed 
payment of CHF 15 if you select alternative B (= No operation)? 
Participant 2’s additional income: ____  Your additional in-
come: ____ 
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4) The operation on a leprosy patient has the objective of  
 
• Destroying the pathogen that causes leprosy. 
 
• Strongly relieving the consequences of disfigurement due to lep-
rosy.  
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MARK E T TRE ATME NT 
Welcome to the Econ-Lab! 
Please read the following instructions carefully. If you have questions, 
please raise your hand; an assistant will come immediately to you at your 
desk. 
General Information 
You are participating in a study at the Department of Economics at the 
University of Zurich. You will receive a fix payment of CHF 15 for your 
participation; you can earn additional monetary amounts depending on 
how the study runs. You will receive your payment at the end of the study 
in cash. 
Please note that these instructions are only for your private information, 
and that communication is absolutely forbidden during the study. If you 
have questions, please address them to us. Violation of this rule leads to 
exclusion from the study and all payments. 
The data collected in this study will never be associated with your name. 
Your name will only be used in signing the receipt for your payment, 
meaning that your anonymity is guaranteed at all times. 
What is this about? 
In this experiment, you will be assigned anonymously to another of this 
study, participant 2. In a virtual marketplace, you can negotiate with par-
ticipant 2 about the final distribution of a monetary amount of CHF 20. 
The negotiations with participant 2 can lead either to an agreement or to 
no agreement. If you reach an agreement, each of you will receive the 
amount that you agreed on. If you do not reach an agreement with one of 
the participants, neither participant receives anything. 
How the market functions 
You can negotiate with participant 2 for the period of three minutes about 
the distribution of CHF 20. This means that you can place demands of how 
much of the CHF 20 you should receive; participant 2 can also make sug-
gestions about how much of the CHF 20 he or she offers to you. You can 
accept the offer from participant 2, and he or she can accept your de-
mands. 
Once demands and offers have been placed, they can no longer be with-
drawn. When you enter a new demand, this must represent an improve-
ment for participant 2, i.e. you must reduce your demand. The same ap-
plies for participant 2; if he or she suggests a new offer, this must be an 
improvement for you; i.e. participant 2 must increase his or her offer. 
As soon as you enter a new – reduced – demand, your previous demands 
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can no longer be accepted. The same applies for offers. As soon as you 
receive a new offer, you can no longer accept the previous offer. Only the 
current offers and demands can be accepted. 
You make a demand by entering the amount on your monitor that you 
would like to keep for yourself. If you enter a demand for CHF X, this 
means that you would like to retain CHF X for yourself and that partici-
pant 2 will thus receive the amount of CHF 20 – X. This demand will then 
be notified to participant 2. The same applies for offers. If participant 2 
offers you CHF Y, he or she will enter it on the monitor. An offer of Y 
means that you will receive the amount of CHF Y in case of an agreement, 
while participant 2 receives CHF 20 – Y.  
Demands must be integers between CHF 0 and 20. 
The market will be closed when 
a)  an agreement is made (i.e. you accept an offer from participant 2, or 
when participant 2 accepts your demand) 
or 
b)  the three minutes have expired. 
Summary of the market 
 
  
The remaining time is shown 
here
You can enter  your  demand 
here and confirm i t with the 
button “ Submit offer ” . Only 
integers between 0 and 20 
are possible.
By cl icking on this button, you 
accept par ticipant 2’ s offer and 
the market wi l l  be closed 
History of your demands
Your  current demand Current offer  from participant 2
History of participant 2‘ s 
offers
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You now have the opportunity to become familiar with the operation of 
the virtual market for three minutes in a test run. You will be randomly 
grouped with another participant in the experiment. The test run has no 
consequences and only has the objective of helping you understand how 
the virtual market functions. 
Please enter the control questions below and raise your hand as soon as 
you are done. 
Control questions 
1) Assume that you see the amount of CHF 5 in the window “Current 
offer from participant 2”. If you click on “Accept current offer from par-
ticipant 2”, this means that you 
 
• Accept the distribution “CHF 5 for me and CHF 15 for participant 
2”. 
• Accept the distribution “CHF 15 for me and CHF 5 for participant 
2” 
 
2) After you or participant 2 has accepted an offer, 
 
• More demands and offers can be made until the three minutes have 
expired. 
• No further demands and offers can be made because the market is 
closed. 
Continuation of the instructions 
After you were anonymously assigned to participant 2, the market will be 
open to you once for three minutes. The interaction with participant 2 can 
either lead to an agreement or not lead to an agreement. However, agree-
ment or non-agreement also has consequences for a third party – a patient 
suffering from leprosy in India. 
If no agreement is reached, then we will fund a necessary operation for a 
person suffering from leprosy in India, who otherwise would have no 
opportunity to have this operation. In this case, you and participant 2 will 
not receive any further monetary payment, meaning that you will receive 
your fixed payment of CHF 15 at the end of the study. 
If, however, an agreement is reached, we will not fund the operation for 
the person suffering from leprosy. In this case, you and participant 2 will 
receive an additional monetary payment in the amount of the agreed sum. 
We will explain the consequences of the two alternatives in more detail 
below.  
If you do not reach an agreement with participant 2 within the three mi-
nute time period, the market will be closed with the result “no agreement”. 
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We will then fund the operation for a leprosy patient. After expiration of 
the 3 minutes, the experiment will be continued with a small question-
naire. 
The consequences of your actions 
Leprosy is a chronic infectious disease caused by the bacteria Mycobacte-
rium Leprae; it is spread from person to person. The pathogen causes death 
of nerve cells and blockage of arteries and veins. As a result, there is a 
long-term danger of bodily disfigurement, blindness, or other permanent 
disabilities. 
 
        
 
Although the disease can be cured with medical treatment, many leprosy 
victims suffer from the consequences of disfigurement from the sickness 
even after the pathogen has been eradicated. Disfigurement from leprosy 
leads to a very high degree of ostracism and stigmatization, a situation 
that victims suffer from for their entire lives. However, even small surgical 
interventions can significantly reduce the scope of disfigurement. 
Almost 60% of the world’s new leprosy cases occur in India. Due to the 
prevalence of poverty, funding an operation – which would allow for a life 
in dignity – is not possible for most of the victims with disfigurement. 
If you do not reach an agreement with participant 2 about the division of 
the additional monetary payment, we (the Department of Economics of 
the University of Zurich in cooperation with the Swiss relief organization 
FAIRMED) will fund the operation for a victim of leprosy in India. The 
cost of the operation depends on the extent of disfigurement. A simple 
procedure in India costs approximately CHF 60; the Department of Eco-
nomics will cover this amount in full. 
If you reach an agreement with participant 2 about the division of the 
additional monetary payment, we will not provide the funding. This 
means that if an agreement is reached, the leprosy patient will not receive 
the operation. 
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Summary of possible results 
Result 
How is the 
result 
reached? 
Your ad-
ditional 
payment 
Additional 
payment 
for partici-
pant 2 
Consequence 
for the per-
son suffering 
from leprosy 
No agree-
ment 
Three minutes 
elapse with-
out you or 
participant 2 
making or 
accepting an 
offer 
CHF 0 CHF 0 
Operation 
will be done 
Agreement 
–  
CHF X for 
you 
You or partic-
ipant 2 ac-
cepts the cor-
responding 
offer within 
the three 
minutes 
CHF X 
CHF 20 – 
X 
Operation 
will not be 
done 
 
If, for example, you accept an offer from participant 2 for CHF 10, you and 
participant 2 will both earn an additional CHF 10, and an operation for a 
person suffering from leprosy will not be done. In the same way, if partic-
ipant 2 accepts a demand from you for CHF 15, then you will earn an ad-
ditional CHF 15 and participant 2 will earn CHF 5; again, an operation for 
a person suffering from leprosy will not be done. 
If both you and participant 2 do not agree to anything, you both will each 
receive the fix payment of CHF 15, will not earn any additional payment, 
and the operation will be done for a person suffering from leprosy. 
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Control questions 
Please now answer the questions below to examine your understanding of 
the experiment. If you have any questions, please raise your hand. An 
assistant will come to you at your desk and answer your question. Please 
mark the correct answer below. 
1) If you allow the three minutes on the screen to lapse without making a 
demand or accepting an offer, 
 
• A person suffering from leprosy in India will receive an operation, 
and you and participant 2 will receive no further monetary pay-
ments. 
• A person suffering from leprosy in India will not receive an opera-
tion, and you and participant 2 will receive no further monetary 
payments. 
 
2) If you click on “Accept the current offer from participant 2”, 
 
• A person suffering from leprosy in India will receive an operation, 
and you and participant 2 each receive the agreed upon amount as 
an additional monetary payment. 
• A person suffering from leprosy in India will not receive an opera-
tion, and you and participant 2 each receive the agreed upon 
amount as an additional monetary payment. 
• A person suffering from leprosy in India will not receive an opera-
tion, and you and participant 2 will receive no further monetary 
payments. 
 
3) The operation on a leprosy patient has the objective of 
 
• Destroying the pathogen that causes leprosy. 
• Strongly relieving the consequences of disfigurement due to lep-
rosy. 
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MARK E T10 TRE ATME NT 
 
[The first part of the instructions in the Market10 treatment is identical to the 
first part of the instructions in the Market treatment] 
 
Continuation of the instructions 
The market will be open to you for ten rounds lasting three minutes each. 
After three minutes have elapsed, you will be randomly assigned to a new 
participant 2, and you will never be assigned to the same person twice. At 
the end of the last round, one of the ten rounds will be chosen randomly 
and the result of the chosen round will be implemented. The interaction 
with participant 2 can either lead to an agreement or not lead to an agree-
ment. However, agreement or non-agreement also has consequences for a 
third party – a patient suffering from leprosy in India. 
If no agreement is reached in the chosen round, then we will fund a 
necessary operation for a person suffering from leprosy in India, who 
otherwise would have no opportunity to have this operation. In this case, 
you and participant 2 will not receive any further monetary payment, 
meaning that you will receive your fixed payment of CHF 15 at the end of 
the study. 
If, however, an agreement is reached in the chosen round, we will not 
fund the operation for the person suffering from leprosy. In this case, 
you and participant 2 will receive an additional monetary payment in the 
amount of the agreed sum. 
We will explain the consequences of the two alternatives in more detail 
below.  
If you take no action or do not reach an agreement with participant 2 with-
in the three minute time period, the market will be closed with the result 
“no agreement”. If this round is chosen, we will then fund the operation for 
a leprosy patient. After expiration of the ten rounds, the experiment will 
be continued with a small questionnaire. 
The consequences of your actions 
Leprosy is a chronic infectious disease caused by the bacteria Mycobacte-
rium Leprae; it is spread from person to person. The pathogen causes death 
of nerve cells and blockage of arteries and veins. As a result, there is a 
long-term danger of bodily disfigurement, blindness, or other permanent 
disabilities. 
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Although the disease can be cured with medical treatment, many leprosy 
victims suffer from the consequences of disfigurement from the sickness 
even after the pathogen has been eradicated. Disfigurement from leprosy 
leads to a very high degree of ostracism and stigmatization, a situation 
that victims suffer from for their entire lives. However, even small surgical 
interventions can significantly reduce the scope of disfigurement. 
Almost 60% of the world’s new leprosy cases occur in India. Due to the 
prevalence of poverty, funding an operation – which would allow for a life 
in dignity – is not possible for most of the victims with disfigurement. 
If you do not reach an agreement with participant 2 about the division of 
the additional monetary payment, we (the Department of Economics of 
the University of Zurich in cooperation with the Swiss relief organization 
FAIRMED) will fund the operation for a victim of leprosy in India. The 
cost of the operation depends on the extent of disfigurement. A simple 
procedure in India costs approximately CHF 60; the Department of Eco-
nomics will cover this amount in full. 
If you reach an agreement with participant 2 about the division of the 
additional monetary payment, we will not provide the funding. This 
means that if an agreement is reached, the leprosy patient will not receive 
the operation. 
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Summary of possible results 
Result 
How is the 
result 
reached? 
Your ad-
ditional 
payment 
Additional 
payment 
for partici-
pant 2 
Consequence 
for the per-
son suffering 
from leprosy 
No agree-
ment 
Three minutes 
elapse with-
out you or 
participant 2 
making or 
accepting an 
offer 
CHF 0 CHF 0 
Operation 
will be done 
Agreement 
–  
CHF X for 
you 
You or partic-
ipant 2 ac-
cepts the cor-
responding 
offer within 
the three 
minutes 
CHF X 
CHF 20 – 
X 
Operation 
will not be 
done 
 
If, for example, you accept an offer from participant 2 for CHF 10, you and 
participant 2 will both earn an additional CHF 10, and an operation for a 
person suffering from leprosy will not be done. In the same way, if partic-
ipant 2 accepts a demand from you for CHF 15, then you will earn an ad-
ditional CHF 15 and participant 2 will earn CHF 5; again, an operation for 
a person suffering from leprosy will not be done. 
If both you and participant 2 do not agree to anything, you both will each 
receive the fix payment of CHF 15, will not earn any additional payment, 
and the operation will be done for a person suffering from leprosy. 
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Control questions 
Please now answer the questions below to examine your understanding of 
the experiment. If you have any questions, please raise your hand. An 
assistant will come to you at your desk and answer your question. Please 
mark the correct answer below. 
1) If you allow the three minutes on the screen to lapse in the round cho-
sen at the end without making a demand or accepting an offer, 
 
• A person suffering from leprosy in India will receive an operation, 
and you and participant 2 will receive no further monetary pay-
ments. 
• A person suffering from leprosy in India will not receive an opera-
tion, and you and participant 2 will receive no further monetary 
payments. 
 
2) If you click on “Accept the current offer from participant 2” in the round 
chosen at the end, 
 
• A person suffering from leprosy in India will receive an operation, 
and you and participant 2 each receive the agreed upon amount as 
an additional monetary payment. 
• A person suffering from leprosy in India will not receive an opera-
tion, and you and participant 2 each receive the agreed upon 
amount as an additional monetary payment. 
• A person suffering from leprosy in India will not receive an opera-
tion, and you and participant 2 will receive no further monetary 
payments. 
 
3) The operation on a leprosy patient has the objective of 
 
• Destroying the pathogen that causes leprosy. 
• Strongly relieving the consequences of disfigurement due to lep-
rosy. 
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MARK E T1VS2 TRE ATMENT –  INSTRUCTIONS FO R SUBJE CTS IN 
THE  ROL E  OF COMPE TITORS 
Welcome to the Econ-Lab! 
Please read the following instructions carefully. If you have questions, 
please raise your hand; an assistant will come immediately to you at your 
desk. 
General Information 
You are participating in a study at the Department of Economics at the 
University of Zurich. You will receive a fix payment of CHF 15 for your 
participation; you can earn additional monetary amounts depending on 
how the study runs. You will receive your payment at the end of the study 
in cash. 
Please note that these instructions are only for your private information, 
and that communication is absolutely forbidden during the study. If you 
have questions, please address them to us. Violation of this rule leads to 
exclusion from the study and all payments. 
The data collected in this study will never be associated with your name. 
Your name will only be used in signing the receipt for your payment, 
meaning that your anonymity is guaranteed at all times. 
What is this about? 
In this experiment, you will be assigned anonymously to a group with two 
other participants of this study, participant 2a and participant 2b. In a 
virtual marketplace, you can negotiate about the final distribution of a 
monetary amount of CHF 20 with participant 2a. The negotiations with 
participant 2a can lead either to an agreement or to no agreement. If you 
reach an agreement with participant 2a, each of you will receive the 
amount that you agreed on. 
At the same time, participant 2a and participant 2b also negotiate about 
the distribution of CHF 20. Only one agreement can be made, either be-
tween participant 2a and you or between participant 2a and participant 2b.  
How the market functions 
You can negotiate with participant 2a for the period of three minutes 
about the distribution of CHF 20. This means that you can place demands 
of how much of the CHF 20 you should receive; participant 2a can also 
make suggestions about how much of the CHF 20 he or she offers to you. 
You can accept participant 2a’s offers, and he or she can accept your de-
mands. 
At the same time, participant 2a and participant 2b are negotiating over 
the distribution of CHF 20. The offers participant 2a makes apply in exact-
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ly the same way for you and for participant 2b. Both you and participant 
2b see participant 2a’s offers. The first participant of the two of you to 
accept participant 2a’s offer will receive it. However, you do not see how 
much participant 2b demands from participant 2a; in the same way, par-
ticipant 2b does not see how much you demand from participant 2a. 
Participant 2a sees both your and participant 2b’s demands on his or her 
screen and can decide, which of the demands he or she would like to ac-
cept. 
Once demands and offers have been placed, they can no longer be with-
drawn. This applies for all participants. When you enter a new demand, 
this must represent an improvement for participant 2a, i.e. you must re-
duce your demand. The same applies for participant 2a; if he or she sug-
gests a new offer, this must be an improvement for you; i.e. participant 2a 
must increase his or her offer. 
As soon as you enter a new – reduced – demand, your previous demands 
can no longer be accepted. The same applies for offers. As soon as you 
receive a new offer, you can no longer accept the previous offer. Only the 
current offers and demands can be accepted. 
You make a demand by entering the amount on your monitor that you 
would like to keep for yourself. If you enter a demand for CHF X, this 
means that you would like to retain CHF X for yourself and that partici-
pant 2a will thus receive the amount of CHF 20 – X. This demand will then 
be notified to participant 2a, but not to participant 2b. The same applies for 
offers. If participant 2a offers you CHF Y, he or she will enter it on the 
monitor. An offer of Y means that you will receive the amount of CHF Y in 
case of an agreement, while participant 2a receives CHF 20 – Y.  
Demands must be integers between CHF 0 and 20. 
The market will be closed when 
a)  an agreement is made (i.e. you or participant 2b accepts an offer 
from participant 2a or when participant 2a accepts your demand 
or that of participant 2b) 
or 
b)  the three minutes have expired. 
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Summary of the market 
 
 
You now have the opportunity to become familiar with the operation of 
the virtual market for three minutes in a test run. You will be randomly 
grouped with two other participants in the experiment, a participant 2a 
and a participant 2b. The test run has no consequences and only has the 
objective of helping you understand how the virtual market functions. 
Please enter the control questions below and raise your hand as soon as 
you are done. 
  
The remaining time is shown 
here
You can enter  your  demand 
here and confirm i t with the 
button “ Submit offer ” . Only 
integers between 0 and 20 
are possible
By cl icking on this button, you 
accept par ticipant 2a’s offer  and 
the market wi l l  be closed 
History of your demands
Your  current demand Current offer  from participant 2a
History of partici pant 2a‘s 
offers
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Control questions 
1) Assume that you see the amount of CHF 5 in the window “Current 
offer from participant 2a”. If you click on “Accept current offer from par-
ticipant 2a”, this means that you 
• Accept the distribution “CHF 5 for me and CHF 15 for participant 
2a”. 
 
• Accept the distribution “CHF 15 for me and CHF 5 for participant 
2a” 
 
2) After you, participant 2a, or participant 2b has accepted an offer, 
 
• More demands and offers can be made until the three minutes have 
expired. 
• No further demands and offers can be made because the market is 
closed. 
 
3) Does participant 2b see what your current demand on participant 2a 
is? 
 
• Yes 
• No 
 
4) If you neither make a demand nor accept an offer 
 
• none of the three participants receive any further payment.  
• the further payments to participants 2a and 2b depend on how these 
two participants negotiate with one another. 
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Continuation of the instructions 
After you were anonymously assigned to participants 2a and 2b, the mar-
ket will be open to you once for three minutes. The interaction with partic-
ipant 2a can either lead to an agreement or not lead to an agreement. 
However, agreement or non-agreement also has consequences for a third 
party – a patient suffering from leprosy in India. 
If no agreement is reached either between you and participant 2a or be-
tween participant 2b and participant 2a, then we will fund a necessary 
operation for a person suffering from leprosy in India, who otherwise 
would have no opportunity to have this operation. In this case, you, par-
ticipant 2a, and participant 2b will not receive any further monetary pay-
ment, meaning that you will receive your fixed payment of CHF 15 at the 
end of the study. 
If, however, an agreement is reached between you and participant 2a or 
between participant 2b and participant 2a, we will not fund the opera-
tion for the person suffering from leprosy. In this case, you and partici-
pant 2a or participant 2b and participant 2a will receive an additional 
monetary payment in the amount of the agreed sum. 
We will explain the consequences of the two alternatives in more detail 
below. The other two participants are also completely informed about 
possible consequences.  
If neither you nor participant 2b reaches an agreement with participant 2a 
within the three minute time period, the market will be closed with the 
result “no agreement”. We will then fund the operation for a leprosy pa-
tient. After expiration of the 3 minutes, the experiment will be continued 
with a small questionnaire. 
The consequences of your actions 
Leprosy is a chronic infectious disease caused by the bacteria Mycobacte-
rium Leprae; it is spread from person to person. The pathogen causes death 
of nerve cells and blockage of arteries and veins. As a result, there is a 
long-term danger of bodily disfigurement, blindness, or other permanent 
disabilities. 
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Although the disease can be cured with medical treatment, many leprosy 
victims suffer from the consequences of disfigurement from the sickness 
even after the pathogen has been eradicated. Disfigurement from leprosy 
leads to a very high degree of ostracism and stigmatization, a situation 
that victims suffer from for their entire lives. However, even small surgical 
interventions can significantly reduce the scope of disfigurement. 
Almost 60% of the world’s new leprosy cases occur in India. Due to the 
prevalence of poverty, funding an operation – which would allow for a life 
in dignity – is not possible for most of the victims with disfigurement. 
If neither you nor participant 2b reach an agreement with participant 2a 
about the division of the additional monetary payment, we (the Depart-
ment of Economics of the University of Zurich in cooperation with the 
Swiss relief organization FAIRMED) will fund the operation for a victim of 
leprosy in India. The cost of the operation depends on the extent of disfig-
urement. A simple procedure in India costs approximately CHF 60; the 
Department of Economics will cover this amount in full. 
If you either you or participant 2b reaches an agreement about the divi-
sion of the additional monetary payment, we will not provide the fund-
ing. This means that if an agreement is reached, the leprosy patient will 
not receive the operation. 
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Summary of possible results 
Result 
How is the 
result 
reached? 
Your 
addi-
tional 
pay-
ment 
Addi-
tional 
payment 
for par-
ticipant 
2a 
Addi-
tional 
payment 
for par-
ticipant 
2b 
Conse-
quence for 
the person 
suffering 
from lep-
rosy 
No 
agree-
ment 
Three 
minutes 
elapse 
without 
you, partic-
ipant 2a, 
and partici-
pant 2b 
accepting an 
offer 
CHF 0 CHF 0 CHF 0 
Operation 
will be 
done 
Agree-
ment 
with 
partici-
pant 2a – 
CHF X 
for you 
You or par-
ticipant 2a 
accepts the 
correspond-
ing offer 
within the 
three 
minutes 
CHF X 
CHF 20 – 
X 
CHF 0 
Operation 
will not be 
done 
Agree-
ment 
between 
partici-
pant 2a 
and 2b – 
CHF X 
for par-
ticipant 
2b 
Participant 
2a or partic-
ipant 2b 
accepts the 
correspond-
ing offer 
within the 
three 
minutes 
CHF 0 
CHF 20 – 
X 
CHF X 
Operation 
will not be 
done 
 
If, for example, you accept an offer from participant 2a for CHF 10, you 
and participant 2a will both earn an additional CHF 10, and an operation 
for a person suffering from leprosy will not be done. In the same way, if 
participant 2a accepts a demand from you for CHF 15, then you will earn 
an additional CHF 15 and participant 2a will earn CHF 5; again, an opera-
tion for a person suffering from leprosy will not be done. 
If both you and also participant 2b or 2a do not reach an agreement, all 
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three participants will each receive the fix payment of CHF 15, will not 
earn any additional payment, and the operation will be done for a person 
suffering from leprosy. 
Control questions 
Please now answer the questions below to examine your understanding of 
the experiment. If you have any questions, please raise your hand. An 
assistant will come to you at your desk and answer your question. Please 
mark the correct answer below. 
 
1) If you allow the three minutes on the screen to lapse without making a 
demand or accepting an offer, 
 
• A person suffering from leprosy in India will receive an operation, 
and you, participant 2a, and participant 2b will receive no further 
monetary payments. 
• A person suffering from leprosy in India will not receive an opera-
tion, and you, participant 2a, and participant 2b will receive no 
further monetary payments. 
• The funding of the operation for a person suffering from leprosy 
in India depends on how the other two participants act. 
 
2) If you click on “Accept the current offer from participant 2a”, 
 
• A person suffering from leprosy in India will receive an operation, 
and you and participant 2a each receive the agreed upon amount 
as an additional monetary payment. 
• A person suffering from leprosy in India will not receive an opera-
tion, and you and participant 2a each receive the agreed upon 
amount as an additional monetary payment. 
• A person suffering from leprosy in India will not receive an opera-
tion, and you and participant 2a will receive no further monetary 
payments. 
 
3) The operation on a leprosy patient has the objective of 
 
• Destroying the pathogen that causes leprosy. 
• Strongly relieving the consequences of disfigurement due to lep-
rosy. 
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MARK E T1VS2 TRE ATMENT –  INSTRUCTIONS FO R SUBJE CTS IN 
THE  ROL E  OF MONOPOLISTS 
Welcome to the Econ-Lab! 
Please read the following instructions carefully. If you have questions, 
please raise your hand; an assistant will come immediately to you at your 
desk. 
General Information 
You are participating in a study at the Department of Economics at the 
University of Zurich. You will receive a fix payment of CHF 15 for your 
participation; you can earn additional monetary amounts depending on 
how the study runs. You will receive your payment at the end of the study 
in cash. 
Please note that these instructions are only for your private information, 
and that communication is absolutely forbidden during the study. If you 
have questions, please address them to us. Violation of this rule leads to 
exclusion from the study and all payments. 
The data collected in this study will never be associated with your name. 
Your name will only be used in signing the receipt for your payment, 
meaning that your anonymity is guaranteed at all times. 
What is this about? 
In this experiment, you will be assigned anonymously to a group with two 
other participants of this study, participant 2a and participant 2b. In a 
virtual marketplace, you can negotiate about the final distribution of a 
monetary amount of CHF 20. The negotiations with participants 2a and 2b 
can lead either to an agreement with one participant or to no agreement. If 
you reach an agreement with one of the participants, each of you will re-
ceive the amount that you agreed on. If you do not reach an agreement 
with one of the participants, all three participants receive nothing. 
You can only reach an agreement with one of the two other participants. 
Participant 2a and participant 2b only negotiate with you, and not with 
each other. If you reach an agreement with one of the participants, the 
other will not receive an additional payment. 
How the market functions 
You can negotiate with participant 2a and participant 2b simultaneously 
for the period of three minutes about the distribution of CHF 20. This 
means that you can place demands of how much of the CHF 20 you 
should receive; participant 2a and participant 2b can also make sugges-
tions about how much of the CHF 20 each of them offers to you. You can 
accept the offers from participant 2a and 2b, and they can accept your de-
mands. 
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Your demands apply for both participants 2a and 2b. Both participant 2a 
and participant 2b see your demand. The first participant to accept your 
demand will also receive it. However, participant 2a does not see how 
much participant 2b offers you, and participant 2b does not see how 
much participant 2a offers you. 
Once demands and offers have been placed, they can no longer be with-
drawn. This applies for all participants. When you enter a new demand, 
this must represent an improvement for the other participants, i.e. you 
must reduce your demand. The same applies for participant 2a and partic-
ipant 2b; if either of them suggests a new offer, this must be an improve-
ment for you; i.e. participant 2a or participant 2b must increase his or her 
offer. 
As soon as you enter a new – reduced – demand, your previous demands 
can no longer be accepted. The same applies for offers. As soon as you 
receive a new offer, you can no longer accept the previous offer. Only the 
current offers and demands can be accepted. 
You make a demand by entering the amount on your monitor that you 
would like to keep for yourself. If you enter a demand for CHF X, this 
means that you would like to retain CHF X for yourself and that partici-
pant 2a or participant 2b will thus receive the amount of CHF 20 – X. This 
demand will then be notified to participant 2a and to participant 2b. The 
same applies for offers. If participant 2a or participant 2b offers you CHF 
Y, he or she will enter it on the monitor. An offer of Y means that you will 
receive the amount of CHF Y in case of an agreement, while participant 2a 
or participant 2b receives CHF 20 – Y.  
Demands must be integers between CHF 0 and 20. 
The market will be closed when 
a)  an agreement is made (i.e. you accept an offer from participant 2a 
or participant 2b, or when participant 2a or participant 2b accepts 
your demand) 
or 
b)  the three minutes have expired. 
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Summary of the market 
 
 
You now have the opportunity to become familiar with the operation of 
the virtual market for three minutes in a test run. You will be randomly 
grouped with two other participants in the experiment, a participant 2a 
and a participant 2b. The test run has no consequences and only has the 
objective of helping you understand how the virtual market functions. 
Please enter the control questions below and raise your hand as soon as 
you are done. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The remaining time i s shown 
here.
You can enter  your  demand 
here and confirm i t wi th the 
button “ Submit offer” . Only 
integers between 0 and 20 
are possible.
By cl icking on this 
button, you accept 
par ticipant 2a’s offer 
and the market wi ll  be 
closed.
History of your demands
Your  current demand Current offer  from 
participant 2a
History of participant 2a’s 
offers
Cur rent offer  from 
parti cipant 2b
By cl icking on this 
button, you accept 
par ti cipant 2b’s offer 
and the market wi ll  be 
closed.
History of participant 2b’s 
offers
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Control questions 
1) Assume that you see the amount of CHF 5 in the window “Current 
offer from participant 2a”. If you click on “Accept current offer from par-
ticipant 2a”, this means that you 
 
• Accept the distribution “CHF 5 for me and CHF 15 for participant 
2a”. 
• Accept the distribution “CHF 15 for me and CHF 5 for participant 
2a” 
 
2) After you, participant 2a, or participant 2b has accepted an offer, 
 
• More demands and offers can be made until the three minutes have 
expired. 
• No further demands and offers can be made because the market is 
closed. 
 
3) Does participant 2b see what the current, highest offer of participant 
2a to you is? 
 
• Yes 
• No 
 
4) If you neither make a demand nor accept an offer 
 
• none of the three participants receive any further payment.  
• the further payments to participants 2a and 2b depend on how these 
two participants act. 
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Continuation of the instructions 
After you were anonymously assigned to participants 2a and 2b, the mar-
ket will be open to you once for three minutes. The interaction with partic-
ipant 2a and participant 2b can either lead to an agreement or not lead to 
an agreement. However, agreement or non-agreement also has conse-
quences for a third party – a patient suffering from leprosy in India. 
If no agreement is reached, then we will fund a necessary operation for a 
person suffering from leprosy in India, who otherwise would have no 
opportunity to have this operation. In this case, you, participant 2a, and 
participant 2b will not receive any further monetary payment, meaning 
that you will receive your fixed payment of CHF 15 at the end of the 
study. 
If, however, an agreement is reached between you and either participant 
2a or participant 2b, we will not fund the operation for the person suf-
fering from leprosy. In this case, you and participant 2a or participant 2b 
will receive an additional monetary payment in the amount of the agreed 
sum. 
We will explain the consequences of the two alternatives in more detail 
below. The other two participants are also completely informed about 
possible consequences.  
If you do not take any action or do not reach an agreement with partici-
pant 2a or participant 2b within the three minute time period, the market 
will be closed with the result “no agreement”. We will then fund the opera-
tion for a leprosy patient. After expiration of the 3 minutes, the experiment 
will be continued with a small questionnaire. 
The consequences of your actions 
Leprosy is a chronic infectious disease caused by the bacteria Mycobacte-
rium Leprae; it is spread from person to person. The pathogen causes death 
of nerve cells and blockage of arteries and veins. As a result, there is a 
long-term danger of bodily disfigurement, blindness, or other permanent 
disabilities. 
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Although the disease can be cured with medical treatment, many leprosy 
victims suffer from the consequences of disfigurement from the sickness 
even after the pathogen has been eradicated. Disfigurement from leprosy 
leads to a very high degree of ostracism and stigmatization, a situation 
that victims suffer from for their entire lives. However, even small surgical 
interventions can significantly reduce the scope of disfigurement. 
Almost 60% of the world’s new leprosy cases occur in India. Due to the 
prevalence of poverty, funding an operation – which would allow for a life 
in dignity – is not possible for most of the victims with disfigurement. 
If you do not reach an agreement with participant 2a or participant 2b 
about the division of the additional monetary payment, we (the Depart-
ment of Economics of the University of Zurich in cooperation with the 
Swiss relief organization FAIRMED) will fund the operation for a victim of 
leprosy in India. The cost of the operation depends on the extent of disfig-
urement. A simple procedure in India costs approximately CHF 60; the 
Department of Economics will cover this amount in full. 
If you reach an agreement with participant 2a or participant 2b about the 
division of the additional monetary payment, we will not provide the 
funding. This means that if an agreement is reached, the leprosy patient 
will not receive the operation. 
  
A.2 instructions 103
  
Summary of possible results 
Result 
How is the 
result 
reached? 
Your 
addi-
tional 
pay-
ment 
Addi-
tional 
payment 
for par-
ticipant 
2a 
Addi-
tional 
payment 
for par-
ticipant 
2b 
Conse-
quence for 
the person 
suffering 
from lep-
rosy 
No 
agree-
ment 
Three 
minutes 
elapse 
without 
you, partic-
ipant 2a, 
and partici-
pant 2b 
accepting 
an offer 
CHF 0 CHF 0 CHF 0 
Operation 
will be 
done 
Agree-
ment 
with 
partici-
pant 2a – 
CHF X 
for you 
You or par-
ticipant 2a 
accepts the 
correspond-
ing offer 
within the 
three 
minutes 
CHF X 
CHF 20 
– X 
CHF 0 
Operation 
will not be 
done 
Agree-
ment 
with 
partici-
pant 2b – 
CHF X 
for par-
ticipant 
you 
You or par-
ticipant 2b 
accepts the 
correspond-
ing offer 
within the 
three 
minutes 
CHF X CHF 0 
CHF 20 
– X 
Operation 
will not be 
done 
 
If, for example, you accept an offer from participant 2a for CHF 10, you 
and participant 2a will both earn an additional CHF 10, and an operation 
for a person suffering from leprosy will not be done. In the same way, if 
participant 2a accepts a demand from you for CHF 15, then you will earn 
an additional CHF 15 and participant 2a will earn CHF 5; again, an opera-
tion for a person suffering from leprosy will not be done. 
If both you or the other participants do not reach an agreement, all three 
participants will each receive the fix payment of CHF 15, will not earn any 
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additional payment, and the operation will be done for a person suffering 
from leprosy. 
Control questions 
Please now answer the questions below to examine your understanding of 
the experiment. If you have any questions, please raise your hand. An 
assistant will come to you at your desk and answer your question. Please 
mark the correct answer below. 
 
1) If you allow the three minutes on the screen to lapse without making a 
demand or accepting an offer, 
 
• A person suffering from leprosy in India will receive an operation, 
and you, participant 2a, and participant 2b will receive no further 
monetary payments. 
• A person suffering from leprosy in India will not receive an opera-
tion, and you, participant 2a, and participant 2b will receive no 
further monetary payments. 
 
2) If you click on “Accept the current offer from participant 2b”, 
 
• A person suffering from leprosy in India will receive an operation, 
and you and participant 2b each receive the agreed upon amount 
as an additional monetary payment. 
• A person suffering from leprosy in India will not receive an opera-
tion, and you and participant 2b each receive the agreed upon 
amount as an additional monetary payment. 
• A person suffering from leprosy in India will not receive an opera-
tion, and you and participant 2b will receive no further monetary 
payments. 
 
3) The operation on a leprosy patient has the objective of 
 
• Destroying the pathogen that causes leprosy. 
• Strongly relieving the consequences of disfigurement due to lep-
rosy. 
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MARK E T1VS4 TRE ATMENT –  INSTRUCTIONS FO R SUBJE CTS IN 
THE  ROL E  OF COMPE TITORS 
Welcome to the Econ-Lab! 
Please read the following instructions carefully. If you have questions, 
please raise your hand; an assistant will come immediately to you at your 
desk. 
General Information 
You are participating in a study at the Department of Economics at the 
University of Zurich. You will receive a fix payment of CHF 15 for your 
participation; you can earn additional monetary amounts depending on 
how the study runs. You will receive your payment at the end of the study 
in cash. 
Please note that these instructions are only for your private information, 
and that communication is absolutely forbidden during the study. If you 
have questions, please address them to us. Violation of this rule leads to 
exclusion from the study and all payments. 
The data collected in this study will never be associated with your name. 
Your name will only be used in signing the receipt for your payment, 
meaning that your anonymity is guaranteed at all times. 
What is this about? 
In this experiment, you will be assigned anonymously to a group with 
four other participants of this study, participant 2a, participant 2b, partici-
pant 2c, and participant 2d. In a virtual marketplace, you can negotiate 
about the final distribution of a monetary amount of CHF 20 with partici-
pant 2a. The negotiations with participant 2a can lead either to an agree-
ment or to no agreement. If you reach an agreement with participant 2a, 
each of you will receive the amount that you agreed on. 
At the same time, participant 2a also negotiates with participant 2b, 2c, 
and 2d about the distribution of CHF 20. Only one agreement can be 
made, either between participant 2a and you or between participant 2a 
and participant 2b, between participant 2a and participant 2c, or between 
participant 2a and participant 2d.  
How the market functions 
You can negotiate with participant 2a for the period of three minutes 
about the distribution of CHF 20. This means that you can place demands 
of how much of the CHF 20 you should receive; participant 2a can also 
make suggestions about how much of the CHF 20 he or she offers to you. 
You can accept participant 2a’s offers, and he or she can accept your de-
mands. 
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At the same time, participant 2a is negotiating with participant 2b, 2c, and 
2d over the distribution of CHF 20. The offers participant 2a makes apply 
in exactly the same way for you and for participant 2b, participant 2c, and 
participant 2d. You, participant 2b, participant 2c, and participant 2d see 
participant 2a’s offers. The first participant to accept participant 2a’s 
offer will receive it. However, you do not see how much the other partic-
ipants demand from participant 2a; in the same way, participants 2b, 2c, 
and 2d do not see how much the other participants demand from partic-
ipant 2a. Participant 2a sees both your demands and those of participants 
2b, 2c, and 2d on his or her screen and can decide, which of the demands 
he or she would like to accept. 
Once demands and offers have been placed, they can no longer be with-
drawn. This applies for all participants. When you enter a new demand, 
this must represent an improvement for participant 2a, i.e. you must re-
duce your demand. The same applies for participant 2a; if he or she sug-
gests a new offer, this must be an improvement for you; i.e. participant 2a 
must increase his or her offer. 
As soon as you enter a new – reduced – demand, your previous demands 
can no longer be accepted. The same applies for offers. As soon as you 
receive a new offer, you can no longer accept the previous offer. Only the 
current offers and demands can be accepted. 
You make a demand by entering the amount on your monitor that you 
would like to keep for yourself. If you enter a demand for CHF X, this 
means that you would like to retain CHF X for yourself and that partici-
pant 2a will thus receive the amount of CHF 20 – X. This demand will then 
be notified to participant 2a, but not to participant 2b, 2c, and 2d. The 
same applies for offers from participant 2a. If participant 2a offers you 
CHF Y, he or she will enter it on the monitor. An offer of Y means that you 
will receive the amount of CHF Y in case of an agreement, while partici-
pant 2a receives CHF 20 – Y.  
Demands must be integers between CHF 0 and 20. 
The market will be closed when 
a)  an agreement is made (i.e. you or participant 2b, participant 2c, or 
participant 2d accepts an offer from participant 2a or when partic-
ipant 2a accepts a demand) 
or 
b)  the three minutes have expired. 
You will not learn until after the period of three minutes has elapsed 
whether the market was already closed due an agreement was reached 
between participant 2a and one of the participants 2b, 2c, or 2d. 
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Summary of the market 
 
 
You now have the opportunity to become familiar with the operation of 
the virtual market for three minutes in a test run. You will be randomly 
grouped with four other participants in the experiment. The test run has 
no consequences and only has the objective of helping you understand 
how the virtual market functions. We will distribute further instructions 
after the end of the test run. 
Please enter the control questions below and raise your hand as soon as 
you are done. 
  
The remaining time is shown 
here
You can enter  your  demand 
here and confirm i t with the 
button “ Submit offer ” . Only 
integers between 0 and 20 
are possible
By cl icking on this button, you 
accept par ticipant 2a’s offer  and 
the market wi l l  be closed 
History of your demands
Your  current demand Current offer  from participant 2a
History of partici pant 2a‘s 
offers
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Control questions 
1) Assume that you see the amount of CHF 5 in the window “Current 
offer from participant 2a”. If you click on “Accept current offer from par-
ticipant 2a”, this means that you 
 
• Accept the distribution “CHF 5 for me and CHF 15 for participant 
2a”. 
• Accept the distribution “CHF 15 for me and CHF 5 for participant 
2a” 
 
2) After you have accepted an offer, you can 
 
• Accept a further offer as long as the three minutes have not yet ex-
pired. 
• Not accept another offer, as only one agreement can be made. 
 
3) Does participant 2b see what your current demand on participant 2a 
is? 
 
• Yes 
• No 
 
4) If you neither make a demand nor accept an offer 
 
• none of the five participants receives any further payment.  
• the further payments to participants 2a, 2b, 2c, and 2d depend on 
how these participants negotiate with one another. 
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Continuation of the instructions 
After you were anonymously assigned to participants 2a, 2b, 2c, and 2d, 
the market will be open to you once for three minutes. The interaction 
with participant 2a can either lead to an agreement or not lead to an 
agreement. However, agreement or non-agreement also has consequences 
for a third party – a patient suffering from leprosy in India. 
If no agreement is reached either between you and participant 2a or be-
tween participant 2a and another participant, then we will fund a neces-
sary operation for a person suffering from leprosy in India, who other-
wise would have no opportunity to have this operation. In this case, you, 
participant 2a, participant 2b, participant 2c, and participant 2d will not 
receive any further monetary payment, meaning that all of you will re-
ceive your fixed payment of CHF 15 at the end of the study. 
If, however, an agreement is reached between you and participant 2a or 
between participant 2a and another participant, we will not fund the 
operation for the person suffering from leprosy. In this case, you and 
participant 2a or participant 2a and the other participant will receive an 
additional monetary payment in the amount of the agreed sum. 
We will explain the consequences of the two alternatives in more detail 
below. The other three participants are also completely informed about 
possible consequences.  
If neither you nor another participant reaches an agreement with partici-
pant 2a within the three minute time period, the market will be closed 
with the result “no agreement”. We will then fund the operation for a lepro-
sy patient. After expiration of the 3 minutes, the experiment will be con-
tinued with a small questionnaire. 
The consequences of your actions 
Leprosy is a chronic infectious disease caused by the bacteria Mycobacte-
rium Leprae; it is spread from person to person. The pathogen causes death 
of nerve cells and blockage of arteries and veins. As a result, there is a 
long-term danger of bodily disfigurement, blindness, or other permanent 
disabilities. 
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Although the disease can be cured with medical treatment, many leprosy 
victims suffer from the consequences of disfigurement from the sickness 
even after the pathogen has been eradicated. Disfigurement from leprosy 
leads to a very high degree of ostracism and stigmatization, a situation 
that victims suffer from for their entire lives. However, even small surgical 
interventions can significantly reduce the scope of disfigurement. 
Almost 60% of the world’s new leprosy cases occur in India. Due to the 
prevalence of poverty, funding an operation – which would allow for a life 
in dignity – is not possible for most of the victims with disfigurement. 
If neither you nor participant 2b, 2c, or 2d reaches an agreement with 
participant 2a about the division of the additional monetary payment, 
we (the Department of Economics of the University of Zurich in coopera-
tion with the Swiss relief organization FAIRMED) will fund the operation 
for a victim of leprosy in India. The cost of the operation depends on the 
extent of disfigurement. A simple procedure in India costs approximately 
CHF 60; the Department of Economics will cover this amount in full. 
If you either you or one of the other participants 2b, 2c, or 2d reaches an 
agreement with participant 2a about the division of the additional mon-
etary payment, we will not provide the funding. This means that if an 
agreement is reached, the leprosy patient will not receive the operation. 
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Summary of possible results 
 
If, for example, you accept an offer from participant 2a for CHF 10, you 
and participant 2a will both earn an additional CHF 10, and an operation 
for a person suffering from leprosy will not be done. In the same way, if 
participant 2a accepts a demand from you for CHF 15, then you will earn 
an additional CHF 15 and participant 2a will earn CHF 5; again, an opera-
tion for a person suffering from leprosy will not be done. 
If both you and also participant 2b, 2c, or 2d do not reach an agreement, or 
if participant 2a does not agree to anything, all five participants will each 
receive the fix payment of CHF 15, will not earn any additional payment, 
and the operation will be done for a person suffering from leprosy. 
  
Result 
How is the 
result 
reached? 
Your 
additional 
payment 
Additional payment for participant Consequence for the person 
suffering from 
leprosy 2a 2b 2c 2d 
No 
agreement 
Three minutes 
elapse without 
you, 
participant 2a, 
2b, 2c, 2d 
accepting an 
offer 
CHF 0 CHF 0 CHF 0 CHF 0 CHF 0 Operation will be done 
Agreement 
with 
participant 
2a – CHF X 
for you 
You or 
participant 2a 
accepts the 
corresponding 
offer within the 
three minutes 
CHF X CHF 20 – X CHF 0 CHF 0 CHF 0 
Operation will 
not be done 
Agreement 
between 
participant 
2a and 2b – 
CHF X for 
participant 
2b 
Participant 2a 
or participant 
2b accepts the 
corresponding 
offer within the 
three minutes 
CHF 0 CHF 20 – X CHF X CHF 0 CHF 0 
Operation will 
not be done 
Agreement 
between 
participant 
2a and 2c – 
CHF X for 
participant 2c 
You or 
participant 2a 
accepts the 
corresponding 
offer within the 
three minutes 
CHF 0 CHF 20 – X CHF 0 CHF X CHF 0 
Operation will 
not be done 
Agreement 
between 
participant 
2a and 2d – 
CHF X for 
participant 
2d 
Participant 2a 
or participant 
2b accepts the 
corresponding 
offer within the 
three minutes 
CHF 0 CHF 20 – X CHF 0 CHF 0 CHF X 
Operation will 
not be done 
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Control questions 
Please now answer the questions below to examine your understanding of 
the experiment. If you have any questions, please raise your hand. An 
assistant will come to you at your desk and answer your question. Please 
mark the correct answer below. 
1) If you allow the three minutes on the screen to lapse without making a 
demand or accepting an offer 
 
• A person suffering from leprosy in India will receive an operation, 
and you, participant 2a, participant 2b, participant 2c, and partici-
pant 2d will receive no further monetary payments. 
• A person suffering from leprosy in India will not receive an opera-
tion, and you, participant 2a, participant 2b, participant 2c, and 
participant 2d will receive no further monetary payments. 
• The funding of the operation for a person suffering from leprosy 
in India depends on how the other participants act. 
 
2) If you click on “Accept the current offer from participant 2a” before an 
agreement between participant 2a and another participant was 
reached, 
 
• A person suffering from leprosy in India will receive an operation, 
and you and participant 2a each receive the agreed upon amount 
as an additional monetary payment. 
• A person suffering from leprosy in India will not receive an opera-
tion, and you and participant 2a each receive the agreed upon 
amount as an additional monetary payment. 
• A person suffering from leprosy in India will not receive an opera-
tion, and you and participant 2a will receive no further monetary 
payments. 
 
3) The operation on a leprosy patient has the objective of 
 
• Destroying the pathogen that causes leprosy. 
• Strongly relieving the consequences of disfigurement due to lep-
rosy. 
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MARK E T1VS4 TRE ATME NT –  INSTRUCTIONS FO R SUBJE CTS IN 
THE  ROL E  OF MONOPOLISTS 
Welcome to the Econ-Lab! 
Please read the following instructions carefully. If you have questions, 
please raise your hand; an assistant will come immediately to you at your 
desk. 
General Information 
You are participating in a study at the Department of Economics at the 
University of Zurich. You will receive a fix payment of CHF 15 for your 
participation; you can earn additional monetary amounts depending on 
how the study runs. You will receive your payment at the end of the study 
in cash. 
Please note that these instructions are only for your private information, 
and that communication is absolutely forbidden during the study. If you 
have questions, please address them to us. Violation of this rule leads to 
exclusion from the study and all payments. 
The data collected in this study will never be associated with your name. 
Your name will only be used in signing the receipt for your payment, 
meaning that your anonymity is guaranteed at all times. 
What is this about? 
In this experiment, you will be assigned anonymously to a group with 
four other participants of this study, participant 2a, participant 2b, partici-
pant 2c, and participant 2d. In a virtual marketplace, you can negotiate 
with participants 2a, 2b, 2c, and 2d about the final distribution of a mone-
tary amount of CHF 20. The negotiations can lead either to an agreement 
with one participant or to no agreement. If you reach an agreement with 
one of the participants, each of you will receive the amount that you 
agreed on. If you do not reach an agreement with one of the participants, 
all five participants receive nothing. 
You can only reach an agreement with one of the four other participants. 
Participants 2a, 2b, 2c, and 2d only negotiate with you, and not with each 
other. If you reach an agreement with one of the participants, the other 
participants will not receive an additional payment. 
How the market functions 
You can negotiate with participants 2a, 2b, 2c, and 2d simultaneously for 
the period of three minutes about the distribution of CHF 20. This means 
that you can place demands of how much of the CHF 20 you should re-
ceive; participants 2a, 2b, 2c, and 2d can also make suggestions about how 
much of the CHF 20 each of them offers to you. You can accept the offers 
from participants 2a, 2b, 2c, and 2d, and they can accept your demands. 
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Your demands apply for all of the participants 2a, 2b, 2c, and 2d. All par-
ticipants see your demand. The first participant to accept your demand 
will also receive it. However, participants 2a, 2b, 2c, and 2d do not see 
how much the other participants offer you. For example, participant 2a 
does not see how much participant 2b offers you, and participant 2b does 
not see what participant 2a offers you. 
Once demands and offers have been placed, they can no longer be with-
drawn. This applies for all participants. When you enter a new demand, 
this must represent an improvement for the other participants, i.e. you 
must reduce your demand. The same applies for participants 2a, 2b, 2c, 
and 2d; if either of them suggests a new offer, this must be an improve-
ment for you; i.e. participant 2a, 2b, 2c, or 2d must increase his or her offer. 
As soon as you enter a new – reduced – demand, your previous demands 
can no longer be accepted. The same applies for offers. As soon as you 
receive a new offer, you can no longer accept the previous offer. Only the 
current offers and demands can be accepted. 
You make a demand by entering the amount on your monitor that you 
would like to keep for yourself. If you enter a demand for CHF X, this 
means that you would like to retain CHF X for yourself and that partici-
pants 2a, 2b, 2c, or 2d will thus receive the amount of CHF 20 – X. This 
demand will then be notified to participants 2a, 2b, 2c, and 2d. The same 
applies for offers. If participant 2a, 2b, 2c, or 2d offers you CHF Y, he or 
she will enter it on the monitor. An offer of Y means that you will receive 
the amount of CHF Y in case of an agreement, while participants 2a, 2b, 2c, 
or 2d receives CHF 20 – Y.  
Demands must be integers between CHF 0 and 20. 
The market will be closed when 
a)  an agreement is made (i.e. you accept an offer from participants 2a, 
2b, 2c, or 2d, or when one of the participants accepts your de-
mand) 
or 
b)  the three minutes have expired. 
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Summary of the market 
 
 
You now have the opportunity to become familiar with the operation of 
the virtual market for three minutes in a test run. You will be randomly 
grouped with four other participants in the experiment. The test run has 
no consequences and only has the objective of helping you understand 
how the virtual market functions. We will distribute further instructions 
after the end of the test run. 
Please enter the control questions below and raise your hand as soon as 
you are done. 
  
The remaining time i s shown 
here.
You can enter your demand 
here and confirm i t wi th the 
button “ Submi t offer” . Only 
integers between 0 and 20 
are possible.
History of your 
demands
Your  current demand
By cl icking on this 
button, you accept 
participant 2a’s offer 
and the market wi ll  be 
closed.
Current offer from 
participant 2a
History of 
participant 2a’s 
offers
By cl icking on this 
button, you accept 
participant 2b’s offer 
and the market wi ll  be 
closed.
Current offer from 
participant 2b
History of 
participant 2b’s 
offers
By cl icking on this 
button, you accept 
participant 2c’ s offer 
and the market wi ll  be 
closed.
Cur rent offer  from 
participant 2c
History of 
par ticipant 2c’s 
offers
By cl icking on this 
button, you accept 
participant 2d’s offer 
and the market wi ll  be 
cl osed.
Current offer from 
participant 2d
History of 
par ticipant 2d’s 
offers
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Control questions 
1) Assume that you see the amount of CHF 5 in the window “Current 
offer from participant 2a”. If you click on “Accept current offer from par-
ticipant 2a”, this means that you 
 
• Accept the distribution “CHF 5 for me and CHF 15 for participant 
2a”. 
• Accept the distribution “CHF 15 for me and CHF 5 for participant 
2a” 
 
2) After you, participant 2a, 2b, 2c, or 2d has accepted an offer, 
 
• More demands and offers can be made until the three minutes have 
expired. 
• No further demands and offers can be made because the market is 
closed. 
 
3) Does participant 2b see what the current, highest offer of participant 
2d to you is? 
 
• Yes 
• No 
 
4) If you neither make a demand nor accept an offer 
 
• none of the three participants receive any further payment.  
• the further payments to participants 2a, 2b, 2c, and 2d depend on 
how these two participants act. 
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Continuation of the instructions 
After you were anonymously assigned to participants 2a, 2b, 2c, and 2d, 
the market will be open to you once for three minutes. The interaction 
with participants 2a, 2b, 2c, and 2d can either lead to an agreement or not 
lead to an agreement. However, agreement or non-agreement also has 
consequences for a third party – a patient suffering from leprosy in India. 
If no agreement is reached, then we will fund a necessary operation for a 
person suffering from leprosy in India, who otherwise would have no 
opportunity to have this operation. In this case, you, participant 2a, par-
ticipant 2b, participant 2c, and participant 2d will not receive any further 
monetary payment, meaning that you will receive your fixed payment of 
CHF 15 at the end of the study. 
If, however, an agreement is reached between you and one of the partic-
ipants 2a 2b, 2c, or 2d, we will not fund the operation for the person 
suffering from leprosy. In this case, you and the participant with whom 
you reached an agreement will receive an additional monetary payment in 
the amount of the agreed sum. 
We will explain the consequences of the two alternatives in more detail 
below. The other four participants are also completely informed about 
possible consequences.  
If you do not take any action or do not reach an agreement with partici-
pants 2a, 2b, 2c, or 2d within the three minute time period, the market will 
be closed with the result “no agreement”. We will then fund the operation 
for a leprosy patient. After expiration of the 3 minutes, the experiment will 
be continued with a small questionnaire. 
The consequences of your actions 
Leprosy is a chronic infectious disease caused by the bacteria Mycobacte-
rium Leprae; it is spread from person to person. The pathogen causes death 
of nerve cells and blockage of arteries and veins. As a result, there is a 
long-term danger of bodily disfigurement, blindness, or other permanent 
disabilities. 
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Although the disease can be cured with medical treatment, many leprosy 
victims suffer from the consequences of disfigurement from the sickness 
even after the pathogen has been eradicated. Disfigurement from leprosy 
leads to a very high degree of ostracism and stigmatization, a situation 
that victims suffer from for their entire lives. However, even small surgical 
interventions can significantly reduce the scope of disfigurement. 
Almost 60% of the world’s new leprosy cases occur in India. Due to the 
prevalence of poverty, funding an operation – which would allow for a life 
in dignity – is not possible for most of the victims with disfigurement. 
If you do not reach an agreement with one of the participants 2a, 2b, 2c, 
or 2d about the division of the additional monetary payment, we (the 
Department of Economics of the University of Zurich in cooperation with 
the Swiss relief organization FAIRMED) will fund the operation for a vic-
tim of leprosy in India. The cost of the operation depends on the extent of 
disfigurement. A simple procedure in India costs approximately CHF 60; 
the Department of Economics will cover this amount in full. 
If you reach an agreement with one of the participants 2a, 2b, 2c, or 2d 
about the division of the additional monetary payment, we will not pro-
vide the funding. This means that if an agreement is reached, the leprosy 
patient will not receive the operation. 
  
A.2 instructions 119
  
Summary of possible results 
 
 
If, for example, you accept an offer from participant 2a for CHF 10, you 
and participant 2a will both earn an additional CHF 10, and an operation 
for a person suffering from leprosy will not be done. In the same way, if 
participant 2a accepts a demand from you for CHF 15, then you will earn 
an additional CHF 15 and participant 2a will earn CHF 5; again, an opera-
tion for a person suffering from leprosy will not be done. 
If both you or the four other participants do not reach an agreement, all 
five participants will each receive the fix payment of CHF 15, will not earn 
any additional payment, and the operation will be done for a person suf-
fering from leprosy. 
  
Result 
How is the 
result 
reached? 
Your 
additional 
payment 
Additional payment for participant Consequence for the person 
suffering from 
leprosy 2a 2b 2c 2d 
No 
agreement 
Three minutes 
elapse without 
you, 
participant 2a, 
2b, 2c, 2d 
accepting an 
offer 
CHF 0 CHF 0 CHF 0 CHF 0 CHF 0 Operation will be done 
Agreement 
with 
participant 2a 
– CHF X for 
you 
You or 
participant 2a 
accepts the 
corresponding 
offer within the 
three minutes 
CHF X CHF 20 
– X CHF 0 CHF 0 CHF 0 
Operation will 
not be done 
Agreement 
with 
participant 2b 
– CHF X for 
you 
You or 
participant 2b 
accepts the 
corresponding 
offer within the 
three minutes 
CHF X CHF 0 CHF 20 
– X CHF 0 CHF 0 
Operation will 
not be done 
Agreement 
with 
participant 2c 
– CHF X for 
you  
You or 
participant 2c 
accepts the 
corresponding 
offer within the 
three minutes 
CHF X CHF 0 CHF 0 CHF 20 
– X CHF 0 
Operation will 
not be done 
Agreement 
with 
participant 2d 
– CHF X for 
you 
You or 
participant 2d 
accepts the 
corresponding 
offer within the 
three minutes 
CHF X CHF 0 CHF 0 CHF 0 CHF 20 
– X 
Operation will 
not be done 
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Control questions 
Please now answer the questions below to examine your understanding of 
the experiment. If you have any questions, please raise your hand. An 
assistant will come to you at your desk and answer your question. Please 
mark the correct answer below. 
 
1) If you allow the three minutes on the screen to lapse without making a 
demand or accepting an offer, 
 
• A person suffering from leprosy in India will receive an operation, 
and you, participant 2a, participant 2b, participant 2c, and partici-
pant 2d will receive no further monetary payments. 
• A person suffering from leprosy in India will not receive an opera-
tion, and you, participant 2a, participant 2b, participant 2c, and 
participant 2d will receive no further monetary payments. 
 
2) If you click on “Accept the current offer from participant 2b”, 
 
• A person suffering from leprosy in India will receive an operation, 
and you and participant 2b each receive the agreed upon amount 
as an additional monetary payment. 
• A person suffering from leprosy in India will not receive an opera-
tion, and you and participant 2b each receive the agreed upon 
amount as an additional monetary payment. 
• A person suffering from leprosy in India will not receive an opera-
tion, and you and participant 2b will receive no further monetary 
payments. 
 
3) The operation on a leprosy patient has the objective of 
 
• Destroying the pathogen that causes leprosy. 
• Strongly relieving the consequences of disfigurement due to lep-
rosy. 
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MARK E T10SI TRE ATME NT –  INSTRUCTIONS FO R SUBJE CTS IN 
THE  ROL E  OF COMPE TITORS 
Welcome to the Econ-Lab! 
Please read the following instructions carefully. If you have questions, 
please raise your hand; an assistant will come immediately to you at your 
desk. 
General Information 
You are participating in a study at the Department of Economics at the 
University of Zurich. You will receive a fix payment of CHF 15 for your 
participation; you can earn additional monetary amounts depending on 
how the study runs. You will receive your payment at the end of the study 
in cash. 
Please note that these instructions are only for your private information, 
and that communication is absolutely forbidden during the study. If you 
have questions, please address them to us. Violation of this rule leads to 
exclusion from the study and all payments. 
The data collected in this study will never be associated with your name. 
Your name will only be used in signing the receipt for your payment, 
meaning that your anonymity is guaranteed at all times. 
What is this about? 
In this experiment, you will be assigned anonymously to a group with 
four other participants of this study, participant 2a, participant 2b, partici-
pant 2c, and participant 2d. In a virtual marketplace, you can negotiate 
about the final distribution of a monetary amount of CHF 20 with partici-
pant 2a. The negotiations with participant 2a can lead either to an agree-
ment or to no agreement. If you reach an agreement with participant 2a, 
each of you will receive the amount that you agreed on. 
At the same time, participant 2a also negotiates with participants 2b, 2c, 
and 2d about the distribution of CHF 20. Only one agreement can be 
made, either between participant 2a and you or between participant 2a 
and participant 2b, between participant 2a and participant 2c, or between 
participant 2a and participant 2d.  
How the market functions 
You can negotiate with participant 2a for the period of three minutes 
about the distribution of CHF 20. This means that you can place demands 
of how much of the CHF 20 you should receive; participant 2a can also 
make suggestions about how much of the CHF 20 he or she offers to you. 
You can accept participant 2a’s offers, and he or she can accept your de-
mands. 
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At the same time, participant 2a is negotiating with participants 2b, 2c, and 
2d about the distribution of CHF 20. The offers participant 2a makes ap-
ply in exactly the same way for you and for participant 2b, participant 
2c, and participant 2d. All participants see the demands of the other par-
ticipants on their monitors. The first participant among you (i.e. you, 
participant 2b, participant 2c, or participant 2d) to accept an offer from 
participant 2a will also receive it. Participant 2a can thus decide whether 
and which of the demands of the other participants (i.e. you, participant 
2b, participant 2c, or participant 2d) he or she would like to accept. 
Once demands and offers have been placed, they can no longer be with-
drawn. This applies for all participants. When you enter a new demand, 
this must represent an improvement for participant 2a, i.e. you must re-
duce your demand. The same applies for participant 2a; if he or she sug-
gests a new offer, this must be an improvement for you; i.e. participant 2a 
must increase his or her offer. 
As soon as you enter a new – reduced – demand, your previous demands 
can no longer be accepted. The same applies for offers from participant 2a. 
As soon as you receive a new offer, you can no longer accept the previous 
offer. Only the current offers and demands can be accepted. 
You make a demand by entering the amount on your monitor that you 
would like to keep for yourself. If you enter a demand for CHF X, this 
means that you would like to retain CHF X for yourself and that partici-
pant 2a will thus receive the amount of CHF 20 – X. This demand will then 
be notified to the other participants. The same applies for offers from par-
ticipant 2a. If participant 2a offers you CHF Y, he or she will enter it on the 
monitor. An offer of Y means that you will receive the amount of CHF Y in 
case of an agreement, while participant 2a receives CHF 20 – Y. You, par-
ticipant 2b, participant 2c, or participant 2d can then accept this offer. 
Demands must be integers between CHF 0 and 20. 
The market will be closed when 
a)  an agreement is made (i.e. you or participant 2b, participant 2c, or 
participant 2d accepts an offer from participant 2a or when partic-
ipant 2a accepts a demand) 
or 
b)  the three minutes have expired. 
You will not learn until after the period of three minutes has elapsed 
whether the market was already closed due an agreement was reached 
between participant 2a and one of the participants 2b, 2c, or 2d. 
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Summary of the market 
 
 
You now have the opportunity to become familiar with the operation of 
the virtual market for three minutes in a test run. You will be randomly 
grouped with four other participants in the experiment. The test run has 
no consequences and only has the objective of helping you understand 
how the virtual market functions. We will distribute further instructions 
after the end of the test run. 
Please enter the control questions below and raise your hand as soon as 
you are done. 
  
The remaining time is shown 
here
You can enter  your  demand 
here and confirm i t with the 
button “ Submit offer ” . Only 
integers between 0 and 20 
are possible
By cl icking on this button, you 
accept par ticipant 2a’s offer  and 
the market wi l l  be closed 
History of your demands
Your  current demand Current offer  from participant 2a
History of partici pant 2a‘s 
offers
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Control questions 
1) Assume that you see the amount of CHF 5 in the window “Current 
offer from participant 2a”. If you click on “Accept current offer from par-
ticipant 2a”, this means that you 
 
• Accept the distribution “CHF 5 for me and CHF 15 for participant 
2a”. 
• Accept the distribution “CHF 15 for me and CHF 5 for participant 
2a” 
 
2) After you have accepted an offer, you can 
 
• Accept a further offer as long as the three minutes have not yet ex-
pired. 
• Not accept another offer, as only one agreement can be made. 
 
3) Does participant 2b see what your current demand on participant 2a 
is? 
 
• Yes 
• No 
 
4) If you neither make a demand nor accept an offer 
 
• none of the five participants receives any further payment.  
• the further payments to participants 2a, 2b, 2c, and 2d depend on 
how these participants negotiate with one another. 
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Continuation of the instructions 
The market will be opened for you for ten rounds lasting three minutes 
each. After the three minutes lapse, you will be randomly assigned to a 
new group of participants 2a, 2b, 2c, and 2d. After the last round is com-
pleted, one round will be chosen randomly and the results from the cho-
sen round will be realized. The interaction with participant 2a can either 
lead to an agreement or not lead to an agreement. However, agreement or 
non-agreement also has consequences for a third party – a patient suffer-
ing from leprosy in India. 
If no agreement is reached in the chosen round either between you and 
participant 2a or between participant 2a and another participant, then 
we will fund a necessary operation for a person suffering from leprosy 
in India, who otherwise would have no opportunity to have this opera-
tion. In this case, you, participant 2a, participant 2b, participant 2c, and 
participant 2d will not receive any further monetary payment, meaning 
that all of you will receive your fixed payment of CHF 15 at the end of the 
study. 
If, however, an agreement is reached in the chosen round between you 
and participant 2a or between participant 2a and another participant, we 
will not fund the operation for the person suffering from leprosy. In this 
case, you and participant 2a or participant 2a and the other participant will 
receive an additional monetary payment in the amount of the agreed sum. 
We will explain the consequences of the two alternatives in more detail 
below. The other four participants are also completely informed about 
possible consequences.  
If neither you nor another participant reaches an agreement with partici-
pant 2a within the three minute time period, the market will be closed 
with the result “no agreement”. If this round is chosen, we will then fund 
the operation for a leprosy patient. After completion of the ten rounds, the 
experiment will be continued with a small questionnaire. 
The consequences of your actions 
Leprosy is a chronic infectious disease caused by the bacteria Mycobacte-
rium Leprae; it is spread from person to person. The pathogen causes death 
of nerve cells and blockage of arteries and veins. As a result, there is a 
long-term danger of bodily disfigurement, blindness, or other permanent 
disabilities. 
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Although the disease can be cured with medical treatment, many leprosy 
victims suffer from the consequences of disfigurement from the sickness 
even after the pathogen has been eradicated. Disfigurement from leprosy 
leads to a very high degree of ostracism and stigmatization, a situation 
that victims suffer from for their entire lives. However, even small surgical 
interventions can significantly reduce the scope of disfigurement. 
Almost 60% of the world’s new leprosy cases occur in India. Due to the 
prevalence of poverty, funding an operation – which would allow for a life 
in dignity – is not possible for most of the victims with disfigurement. 
If neither you nor participant 2b, 2c, or 2d reaches an agreement with 
participant 2a about the division of the additional monetary payment in 
the chosen round, we (the Department of Economics of the University of 
Zurich in cooperation with the Swiss relief organization FAIRMED) will 
fund the operation for a victim of leprosy in India. The cost of the opera-
tion depends on the extent of disfigurement. A simple procedure in India 
costs approximately CHF 60; the Department of Economics will cover this 
amount in full. 
If you either you or one of the other participants 2b, 2c, or 2d reaches an 
agreement with participant 2a about the division of the additional mon-
etary payment in the chosen round, we will not provide the funding. This 
means that if an agreement is reached, the leprosy patient will not receive 
the operation. 
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Summary of possible results 
 
If, for example, you accept an offer from participant 2a for CHF 10 in the 
chosen round, you and participant 2a will both earn an additional CHF 10, 
and an operation for a person suffering from leprosy will not be done. In 
the same way, if participant 2a accepts a demand from you for CHF 15, 
then you will earn an additional CHF 15 and participant 2a will earn CHF 
5; again, an operation for a person suffering from leprosy will not be done. 
If you and also participant 2b, 2c, or 2d do not reach an agreement, or if 
participant 2a does not agree to anything in the chosen round, all five par-
ticipants will each receive the fix payment of CHF 15, will not earn any 
additional payment, and the operation will be done for a person suffering 
from leprosy. 
  
Result 
How is the 
result 
reached? 
Your 
additional 
payment 
Additional payment for participant Consequence for the person 
suffering from 
leprosy 2a 2b 2c 2d 
No 
agreement 
Three minutes 
elapse without 
you, 
participant 2a, 
2b, 2c, 2d 
accepting an 
offer 
CHF 0 CHF 0 CHF 0 CHF 0 CHF 0 Operation will be done 
Agreement 
with 
participant 
2a – CHF X 
for you 
You or 
participant 2a 
accepts the 
corresponding 
offer within the 
three minutes 
CHF X CHF 20 
– X CHF 0 CHF 0 CHF 0 
Operation will 
not be done 
Agreement 
between 
participant 
2a and 2b – 
CHF X for 
participant 
2b 
Participant 2a 
or participant 
2b accepts the 
corresponding 
offer within the 
three minutes 
CHF 0 CHF 20 
– X CHF X CHF 0 CHF 0 
Operation will 
not be done 
Agreement 
between 
participant 
2a and 2c – 
CHF X for 
participant 2c 
You or 
participant 2a 
accepts the 
corresponding 
offer within the 
three minutes 
CHF 0 CHF 20 
– X CHF 0 CHF X CHF 0 
Operation will 
not be done 
Agreement 
between 
participant 
2a and 2d – 
CHF X for 
participant 
2d 
Participant 2a 
or participant 
2b accepts the 
corresponding 
offer within the 
three minutes 
CHF 0 CHF 20 
– X CHF 0 CHF 0 CHF X 
Operation will 
not be done 
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Control questions 
Please now answer the questions below to examine your understanding of 
the experiment. If you have any questions, please raise your hand. An 
assistant will come to you at your desk and answer your question. Please 
mark the correct answer below. 
 
1) If you allow the three minutes on the screen to lapse without making a 
demand or accepting an offer in the chosen round, 
 
• A person suffering from leprosy in India will receive an operation, 
and you, participant 2a, participant 2b, participant 2c, and partici-
pant 2d will receive no further monetary payments. 
• A person suffering from leprosy in India will not receive an opera-
tion, and you, participant 2a, participant 2b, participant 2c, and 
participant 2d will receive no further monetary payments. 
• The funding of the operation for a person suffering from leprosy 
in India depends on how the other participants act. 
 
2) If you click on “Accept the current offer from participant 2a” in the chosen 
round before an agreement between participant 2a and another partic-
ipant was reached, 
 
• A person suffering from leprosy in India will receive an operation, 
and you and participant 2a each receive the agreed upon amount 
as an additional monetary payment. 
• A person suffering from leprosy in India will not receive an opera-
tion, and you and participant 2a each receive the agreed upon 
amount as an additional monetary payment. 
• A person suffering from leprosy in India will not receive an opera-
tion, and you and participant 2a will receive no further monetary 
payments. 
 
3) The operation on a leprosy patient has the objective of 
 
• Destroying the pathogen that causes leprosy. 
• Strongly relieving the consequences of disfigurement due to lep-
rosy. 
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MARK E T10SI TRE ATME NT –  INSTRUCTIONS FO R SUBJE CTS IN 
THE  ROL E  OF MONOPOLISTS 
Welcome to the Econ-Lab! 
Please read the following instructions carefully. If you have questions, 
please raise your hand; an assistant will come immediately to you at your 
desk. 
General Information 
You are participating in a study at the Department of Economics at the 
University of Zurich. You will receive a fix payment of CHF 15 for your 
participation; you can earn additional monetary amounts depending on 
how the study runs. You will receive your payment at the end of the study 
in cash. 
Please note that these instructions are only for your private information, 
and that communication is absolutely forbidden during the study. If you 
have questions, please address them to us. Violation of this rule leads to 
exclusion from the study and all payments. 
The data collected in this study will never be associated with your name. 
Your name will only be used in signing the receipt for your payment, 
meaning that your anonymity is guaranteed at all times. 
What is this about? 
In this experiment, you will be assigned anonymously to a group with 
four other participants of this study, participant 2a, participant 2b, partici-
pant 2c, and participant 2d. In a virtual marketplace, you can negotiate 
with participants 2a, 2b, 2c, and 2d about the final distribution of a mone-
tary amount of CHF 20. The negotiations can lead either to an agreement 
with one participant or to no agreement. If you reach an agreement with 
one of the participants, each of you will receive the amount that you 
agreed on. If you do not reach an agreement with one of the participants, 
all five participants receive nothing. 
You can only reach an agreement with one of the four other participants. 
Participants 2a, 2b, 2c, and 2d only negotiate with you, and not with each 
other. If you reach an agreement with one of the participants, the other 
participants will not receive an additional payment. 
How the market functions 
You can negotiate with participants 2a, 2b, 2c, and 2d simultaneously for 
the period of three minutes about the distribution of CHF 20. This means 
that you can place demands of how much of the CHF 20 you should re-
ceive; participants 2a, 2b, 2c, and 2d can also make suggestions about how 
much of the CHF 20 each of them offers to you. You can accept the offers 
from participants 2a, 2b, 2c, and 2d, and they can accept your demands. 
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All participants can see the demands of the other participants on their 
monitors. Your demands apply for all of the participants 2a, 2b, 2c, and 2d. 
The first participant to accept your demand will also receive it. You can 
also choose if and which of the other participants’ demands you would 
like to select.  
Once demands and offers have been placed, they can no longer be with-
drawn. This applies for all participants. When you enter a new demand, 
this must represent an improvement for the other participants, i.e. you 
must reduce your demand. The same applies for participants 2a, 2b, 2c, 
and 2d; if either of them suggests a new offer, this must be an improve-
ment for you; i.e. participant 2a, 2b, 2c, or 2d must increase his or her offer. 
As soon as you enter a new – reduced – demand, your previous demands 
can no longer be accepted. The same applies for offers from the other par-
ticipants. As soon as you receive a new offer, you can no longer accept the 
previous offer. Only the current offers and demands can be accepted. 
You make a demand by entering the amount on your monitor that you 
would like to keep for yourself. If you enter a demand for CHF X, this 
means that you would like to retain CHF X for yourself and that partici-
pants 2a, 2b, 2c, or 2d will thus receive the amount of CHF 20 – X. This 
demand will then be notified to participants 2a, 2b, 2c, and 2d. The same 
applies for offers. If participant 2a, 2b, 2c, or 2d offers you CHF Y, he or 
she will enter it on the monitor. An offer of Y means that you will receive 
the amount of CHF Y in case of an agreement, while participants 2a, 2b, 2c, 
or 2d receives CHF 20 – Y.  
Demands must be integers between CHF 0 and 20. 
The market will be closed when 
a)  an agreement is made (i.e. you accept an offer from participants 2a, 
2b, 2c, or 2d, or when one of the participants accepts your de-
mand) 
or 
b)  the three minutes have expired. 
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Summary of the market 
 
 
You now have the opportunity to become familiar with the operation of 
the virtual market for three minutes in a test run. You will be randomly 
grouped with four other participants in the experiment. The test run has 
no consequences and only has the objective of helping you understand 
how the virtual market functions. We will distribute additional instruc-
tions after conclusion of the test run. 
Please enter the control questions below and raise your hand as soon as 
you are done. 
  
The remaining time i s shown 
here.
You can enter your demand 
here and confirm i t wi th the 
button “ Submi t offer” . Only 
integers between 0 and 20 
are possible.
History of your 
demands
Your  current demand
By cl icking on this 
button, you accept 
participant 2a’s offer 
and the market wi ll  be 
closed.
Current offer from 
participant 2a
History of 
participant 2a’s 
offers
By cl icking on this 
button, you accept 
participant 2b’s offer 
and the market wi ll  be 
closed.
Current offer from 
participant 2b
History of 
participant 2b’s 
offers
By cl icking on this 
button, you accept 
participant 2c’ s offer 
and the market wi ll  be 
closed.
Cur rent offer  from 
participant 2c
History of 
par ticipant 2c’s 
offers
By cl icking on this 
button, you accept 
participant 2d’s offer 
and the market wi ll  be 
cl osed.
Current offer from 
participant 2d
History of 
par ticipant 2d’s 
offers
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Control questions 
1) Assume that you see the amount of CHF 5 in the window “Current 
offer from participant 2a”. If you click on “Accept current offer from par-
ticipant 2a”, this means that you 
 
• Accept the distribution “CHF 5 for me and CHF 15 for participant 
2a”. 
• Accept the distribution “CHF 15 for me and CHF 5 for participant 
2a” 
 
2) After you, participant 2a, 2b, 2c, or 2d has accepted an offer, 
 
• More demands and offers can be made until the three minutes have 
expired. 
• No further demands and offers can be made because the market is 
closed. 
 
3) Does participant 2b see what the current, highest offer of participant 
2d to you is? 
 
• Yes 
• No 
 
4) If you neither make a demand nor accept an offer 
 
• none of the three participants receive any further payment.  
• the further payments to participants 2a, 2b, 2c, and 2d depend on 
how these two participants act. 
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Continuation of the instructions 
The market will be opened for you for ten rounds lasting three minutes 
each. After the three minutes lapse, you will be randomly assigned to a 
new group of participants 2a, 2b, 2c, and 2d. After the last round is com-
pleted, one round will be chosen randomly and the results from the cho-
sen round will be realized. The interaction with participant 2a can either 
lead to an agreement or not lead to an agreement. However, agreement or 
non-agreement also has consequences for a third party – a patient suffer-
ing from leprosy in India. 
If no agreement is reached in the chosen round, then we will fund a 
necessary operation for a person suffering from leprosy in India, who 
otherwise would have no opportunity to have this operation. In this case, 
you, participant 2a, participant 2b, participant 2c, and participant 2d will 
not receive any further monetary payment, meaning that you will receive 
your fixed payment of CHF 15 at the end of the study. 
If, however, an agreement is reached in the chosen round between you 
and one of the participants 2a, 2b, 2c, or 2d, we will not fund the opera-
tion for the person suffering from leprosy. In this case, you and the par-
ticipant with whom you reached an agreement will receive an additional 
monetary payment in the amount of the agreed sum. 
We will explain the consequences of the two alternatives in more detail 
below. The other four participants are also completely informed about 
possible consequences.  
If you do not take any action or do not reach an agreement with partici-
pants 2a, 2b, 2c, or 2d within the three minute time period, the market will 
be closed with the result “no agreement”. If this round is chosen, we will 
then fund the operation for a leprosy patient. After completion of the ten 
rounds, the experiment will be continued with a small questionnaire. 
The consequences of your actions 
Leprosy is a chronic infectious disease caused by the bacteria Mycobacte-
rium Leprae; it is spread from person to person. The pathogen causes death 
of nerve cells and blockage of arteries and veins. As a result, there is a 
long-term danger of bodily disfigurement, blindness, or other permanent 
disabilities. 
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Although the disease can be cured with medical treatment, many leprosy 
victims suffer from the consequences of disfigurement from the sickness 
even after the pathogen has been eradicated. Disfigurement from leprosy 
leads to a very high degree of ostracism and stigmatization, a situation 
that victims suffer from for their entire lives. However, even small surgical 
interventions can significantly reduce the scope of disfigurement. 
Almost 60% of the world’s new leprosy cases occur in India. Due to the 
prevalence of poverty, funding an operation – which would allow for a life 
in dignity – is not possible for most of the victims with disfigurement. 
If you do not reach an agreement with one of the participants 2a, 2b, 2c, 
or 2d about the division of the additional monetary payment in the cho-
sen round, we (the Department of Economics of the University of Zurich 
in cooperation with the Swiss relief organization FAIRMED) will fund the 
operation for a victim of leprosy in India. The cost of the operation de-
pends on the extent of disfigurement. A simple procedure in India costs 
approximately CHF 60; the Department of Economics will cover this 
amount in full. 
If you reach an agreement with one of the participants 2a, 2b, 2c, or 2d 
about the division of the additional monetary payment in the chosen 
round, we will not provide the funding. This means that if an agreement is 
reached, the leprosy patient will not receive the operation. 
  
A.2 instructions 135
  
Summary of possible results 
 
If, for example, you accept an offer from participant 2a for CHF 10 in the 
chosen round, you and participant 2a will both earn an additional CHF 10, 
and an operation for a person suffering from leprosy will not be done. In 
the same way, if participant 2a accepts a demand from you for CHF 15, 
then you will earn an additional CHF 15 and participant 2a will earn CHF 
5; again, an operation for a person suffering from leprosy will not be done. 
If you or the four other participants do not reach an agreement in the cho-
sen round, all five participants will each receive the fix payment of CHF 
15, will not earn any additional payment, and the operation will be done 
for a person suffering from leprosy. 
 
  
Result 
How is the 
result 
reached? 
Your 
additional 
payment 
Additional payment for participant Consequence for the person 
suffering from 
leprosy 2a 2b 2c 2d 
No 
agreement 
Three minutes 
elapse without 
you, 
participant 2a, 
2b, 2c, 2d 
accepting an 
offer 
CHF 0 CHF 0 CHF 0 CHF 0 CHF 0 Operation will be done 
Agreement 
with 
participant 2a 
– CHF X for 
you 
You or 
participant 2a 
accepts the 
corresponding 
offer within the 
three minutes 
CHF X CHF 20 
– X CHF 0 CHF 0 CHF 0 
Operation will 
not be done 
Agreement 
with 
participant 2b 
– CHF X for 
you 
You or 
participant 2b 
accepts the 
corresponding 
offer within the 
three minutes 
CHF X CHF 0 CHF 20 
– X CHF 0 CHF 0 
Operation will 
not be done 
Agreement 
with 
participant 2c 
– CHF X for 
you  
You or 
participant 2c 
accepts the 
corresponding 
offer within the 
three minutes 
CHF X CHF 0 CHF 0 CHF 20 
– X CHF 0 
Operation will 
not be done 
Agreement 
with 
participant 2d 
– CHF X for 
you 
You or 
participant 2d 
accepts the 
corresponding 
offer within the 
three minutes 
CHF X CHF 0 CHF 0 CHF 0 CHF 20 
– X 
Operation will 
not be done 
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Control questions 
Please now answer the questions below to examine your understanding of 
the experiment. If you have any questions, please raise your hand. An 
assistant will come to you at your desk and answer your question. Please 
mark the correct answer below. 
1) If you allow the three minutes on the screen to lapse without making a 
demand or accepting an offer in the chosen round, 
 
• A person suffering from leprosy in India will receive an operation, 
and you, participant 2a, participant 2b, participant 2c, and partici-
pant 2d will receive no further monetary payments. 
• A person suffering from leprosy in India will not receive an opera-
tion, and you, participant 2a, participant 2b, participant 2c, and 
participant 2d will receive no further monetary payments. 
 
2) If you click on “Accept the current offer from participant 2b” in the chosen 
round,  
 
• A person suffering from leprosy in India will receive an operation, 
and you and participant 2b each receive the agreed upon amount 
as an additional monetary payment. 
• A person suffering from leprosy in India will not receive an opera-
tion, and you and participant 2b each receive the agreed upon 
amount as an additional monetary payment. 
• A person suffering from leprosy in India will not receive an opera-
tion, and you and participant 2b will receive no further monetary 
payments. 
 
3) The operation on a leprosy patient has the objective of 
 
• Destroying the pathogen that causes leprosy. 
• Strongly relieving the consequences of disfigurement due to lep-
rosy. 
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B
APPENDIX – THE L IM ITS TO MORAL EROS ION IN
MARKETS : SOC IAL NORMS AND THE
REPLACEMENT EXCUSE
b.1 additional analyses
Replacement effect is predicted by inequity aversion
For the take game we provide a formal derivation of our hypothesis,
based on the application of the simple outcome-based social prefer-
ence model by Fehr and Schmidt (1999). The utility function of agent
i is given by
Ui(x) = xi-↵i
1
n- 1
X
j 6=i
max {xj - xi, 0}- 
1
n- 1
X
j6=i
max {xi - xj, 0}
where n denotes the total number of agents in the reference group,
↵ represents a disadvantageous inequality aversion parameter, and
  represents an advantageous inequality aversion parameter, with
restrictions   6 ↵ and 0 6   < 1. In condition TG-1, player B1 will
prefer “take” if
0.9- 0.8  > 0.5
and, hence, if   < 0.5. In contrast, in condition TG-1, player B1 will
prefer "take" if
0.9-
1
3
 (0.8+ 0.4+ 0.4) > 0.5- p(
1
3
↵ · 0.4+ 1
3
  · 0.4).
Note that the replacement probability p is determined by the take
rates of subsequent players in the chain. Let r2 and r3 denote the
take rates of player B2 and player B3 respectively; then pB1 = 1 -
(1- r2)(1- r3). A larger ↵, as well as larger replacement probability
p, is associated with a higher propensity to choose “take”. Assuming
the lowest possible ↵, with ↵ =  , and a replacement probability of
p = 0.5, the condition reduces to   < 1. Hence, even under the most
conservative assumptions on the parameter ↵, the model predicts that
all agents will take when the replacement probability is 50 percent or
larger.
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Detailed split of social norms
We measured social norms in institutions with and without replace-
ability for the first mover in the respective role. Our results suggest
that the appropriateness of an action does not depend on the exis-
tence of replaceability. Figure A2 depicts the distribution of norm rat-
ings, split into different degrees of replaceability. For example “Take
Game, 3B” shows the distribution of norm ratings for taking the
money from the receiver as the first mover in the take game with
3 dictators. Within each game the distributions do not differ.
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Figure B.1: Social norms across different levels of replaceability
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b.2 instructions
In the following section we present all instructions used in this study.
Subjects in the laboratory were provided with instructions in Ger-
man. Here we present English translations. Subjects on MTurk were
provided with instructions in English.
  
OVE RVIE W OF INSTRUC TIONS 
 
DONATI ON GA ME  
Baseline Condition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  143 
Replacement Condition (Player 1) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  147 
Replacement Condition (Player 2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  151 
Replacement Condition (Player 3) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  155 
Social Norm Elicitation (Baseline Condition) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  159 
Social Norm Elicitation (Replacement Condition) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  161 
Belief Elicitation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  164 
 
TAK E GAME  
Without Punishment (TG-1) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  167 
Without Punishment (TG-2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  169 
Without Punishment (TG-3) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  173 
With Punishment (TGwP-1). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  178 
With Punishment (TGwP-2). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  180 
With Punishment (TGwP-3). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  183 
Social Norm Elicitation (TG-1) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  187 
Social Norm Elicitation (TG-2 / TG-3) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  189 
Belief Elicitation (TG-2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  191 
Belief Elicitation (TG-3) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  193 
Spectator Treatment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  195 
 
ULTI MATU M GAME 
UG-1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  197 
UG-2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  200 
UG-3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  204 
Social Norm Elicitation (UG-1 / UG-2 / UG-3) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  209 
Belief Elicitation (UG-2 / UG-3) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  212 
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DONATION GAME  –  BA SE L INE  CONDITION 
Welcome to the Econ Laboratory! 
Please read the instructions below carefully. If you have questions, please 
raise your hand; a worker will come to your desk in a short time.  
General information 
You are participating in a study at the Department of Economics at the 
University of Zurich. You will receive a fixed payment of CHF 15.00 for 
participating, and, depending on how the study evolves, earn additional 
monetary amounts. You will receive your payment at the end of the study 
in cash. 
Please note that these instructions are exclusively for your private 
information, and that communication is absolutely forbidden during the 
study. If you have questions, please address them to us. Violation of these 
rules will result in exclusion from the study and from all payments. 
The data collected during the study will never be brought into connection 
with your identity. Your name will only be used on the receipt for payment, 
meaning that your anonymity is guaranteed at all times. 
Experimental procedure 
In this experiment, you have the opportunity to decide for an additional 
payment in the amount of CHF 20.  
Taking the money, however, has consequences for a third party – a patient 
suffering from leprosy in India. 
If you do not take the money, we will fund a necessary operation for a 
person suffering from leprosy in India, who otherwise would have no 
opportunity to have this operation. In this case, you will not receive any 
further monetary payment, meaning that you will receive your fixed 
payment of CHF 15 at the end of the study. 
If, however, you take the money, we will not fund the operation for the 
person suffering from leprosy. In this case, you will receive an additional 
monetary payment amounting to CHF 20. 
We will provide more detailed information about the possible 
consequences of your actions below. 
The consequences of your actions 
Leprosy is a chronic infectious disease caused by the bacteria Mycobacterium 
Leprae; it is spread from person to person. The pathogen causes death of 
nerve cells and blockage of arteries and veins. As a result, there is a long-
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term danger of bodily disfigurement, blindness, or other permanent 
disabilities. 
 
        
 
Although the disease can be cured with medical treatment, many leprosy 
victims suffer from the consequences of disfigurement from the sickness 
even after the pathogen has been eradicated. Disfigurement from leprosy 
leads to a very high degree of ostracism and stigmatization, a situation that 
victims suffer from for their entire lives. However, even small surgical 
interventions can significantly reduce the scope of disfigurement. 
Almost 60% of the world’s leprosy cases occur in India. Due to the 
prevalence of poverty, funding an operation – which would allow for a life 
in dignity – is not possible for most of the victims with disfigurement. 
If you do not take the CHF 20, we (the Department of Economics of the 
University of Zurich in cooperation with the Swiss relief organization 
FAIRMED) will fund the operation for a victim of leprosy in India. The cost 
of the operation depends on the extent of disfigurement. A simple 
procedure in India costs approximately CHF 60; the Department of 
Economics will cover this amount in full. 
If you take the CHF 20, we will not provide the funding. This means that 
the leprosy patient will not receive the operation. 
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Summary 
The graph below visualizes how your decision determines the possible 
payments and their consequences for funding the operation.  
 
 
 
Control questions 
Please answer the questions below and raise your hand as soon as you are 
done. 
 
1) Assume you take the CHF 20. What is your additional monetary 
payment, and what are the consequences for the leprosy patient in 
India? 
 
• Your additional monetary payment 
o CHF 0 
o CHF 20 
 
• The operation for the leprosy victim in India 
o will be funded 
o will not be funded 
 
2) Assume you do not take the CHF 20. What is your additional monetary 
payment, and what are the consequences for the leprosy patient in 
India? 
 
• Your additional monetary payment 
o CHF 0 
o CHF 20 
 
• The operation for the leprosy victim in India 
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o will be funded 
o will not be funded 
 
3) The operation on a leprosy patient has the objective of 
 
• Destroying the pathogen that causes leprosy 
• Strongly relieving the consequences of disfigurement due to 
leprosy.   
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DONATION GAME  –  RE PL ACE ME NT CONDITION (PL AYE R 1)  
Welcome to the Econ Laboratory! 
Please read the instructions below carefully. If you have questions, please 
raise your hand; a worker will come to your desk in a short time.  
General information 
You are participating in a study at the Department of Economics at the 
University of Zurich. You will receive a fixed payment of CHF 15.00 for 
participating, and, depending on how the study evolves, earn additional 
monetary amounts. You will receive your payment at the end of the study 
in cash. 
Please note that these instructions are exclusively for your private 
information, and that communication is absolutely forbidden during the 
study. If you have questions, please address them to us. Violation of these 
rules will result in exclusion from the study and from all payments. 
The data collected during the study will never be brought into connection 
with your identity. Your name will only be used on the receipt for payment, 
meaning that your anonymity is guaranteed at all times. 
Experimental procedure 
In this experiment, you will be randomly grouped with two other 
participants of the study. Your group consists of participant 1 (P1), 
participant 2 (P2), and participant 3 (P3). You are participant 1 (P1). 
The three participants have the possibility – one after the other – to decide 
for an additional payment in the amount of CHF 20. You will be the first 
to decide if you would like the money or not; after you, P2 will decide, and 
finally P3. 
However, the money can only be taken by one of the three participants. 
P2 can only take the money if you did not take it, and P3 can only take the 
money if both you and also P2 did not take the money. 
Taking the money, however, has consequences for a third party – a patient 
suffering from leprosy in India. 
If none of the three participants took the money, we will fund a necessary 
operation for a person suffering from leprosy in India, who otherwise 
would have no opportunity to have this operation. In this case, you and 
the other participants will not receive any further monetary payment, 
meaning that you will receive your fixed payment of CHF 15 at the end of 
the study. 
If, however, one of the three participants takes the money, we will not 
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fund the operation for the person suffering from leprosy. In this case, the 
person taking the money will receive an additional monetary payment 
amounting to CHF 20. 
We will provide more detailed information about the possible consequences 
of your actions below. 
The consequences of your actions 
Leprosy is a chronic infectious disease caused by the bacteria Mycobacterium 
Leprae; it is spread from person to person. The pathogen causes death of 
nerve cells and blockage of arteries and veins. As a result, there is a long-
term danger of bodily disfigurement, blindness, or other permanent 
disabilities. 
 
        
 
Although the disease can be cured with medical treatment, many leprosy 
victims suffer from the consequences of disfigurement from the sickness 
even after the pathogen has been eradicated. Disfigurement from leprosy 
leads to a very high degree of ostracism and stigmatization, a situation that 
victims suffer from for their entire lives. However, even small surgical 
interventions can significantly reduce the scope of disfigurement. 
Almost 60% of the world’s leprosy cases occur in India. Due to the 
prevalence of poverty, funding an operation – which would allow for a life 
in dignity – is not possible for most of the victims with disfigurement. 
If you do not take the CHF 20, we (the Department of Economics of the 
University of Zurich in cooperation with the Swiss relief organization 
FAIRMED) will fund the operation for a victim of leprosy in India. The cost 
of the operation depends on the extent of disfigurement. A simple 
procedure in India costs approximately CHF 60; the Department of 
Economics will cover this amount in full. 
If you take the CHF 20, we will not provide the funding. This means that 
the leprosy patient will not receive the operation. 
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Summary 
The graph below visualizes how your decision determines the possible 
payments and their consequences for funding the operation.  
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Control questions 
Please answer the questions below and raise your hand as soon as you are 
done. 
1) Assume you take the CHF 20. Can participant 2 also take the CHF 20 in 
this case? 
 
• Yes 
• No 
 
2) Assume you take the CHF 20. What is your additional monetary 
payment, and what are the consequences for the leprosy patient in 
India? 
 
• Your additional monetary payment 
o CHF 0 
o CHF 20 
 
• The operation for the leprosy victim in India 
o will be funded 
o will not be funded 
o depends on the decisions of 
participants 2 and 3  
 
3) Assume you do not take the CHF 20. What is your additional monetary 
payment, and what are the consequences for the leprosy patient in 
India? 
 
• Your additional monetary payment 
o CHF 0 
o CHF 20 
 
• The operation for the leprosy victim in India 
o will be funded 
o will not be funded 
o depends on the decisions of 
participants 2 and 3  
 
4) The operation on a leprosy patient has the objective of 
 
• Destroying the pathogen that causes leprosy 
• Strongly relieving the consequences of disfigurement due to 
leprosy  
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DONATION GAME  –  RE PL ACE ME NT CONDITION (PL AYE R 2)  
Welcome to the Econ Laboratory! 
Please read the instructions below carefully. If you have questions, please 
raise your hand; a worker will come to your desk in a short time.  
General information 
You are participating in a study at the Department of Economics at the 
University of Zurich. You will receive a fixed payment of CHF 15.00 for 
participating, and, depending on how the study evolves, earn additional 
monetary amounts. You will receive your payment at the end of the study 
in cash. 
Please note that these instructions are exclusively for your private 
information, and that communication is absolutely forbidden during the 
study. If you have questions, please address them to us. Violation of these 
rules will result in exclusion from the study and from all payments. 
The data collected during the study will never be brought into connection 
with your identity. Your name will only be used on the receipt for payment, 
meaning that your anonymity is guaranteed at all times. 
Experimental procedure 
In this experiment, you will be randomly grouped with two other 
participants of the study. Your group consists of participant 1 (P1), 
participant 2 (P2), and participant 3 (P3). You are participant 2 (P2). 
The three participants have the possibility – one after the other – to decide 
for an additional payment in the amount of CHF 20. P1 be the first to 
decide if he would like the money or not; after P1, you will decide, and 
finally P3. 
However, the money can only be taken by one of the three participants. 
You can only take the money if P1 did not take it, and P3 can only take the 
money if both P1 and also you did not take the money. 
Taking the money, however, has consequences for a third party – a patient 
suffering from leprosy in India. 
If none of the three participants took the money, we will fund a necessary 
operation for a person suffering from leprosy in India, who otherwise 
would have no opportunity to have this operation. In this case, you and 
the other participants will not receive any further monetary payment, 
meaning that you will receive your fixed payment of CHF 15 at the end of 
the study. 
If, however, one of the three participants takes the money, we will not 
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fund the operation for the person suffering from leprosy. In this case, the 
person taking the money will receive an additional monetary payment 
amounting to CHF 20. 
We will provide more detailed information about the possible consequences 
of your actions below. 
The consequences of your actions 
Leprosy is a chronic infectious disease caused by the bacteria Mycobacterium 
Leprae; it is spread from person to person. The pathogen causes death of 
nerve cells and blockage of arteries and veins. As a result, there is a long-
term danger of bodily disfigurement, blindness, or other permanent 
disabilities. 
 
        
 
Although the disease can be cured with medical treatment, many leprosy 
victims suffer from the consequences of disfigurement from the sickness 
even after the pathogen has been eradicated. Disfigurement from leprosy 
leads to a very high degree of ostracism and stigmatization, a situation that 
victims suffer from for their entire lives. However, even small surgical 
interventions can significantly reduce the scope of disfigurement. 
Almost 60% of the world’s leprosy cases occur in India. Due to the 
prevalence of poverty, funding an operation – which would allow for a life 
in dignity – is not possible for most of the victims with disfigurement. 
If none of the three participants in your group takes the CHF 20, we (the 
Department of Economics of the University of Zurich in cooperation with 
the Swiss relief organization FAIRMED) will fund the operation for a victim 
of leprosy in India. The cost of the operation depends on the extent of 
disfigurement. A simple procedure in India costs approximately CHF 60; 
the Department of Economics will cover this amount in full. 
If one of the three participants in your group takes the CHF 20, we will 
not provide the funding. This means that the leprosy patient will not receive 
the operation. 
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Summary 
The graph below visualizes how your decision determines the possible 
payments and their consequences for funding the operation.  
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Control questions 
Please answer the questions below and raise your hand as soon as you are 
done. 
 
1) Assume participant 1 takes the CHF 20. Can you also take the CHF 20 
in this case? 
 
• Yes 
• No 
 
2) Assume participant 1 takes the CHF 20. What is the additional 
monetary payment of participant 1, and what are the consequences for 
the leprosy patient in India? 
 
• Additional monetary payment of participant 1 
o CHF 0 
o CHF 20 
 
• The operation for the leprosy victim in India 
o will be funded 
o will not be funded 
o depends on the decisions of you 
and participant 3  
 
3) Assume participant 1 does not take the CHF 20. What is the additional 
monetary payment of participant 1, and what are the consequences for 
the leprosy patient in India? 
 
• Additional monetary payment of participant 1 
o CHF 0 
o CHF 20 
 
• The operation for the leprosy victim in India 
o will be funded 
o will not be funded 
o depends on the decisions of you 
and participant 3  
 
4) The operation on a leprosy patient has the objective of 
 
• Destroying the pathogen that causes leprosy 
• Strongly relieving the consequences of disfigurement due to 
leprosy  
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DONATION GAME  –  RE PL ACE ME NT CONDITION (PL AYE R 3)  
Welcome to the Econ Laboratory! 
Please read the instructions below carefully. If you have questions, please 
raise your hand; a worker will come to your desk in a short time.  
General information 
You are participating in a study at the Department of Economics at the 
University of Zurich. You will receive a fixed payment of CHF 15.00 for 
participating, and, depending on how the study evolves, earn additional 
monetary amounts. You will receive your payment at the end of the study 
in cash. 
Please note that these instructions are exclusively for your private 
information, and that communication is absolutely forbidden during the 
study. If you have questions, please address them to us. Violation of these 
rules will result in exclusion from the study and from all payments. 
The data collected during the study will never be brought into connection 
with your identity. Your name will only be used on the receipt for payment, 
meaning that your anonymity is guaranteed at all times. 
Experimental procedure 
In this experiment, you will be randomly grouped with two other 
participants of the study. Your group consists of participant 1 (P1), 
participant 2 (P2), and participant 3 (P3). You are participant 3 (P3). 
The three participants have the possibility – one after the other – to decide 
for an additional payment in the amount of CHF 20. P1 be the first to 
decide if he would like the money or not; after P1, P2 will decide, and finally 
you. 
However, the money can only be taken by one of the three participants. 
P2 can only take the money if P1 did not take it, and you can only take the 
money if both P1 and also P2 did not take the money. 
Taking the money, however, has consequences for a third party – a patient 
suffering from leprosy in India. 
If none of the three participants took the money, we will fund a necessary 
operation for a person suffering from leprosy in India, who otherwise 
would have no opportunity to have this operation. In this case, you and 
the other participants will not receive any further monetary payment, 
meaning that you will receive your fixed payment of CHF 15 at the end of 
the study. 
If, however, one of the three participants takes the money, we will not 
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fund the operation for the person suffering from leprosy. In this case, the 
person taking the money will receive an additional monetary payment 
amounting to CHF 20. 
We will provide more detailed information about the possible consequences 
of your actions below. 
The consequences of your actions 
Leprosy is a chronic infectious disease caused by the bacteria Mycobacterium 
Leprae; it is spread from person to person. The pathogen causes death of 
nerve cells and blockage of arteries and veins. As a result, there is a long-
term danger of bodily disfigurement, blindness, or other permanent 
disabilities. 
 
        
 
Although the disease can be cured with medical treatment, many leprosy 
victims suffer from the consequences of disfigurement from the sickness 
even after the pathogen has been eradicated. Disfigurement from leprosy 
leads to a very high degree of ostracism and stigmatization, a situation that 
victims suffer from for their entire lives. However, even small surgical 
interventions can significantly reduce the scope of disfigurement. 
Almost 60% of the world’s leprosy cases occur in India. Due to the 
prevalence of poverty, funding an operation – which would allow for a life 
in dignity – is not possible for most of the victims with disfigurement. 
If none of the three participants in your group takes the CHF 20, we (the 
Department of Economics of the University of Zurich in cooperation with 
the Swiss relief organization FAIRMED) will fund the operation for a victim 
of leprosy in India. The cost of the operation depends on the extent of 
disfigurement. A simple procedure in India costs approximately CHF 60; 
the Department of Economics will cover this amount in full. 
If one of the three participants in your group takes the CHF 20, we will 
not provide the funding. This means that the leprosy patient will not receive 
the operation. 
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Summary 
The graph below visualizes how your decision determines the possible 
payments and their consequences for funding the operation.  
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Control questions 
Please answer the questions below and raise your hand as soon as you are 
done. 
 
1) Assume participant 1 takes the CHF 20. Can participant 2 also take the 
CHF 20 in this case? 
 
• Yes 
• No 
 
2) Assume participant 1 takes the CHF 20. What is the additional 
monetary payment of participant 1, and what are the consequences for 
the leprosy patient in India? 
 
• Additional monetary payment of participant 1 
o CHF 0 
o CHF 20 
 
• The operation for the leprosy victim in India 
o will be funded 
o will not be funded 
o depends on the decisions of 
participant 2 and you  
 
3) Assume participant 1 does not take the CHF 20. What is the additional 
monetary payment of participant 1, and what are the consequences for 
the leprosy patient in India? 
 
• Additional monetary payment of participant 1 
o CHF 0 
o CHF 20 
 
• The operation for the leprosy victim in India 
o will be funded 
o will not be funded 
o depends on the decisions of 
participant 2 and you 
 
4) The operation on a leprosy patient has the objective of 
 
• Destroying the pathogen that causes leprosy 
• Strongly relieving the consequences of disfigurement due to 
leprosy  
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DONATION GAME  –  SO CIAL  NORM EL I CITATIO N (BASE L INE  
CONDITION) 
 
Recently we conducted an experimental study in the Econ-Lab. Your task is 
to evaluate a possible action of a participant in this study and to decide 
whether taking that action would be "socially appropriate" and "consistent 
with moral or proper social behavior" or "socially inappropriate" and 
"inconsistent with moral or proper social behavior" or "neutral," i.e. neither 
socially appropriate nor inappropriate. By socially appropriate, we mean 
behavior that most people agree is the "correct" or "ethical" thing to do.  
If you give the same response as that most frequently given by other 
participants in this experiment, then you will receive an additional CHF 
10 as a bonus. 
The rules of the interaction in the recent study were as follows: 
 
--- Original instructions of donation game / baseline condition / player 1--- 
 
Your task is to evaluate the decision of the participant to take away the 
CHF 20: If the participant took away the CHF 20, would the participant’s 
action be rated by most people as "socially appropriate" and "consistent 
with moral or proper social behavior" or "socially inappropriate" and 
"inconsistent with moral or proper social behavior" or would it be rated as 
"neutral," i.e. neither socially appropriate nor inappropriate?  
You will have to indicate your belief by choosing one of the following five 
options: 
- very socially inappropriate 
- somewhat socially inappropriate 
- neutral: neither socially inappropriate nor appropriate 
- somewhat socially appropriate 
- very socially appropriate 
Note that we do not ask you to provide the rating you believe to be “right,” 
but the rating you believe will be the one most frequently chosen by the 
other participants in this experiment. Therefore, to maximize your chances 
of receiving the bonus of CHF 10, you should report your best possible 
guess about the most frequently given response to the question. 
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Control questions 
Please answer the questions below and raise your hand as soon as you are 
done. 
Questions about the rules of the recently conducted study: 
1) Assume the participant takes the CHF 20. What is the participant’s 
additional monetary payment, and what are the consequences for the 
leprosy patient in India? 
 
• The participant’s additional monetary payment 
o CHF 0 
o CHF 20 
 
• The operation for the leprosy victim in India 
o will be funded 
o will not be funded 
 
2) Assume the participant does not take the CHF 20. What is the 
participant’s additional monetary payment, and what are the 
consequences for the leprosy patient in India? 
 
• The participant’s additional monetary payment 
o CHF 0 
o CHF 20 
 
• The operation for the leprosy victim in India 
o will be funded 
o will not be funded 
 
3) The operation on a leprosy patient has the objective of 
 
• Destroying the pathogen that causes leprosy 
• Strongly relieving the consequences of disfigurement due to 
leprosy.  
 
Question about your incentive to report your best possible guess about the 
most frequently given response by other participants: 
4) If you give the same response as that most frequently given by other 
participants in this experiment, what will be your bonus payment? 
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DONATION GAME  –  SO CIAL  NORM EL I CITATIO N (RE PL ACE ME NT 
CONDITION) 
 
Recently we conducted an experimental study in the Econ-Lab. Your task is 
to evaluate a possible action of a participant in this study and to decide 
whether taking that action would be "socially appropriate" and "consistent 
with moral or proper social behavior" or "socially inappropriate" and 
"inconsistent with moral or proper social behavior" or "neutral," i.e. neither 
socially appropriate nor inappropriate. By socially appropriate, we mean 
behavior that most people agree is the "correct" or "ethical" thing to do.  
If you give the same response as that most frequently given by other 
participants in this experiment, then you will receive an additional CHF 
10 as a bonus. 
The rules of the interaction in the recent study were as follows: 
 
--- Original instructions of donation game / replacement condition /  
player 1--- 
 
Your task is to evaluate the decision of the participant 1 (P1) to take away 
the CHF 20: If participant 1 (P1) took away the CHF 20, would the 
participant 1’s action be rated by most people as "socially appropriate" and 
"consistent with moral or proper social behavior" or "socially inappropriate" 
and "inconsistent with moral or proper social behavior" or would it be rated 
as "neutral," i.e. neither socially appropriate nor inappropriate?  
You will have to indicate your belief by choosing one of the following five 
options: 
- very socially inappropriate 
- somewhat socially inappropriate 
- neutral: neither socially inappropriate nor appropriate 
- somewhat socially appropriate 
- very socially appropriate 
Note that we do not ask you to provide the rating you believe to be “right,” 
but the rating you believe will be the one most frequently chosen by the 
other participants in this experiment. Therefore, to maximize your chances 
of receiving the bonus of CHF 10, you should report your best possible 
guess about the most frequently given response to the question. 
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Control questions 
Please answer the questions below and raise your hand as soon as you are 
done. 
Questions about the rules of the recently conducted study: 
1) Assume participant 1 takes the CHF 20. Can participant 2 also take the 
CHF 20 in this case? 
 
• Yes 
• No 
 
2) Assume participant 1 takes the CHF 20. What is the additional 
monetary payment of participant 1, and what are the consequences for 
the leprosy patient in India? 
 
• Additional monetary payment of participant 1 
o CHF 0 
o CHF 20 
 
• The operation for the leprosy victim in India 
o will be funded 
o will not be funded 
o depends on the decisions of 
participants 2 and 3  
 
3) Assume participant 1 does not take the CHF 20. What is the additional 
monetary payment of participant 1, and what are the consequences for 
the leprosy patient in India? 
 
• Additional monetary payment of participant 1 
o CHF 0 
o CHF 20 
 
• The operation for the leprosy victim in India 
o will be funded 
o will not be funded 
o depends on the decisions of 
participants 2 and 3 
 
4) The operation on a leprosy patient has the objective of 
 
• Destroying the pathogen that causes leprosy 
• Strongly relieving the consequences of disfigurement due to 
leprosy.  
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Question about your incentive to report your best possible guess about the 
most frequently given response by other participants: 
5) If you give the same response as that most frequently given by other 
participants in this experiment, what will be your bonus payment? 
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DONATION GAME  –  BE L IE F EL I CITATION 
 
Recently we conducted an experimental study in the Econ-Lab. Your task is 
to make an estimate about the actual behavior of participants in this study. 
The rules of the interaction were as follows: 
 
---Original instructions donation game / replacement condition / player 1--- 
 
Your task is to guess the behavior of participants 2 and 3 (P2 and P3) in the 
cases in which P1 did not take the CHF 20.  
What do you think: in what percent (%) of the cases in which P1 did not 
take the CHF20 was the money taken either by P2 or, if not by player P2, 
then finally by P3? 
You will have to type in a guess between 0% - 100%. You will earn a bonus 
of CHF 10, if your estimate is not further than 5%-points away from the true 
value. 
Therefore, to maximize your chances of receiving the bonus of $ 3, you 
should report your best possible guess. 
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Control questions 
Please answer the questions below and raise your hand as soon as you are 
done. 
Questions about the rules of the recently conducted study: 
1) Assume participant 1 takes the CHF 20. Can participant 2 also take the 
CHF 20 in this case? 
 
• Yes 
• No 
 
2) Assume participant 1 takes the CHF 20. What is the additional 
monetary payment of participant 1, and what are the consequences for 
the leprosy patient in India? 
 
• Additional monetary payment of participant 1 
o CHF 0 
o CHF 20 
 
• The operation for the leprosy victim in India 
o will be funded 
o will not be funded 
o depends on the decisions of 
participants 2 and 3  
 
3) Assume participant 1 does not take the CHF 20. What is the additional 
monetary payment of participant 1, and what are the consequences for 
the leprosy patient in India? 
 
• Additional monetary payment of participant 1 
o CHF 0 
o CHF 20 
 
• The operation for the leprosy victim in India 
o will be funded 
o will not be funded 
o depends on the decisions of 
participants 2 and 3 
 
4) The operation on a leprosy patient has the objective of 
 
• Destroying the pathogen that causes leprosy 
• Strongly relieving the consequences of disfigurement due to 
leprosy.  
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Question about your incentive to report your best possible guess: 
5) If your guess for the randomly selected question is sufficiently close to 
the true value (not further away than 5%-points), what will be your 
bonus payment? 
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TAK E  GAME  WITHOUT PUNISHME NT (TG-1)  
Introduction 
Welcome to this research project! We very much appreciate your 
participation. 
Please read the following instructions very carefully. After you click “OK” 
we will ask you some quiz questions to check your understanding of the 
instructions. You have to answer the questions correctly in order to receive 
your payment. 
All dollar amounts mentioned in the instructions refer to your bonus 
payment, which will be paid out in addition to your fixed participation fee 
of $ 0.5. 
Instructions 
You are participating in a study with another participant, also recruited via 
Amazon Mechanical Turk. There are players A and B. Both players start 
with an endowment of $	0.5 each. (Recall that this money comes on top of 
your fixed participation fee of $	0.5.) You are player [insert role here].  
The player B has the option to take away $	0.4 from A. 
The following illustration shows the possible moves and payoffs, 
depending on the decisions made by yourself and the other participant.  
 
Figure provided to player B (figures provided to other participant 
analogous): 
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Control Questions 
Please answer the following questions. 
Note that answering the control questions correctly is a requirement for a 
successful completion of the task.  
All dollar amounts mentioned refer to your bonus payment, which will be 
paid out in addition to your fixed participation fee of $ 0.5. 
 
B: 
1. Suppose you do not take away $ 0.4 from A. What will be your 
bonus payment? 
Your bonus payment: ___  
 
2. Suppose you take away $ 0.4 from A. What will be your bonus 
payment, and what will be A’s bonus payment? 
Your bonus payment: ____  
A’s bonus payment: ____  
 
A: 
1. Suppose B1 does not take away $ 0.4 from you. What will be your 
bonus payment? 
Your bonus payment : ___  
 
2. Suppose B1 takes away $ 0.4 from you. What will be your bonus 
payment and what will be B1’s bonus payment? 
Your bonus payment : ____  
B1’s bonus payment : ____   
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TAK E  GAME  WITHOUT PUNISHME NT (TG-2)  
Introduction 
Welcome to this research project! We very much appreciate your 
participation. 
Please read the following instructions very carefully. After you click “OK” 
we will ask you some quiz questions to check your understanding of the 
instructions. You have to answer the questions correctly in order to receive 
your payment. 
All dollar amounts mentioned in the instructions refer to your bonus 
payment, which will be paid out in addition to your fixed participation fee 
of $ 0.5. 
Instructions 
You are participating in a study with two other participants, also recruited 
via Amazon Mechanical Turk. There are players A, B1 and B2. All three 
players start with an endowment of $	0.5 each. (Recall that this money 
comes on top of your fixed participation fee of $	0.5.) You are player [insert 
role here].  
The two players B have the option—one after the other—to take away $	0.4 
from A. First, B1 decides whether or not to take away the money and then 
B2 decides. 
However, A can be taken away the $	0.4 only once. B2 thus can take away 
the money only if B1 did not take it.  
The following illustration shows the possible moves and payoffs, 
depending on the decisions made by yourself and the other participants.  
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Figure provided to player B1 (figures provided to other participants 
analogous): 
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Control Questions 
Please answer the following questions. 
Note that answering the control questions correctly is a requirement for a 
successful completion of the task.  
All dollar amounts mentioned refer to your bonus payment, which will be 
paid out in addition to your fixed participation fee of $ 0.5. 
 
B1: 
1. Suppose you take away $ 0.4 from A. Can B2 take away $ 0.4 from 
A in this case? 
___Yes  ___No 
 
2. Suppose you do not take away $ 0.4 from A. What will be your 
bonus payment? 
Your bonus payment: ___  
 
3. Suppose you take away $ 0.4 from A. What will be your bonus 
payment, and what will be A’s bonus payment? 
Your bonus payment: ____  
A’s bonus payment: ____  
 
B2: 
1. Suppose B1 takes away $ 0.4 from A. Can you take away $ 0.4 
from A in this case? 
___Yes  ___No 
 
2. Suppose B1 does not take away $ 0.4 from A and you do not take 
away $ 0.4 from A either. What will be your bonus payment? 
Your bonus payment : ___  
 
3. Suppose B1 does not take away $ 0.4 from A. It is thus your move 
and suppose you decide to take away $ 0.4 from A. What will be 
your bonus payment, and what will be A’s bonus payment? 
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Your bonus payment : ____  
A’s bonus payment : ____  
 
A: 
1. Suppose B1 takes away $ 0.4 from you. Can B2 take away $ 0.4 
from you in this case? 
___Yes  ___No 
 
2. Suppose B1 does not take away $ 0.4 from you. Can B2 take away 
$ 0.4 from you in this case? 
___Yes  ___No 
 
3. Suppose B1 and B2 do not take away $ 0.4 from you. What will be 
your bonus payment? 
Your bonus payment : ___  
 
4. Suppose B1 takes away $ 0.4 from you. What will be your bonus 
payment and what will be B1’s bonus payment? 
Your bonus payment : ____  
B1’s bonus payment : ____  
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TAK E  GAME  WITHOUT PUNISHME NT (TG-3)  
Introduction 
Welcome to this research project! We very much appreciate your 
participation. 
Please read the following instructions very carefully. After you click “OK” 
we will ask you some quiz questions to check your understanding of the 
instructions. You have to answer the questions correctly in order to receive 
your payment. 
All dollar amounts mentioned in the instructions refer to your bonus 
payment, which will be paid out in addition to your fixed participation fee 
of $ 0.5. 
Instructions 
You are participating in a study with three other participants, also recruited 
via Amazon Mechanical Turk. There are players A, B1, B2 and B3. All four 
players start with an endowment of $	0.5 each. (Recall that this money 
comes on top of your fixed participation fee of $	0.5.) You are player [insert 
role here].  
The three players B have the option—one after the other—to take away $	0.4 
from A. First, B1 decides whether or not to take away the money, then B2 
decides and finally B3. 
However, A can be taken away the $	0.4 only once. B2 thus can take away 
the money only if B1 did not take it, and B3 can take the money only if both 
B1 and B2 did not take it.  
The following illustration shows the possible moves and payoffs, 
depending on the decisions made by yourself and the other participants.  
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Figure provided to player B1 (figures provided to other participants 
analogous): 
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Control Questions 
Please answer the following questions. 
Note that answering the control questions correctly is a requirement for a 
successful completion of the task.  
All dollar amounts mentioned refer to your bonus payment, which will be 
paid out in addition to your fixed participation fee of $ 0.5. 
 
B1: 
1. Suppose you take away $ 0.4 from A. Can B2 take away $ 0.4 from 
A in this case? 
___Yes  ___No 
 
2. Suppose you do not take away $ 0.4 from A. What will be your 
bonus payment? 
Your bonus payment: ___  
 
3. Suppose you take away $ 0.4 from A. What will be your bonus 
payment, and what will be A’s bonus payment? 
Your bonus payment: ____  
A’s bonus payment: ____  
 
B2: 
1. Suppose B1 does not take away $ 0.4 from A. It is thus your move 
and suppose you decide to take away $ 0.4 from A. Can B3 take 
away $ 0.4 from A in this case? 
___Yes  ___No 
 
2. Suppose B1 takes away $ 0.4 from A. Can you take away $ 0.4 
from A in this case? 
___Yes  ___No 
 
3. Suppose B1 does not take away $ 0.4 from A and you do not take 
away $ 0.4 from A either. What will be your bonus payment? 
Your bonus payment : ___  
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4. Suppose B1 does not take away $ 0.4 from A. It is thus your move 
and suppose you decide to take away $ 0.4 from A. What will be 
your bonus payment, and what will be A’s bonus payment? 
Your bonus payment : ____  
A’s bonus payment : ____  
 
B3: 
1. Suppose B1 takes away $ 0.4 from A. Can you take away $ 0.4 
from A in this case? 
___Yes  ___No 
 
2. Suppose B1 and B2 do not take away $ 0.4 from A and you do not 
take away $ 0.4 from A either. What will be your bonus payment? 
Your bonus payment : ___  
 
3. Suppose B1 and B2 do not take away $ 0.4 from A. It is thus your 
move and suppose you decide to take away $ 0.4 from A. What 
will be your bonus payment, and what will be A’s bonus 
payment? 
Your bonus payment : ____  
A’s bonus payment : ____  
 
A: 
1. Suppose B1 takes away $ 0.4 from you. Can B2 take away $ 0.4 
from you in this case? 
___Yes  ___No 
 
2. Suppose B1 does not take away $ 0.4 from you. Can B2 take away 
$ 0.4 from you in this case? 
___Yes  ___No 
 
3. Suppose B1, B2 and B3 do not take away $ 0.4 from you. What will 
be your bonus payment? 
Your bonus payment : ___  
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4. Suppose B1 takes away $ 0.4 from you. What will be your bonus 
payment and what will be B1’s bonus payment? 
 
Your bonus payment : ____  
B1’s bonus payment : ____  
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TAK E  GAME  WITH P UNI SHME NT (TGWP-1)  
Introduction 
Welcome to this research project! We very much appreciate your 
participation. 
Please read the following instructions very carefully. After you click “OK” 
we will ask you some quiz questions to check your understanding of the 
instructions. You have to answer the questions correctly in order to receive 
your payment. 
All dollar amounts mentioned in the instructions refer to your bonus 
payment, which will be paid out in addition to your fixed participation fee 
of $ 0.5. 
Instructions 
You are participating in a study with another participants, also recruited via 
Amazon Mechanical Turk. There are players A and B. Both players start 
with an endowment of $	0.5 each. (Recall that this money comes on top of 
your fixed participation fee of $	0.5.) You are player [insert role here].  
Player B has the option to take away $	0.4 from A.  
Finally, if B took away the $	0.4 from A, then A can spend up to $	0.05 of his 
or her own money to punish B. For each $	0.01 spent by A, the payoff of B 
who took away the money will decrease by $	0.1. 
The following illustration shows the possible moves and payoffs, 
depending on the decisions made by yourself and the other participant.  
Figure provided to player B (figures provided to other participant 
analogous): 
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Control questions 
Please answer the following questions. 
Note that answering the control questions correctly is a requirement for a 
successful completion of the task.  
All dollar amounts mentioned refer to your bonus payment, which will be 
paid out in addition to your fixed participation fee of $ 0.5. 
 
B1: 
1. Suppose you do not take away $ 0.4 from A. What will be your 
bonus payment? 
Your bonus payment: ___  
 
2. Suppose you take away $ 0.4 from A, and A spends $ 0.05 to 
punish you. What will be your bonus payment, and what will be 
A’s bonus payment? 
Your bonus payment: ____  
A’s bonus payment: ____  
 
A: 
1. Suppose B1 does not take away $ 0.4 from you. What will be your 
bonus payment? 
Your bonus payment : ___  
 
2. Suppose B1 takes away $ 0.4 from you, and you spend $ 0.05 to 
punish B1. What will be your bonus payment and what will be 
B1’s bonus payment? 
Your bonus payment : ____  
B1’s bonus payment : ____  
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TAK E  GAME  WITH P UNI SHME NT (TGWP-2)  
Introduction 
Welcome to this research project! We very much appreciate your 
participation. 
Please read the following instructions very carefully. After you click “OK” 
we will ask you some quiz questions to check your understanding of the 
instructions. You have to answer the questions correctly in order to receive 
your payment. 
All dollar amounts mentioned in the instructions refer to your bonus 
payment, which will be paid out in addition to your fixed participation fee 
of $ 0.5. 
Instructions 
You are participating in a study with two other participants, also recruited 
via Amazon Mechanical Turk. There are players A, B1, and B2. All three 
players start with an endowment of $	0.5 each. (Recall that this money 
comes on top of your fixed participation fee of $	0.5.) You are player [insert 
role here].  
The two players B have the option—one after the other—to take away $	0.4 
from A. First, B1 decides whether or not to take away the money and then 
B2 decides.  
However, A can be taken away the $	0.4 only once. B2 thus can take away 
the money only if B1 did not take it.  
Finally, if one of the players B took away the $	0.4 from A, then A can spend 
up to $	0.05 of his or her own money to punish the player B who took away 
the money. For each $	0.01 spent by A, the payoff of the player B who took 
away the money will decrease by $	0.1. 
The following illustration shows the possible moves and payoffs, 
depending on the decisions made by yourself and the other participants.  
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Figure provided to player B1 (figures provided to other participants 
analogous): 
 
 
 
Control questions 
Please answer the following questions. 
Note that answering the control questions correctly is a requirement for a 
successful completion of the task.  
All dollar amounts mentioned refer to your bonus payment, which will be 
paid out in addition to your fixed participation fee of $ 0.5. 
 
B1: 
1. Suppose you take away $ 0.4 from A. Can B2 take away $ 0.4 from 
A in this case? 
___Yes  ___No 
 
2. Suppose you do not take away $ 0.4 from A. What will be your 
bonus payment? 
Your bonus payment: ___  
 
3. Suppose you take away $ 0.4 from A, and A spends $ 0.05 to 
punish you. What will be your bonus payment, and what will be 
A’s bonus payment? 
Your bonus payment: ____  
A’s bonus payment: ____  
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B2: 
1. Suppose B1 takes away $ 0.4 from A. Can you take away $ 0.4 
from A in this case? 
___Yes  ___No 
 
2. Suppose B1 does not take away $ 0.4 from A and you do not take 
away $ 0.4 from A either. What will be your bonus payment? 
Your bonus payment : ___  
 
3. Suppose B1 does not take away $ 0.4 from A. It is thus your move 
and suppose you decide to take away $ 0.4 from A. Suppose A 
spends $ 0.05 to punish you. What will be your bonus payment, 
and what will be A’s bonus payment? 
Your bonus payment : ____  
A’s bonus payment : ____  
 
A: 
1. Suppose B1 takes away $ 0.4 from you. Can B2 take away $ 0.4 
from you in this case? 
___Yes  ___No 
 
2. Suppose B1 does not take away $ 0.4 from you. Can B2 take away 
$ 0.4 from you in this case? 
___Yes  ___No 
 
3. Suppose B1 and B2 do not take away $ 0.4 from you. What will be 
your bonus payment? 
Your bonus payment : ___  
 
4. Suppose B1 takes away $ 0.4 from you, and you spend $ 0.05 to 
punish B1. What will be your bonus payment and what will be 
B1’s bonus payment? 
Your bonus payment : ____  
B1’s bonus payment : ____   
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TAK E  GAME  WITH P UNI SHME NT (TGWP-3)  
Introduction 
Welcome to this research project! We very much appreciate your 
participation. 
Please read the following instructions very carefully. After you click “OK” 
we will ask you some quiz questions to check your understanding of the 
instructions. You have to answer the questions correctly in order to receive 
your payment. 
All dollar amounts mentioned in the instructions refer to your bonus 
payment, which will be paid out in addition to your fixed participation fee 
of $ 0.5. 
Instructions 
You are participating in a study with three other participants, also recruited 
via Amazon Mechanical Turk. There are players A, B1, B2 and B3. All four 
players start with an endowment of $	0.5 each. (Recall that this money 
comes on top of your fixed participation fee of $	0.5.) You are player [insert 
role here].  
The three players B have the option—one after the other—to take away $	0.4 
from A. First, B1 decides whether or not to take away the money, then B2 
decides and finally B3.  
However, A can be taken away the $	0.4 only once. B2 thus can take away 
the money only if B1 did not take it, and B3 can take the money only if both 
B1 and B2 did not take it.  
Finally, if one of the players B took away the $	0.4 from A, then A can spend 
up to $	0.05 of his or her own money to punish the player B who took away 
the money. For each $	0.01 spent by A, the payoff of the player B who took 
away the money will decrease by $	0.1.  
The following illustration shows the possible moves and payoffs, 
depending on the decisions made by yourself and the other participants. 
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Figure provided to player B1 (figures provided to other participants 
analogous): 
  
 
 
Control questions 
Please answer the following questions. 
Note that answering the control questions correctly is a requirement for a 
successful completion of the task.  
All dollar amounts mentioned refer to your bonus payment, which will be 
paid out in addition to your fixed participation fee of $ 0.5. 
 
B1: 
1. Suppose you take away $ 0.4 from A. Can B2 take away $ 0.4 from 
A in this case? 
___Yes  ___No 
 
2. Suppose you do not take away $ 0.4 from A. What will be your 
bonus payment? 
Your bonus payment: ___  
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3. Suppose you take away $ 0.4 from A, and A spends $ 0.05 to 
punish you. What will be your bonus payment, and what will be 
A’s bonus payment? 
Your bonus payment: ____  
A’s bonus payment: ____  
 
B2: 
1. Suppose B1 does not take away $ 0.4 from A. It is thus your move 
and suppose you decide to take away $ 0.4 from A. Can B3 take 
away $ 0.4 from A in this case? 
___Yes  ___No 
 
2. Suppose B1 takes away $ 0.4 from A. Can you take away $ 0.4 
from A in this case? 
___Yes  ___No 
 
3. Suppose B1 does not take away $ 0.4 from A and you do not take 
away $ 0.4 from A either. What will be your bonus payment? 
Your bonus payment : ___  
 
4. Suppose B1 does not take away $ 0.4 from A. It is thus your move 
and suppose you decide to take away $ 0.4 from A. Suppose A 
spends $ 0.05 to punish you. What will be your bonus payment, 
and what will be A’s bonus payment? 
Your bonus payment : ____  
A’s bonus payment : ____  
 
B3: 
1. Suppose B1 takes away $ 0.4 from A. Can you take away $ 0.4 
from A in this case? 
___Yes  ___No 
 
2. Suppose B1 and B2 do not take away $ 0.4 from A and you do not 
take away $ 0.4 from A either. What will be your bonus payment? 
Your bonus payment : ___  
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3. Suppose B1 and B2 do not take away $ 0.4 from A. It is thus your 
move and suppose you decide to take away $ 0.4 from A. Suppose 
A spends $ 0.05 to punish you. What will be your bonus payment, 
and what will be A’s bonus payment? 
Your bonus payment : ____  
A’s bonus payment : ____  
 
A: 
1. Suppose B1 takes away $ 0.4 from you. Can B2 take away $ 0.4 
from you in this case? 
___Yes  ___No 
 
2. Suppose B1 does not take away $ 0.4 from you. Can B2 take away 
$ 0.4 from you in this case? 
___Yes  ___No 
 
3. Suppose B1, B2 and B3 do not take away $ 0.4 from you. What will 
be your bonus payment? 
Your bonus payment : ___  
 
4. Suppose B1 takes away $ 0.4 from you, and you spend $ 0.05 to 
punish B1. What will be your bonus payment and what will be 
B1’s bonus payment? 
Your bonus payment : ____  
B1’s bonus payment : ____  
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TAK E  GAME  –  SO CIAL  NORM EL I CITATION (TG-1)  
Introduction 
Welcome to this research project! We very much appreciate your 
participation. 
Please read the following instructions very carefully. After you click “OK” 
we will ask you some quiz questions to check your understanding of the 
instructions. You have to answer the questions correctly in order to receive 
your payment. 
All dollar amounts mentioned in the instructions refer to bonus payments, 
which are paid out in addition to the fixed participation fee of $ 0.5. 
Instructions 
Recently we conducted an interactive study on Amazon Mechanical Turk. 
Your task is to evaluate a possible action of a participant in this study and 
to decide whether taking that action would be "socially appropriate" and 
"consistent with moral or proper social behavior" or "socially inappropriate" 
and "inconsistent with moral or proper social behavior" or "neutral," i.e. 
neither socially appropriate nor inappropriate. By socially appropriate, we 
mean behavior that most people agree is the "correct" or "ethical" thing to 
do.  
If you give the same response as that most frequently given by other 
participants in this experiment, then you will receive an additional $ 3 as 
a bonus. 
The rules of the interaction in the recent study were as follows: 
 
--- Original instructions of Take Game (TG-1) / player B--- 
 
Your task is to evaluate player B’s decision to take away the $ 0.4 from A: 
If B took away the $ 0.4 from A, would B’s action be rated by most people 
as "socially appropriate" and "consistent with moral or proper social 
behavior" or "socially inappropriate" and "inconsistent with moral or proper 
social behavior" or would it be rated as "neutral," i.e. neither socially 
appropriate nor inappropriate?  
You will have to indicate your belief by choosing one of the following five 
options: 
- very socially inappropriate 
- somewhat socially inappropriate 
- neutral: neither socially inappropriate nor appropriate 
- somewhat socially appropriate 
- very socially appropriate 
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Note that we do not ask you to provide the rating you believe to be “right,” 
but the rating you believe will be the one most frequently chosen by the 
other participants in this experiment. Therefore, to maximize your chances 
of receiving the bonus of $ 3, you should report your best possible guess 
about the most frequently given response to the question. 
Control Questions 
Note that answering the control questions correctly is a requirement for a 
successful completion of the task.  
All dollar amounts mentioned refer to bonus payments, which are paid out 
in addition to the fixed participation fee of $ 0.5. 
Please answer the following questions about the rules of the interaction: 
 
1. Suppose B does not take away $ 0.4 from A. What will be B’s 
bonus payment? 
B’s bonus payment:____ 
 
2. Suppose B takes away $ 0.4 from A. What will be B’s bonus 
payment, and what will be A’s bonus payment? 
B’s bonus payment: ____  
A’s bonus payment: ____  
 
Please answer the following question about your incentives to report your 
best possible guess about the most frequently given response by other 
participants: 
3. If you give the same response as that most frequently given by 
other participants in this experiment, what will be your bonus 
payment? 
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TAK E  GAME  –  SO CIAL  NORM EL I CITATION (TG-2 /  TG-3)  
Introduction 
Welcome to this research project! We very much appreciate your 
participation. 
Please read the following instructions very carefully. After you click “OK” 
we will ask you some quiz questions to check your understanding of the 
instructions. You have to answer the questions correctly in order to receive 
your payment. 
All dollar amounts mentioned in the instructions refer to bonus payments, 
which are paid out in addition to the fixed participation fee of $ 0.5. 
Instructions 
Recently we conducted an interactive study on Amazon Mechanical Turk. 
Your task is to evaluate a possible action of a participant in this study and 
to decide whether taking that action would be "socially appropriate" and 
"consistent with moral or proper social behavior" or "socially inappropriate" 
and "inconsistent with moral or proper social behavior" or "neutral," i.e. 
neither socially appropriate nor inappropriate. By socially appropriate, we 
mean behavior that most people agree is the "correct" or "ethical" thing to 
do.  
If you give the same response as that most frequently given by other 
participants in this experiment, then you will receive an additional $ 3 as 
a bonus. 
The rules of the interaction in the recent study were as follows: 
 
--- Original instructions of Take Game (TG-2 or TG-3) / player B1--- 
 
Your task is to evaluate player B1’s decision to take away the $ 0.4 from 
A: If B1 took away the $ 0.4 from A, would B1’s action be rated by most 
people as "socially appropriate" and "consistent with moral or proper social 
behavior" or "socially inappropriate" and "inconsistent with moral or proper 
social behavior" or would it be rated as "neutral," i.e. neither socially 
appropriate nor inappropriate?  
You will have to indicate your belief by choosing one of the following five 
options: 
- very socially inappropriate 
- somewhat socially inappropriate 
- neutral: neither socially inappropriate nor appropriate 
- somewhat socially appropriate 
- very socially appropriate 
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Note that we do not ask you to provide the rating you believe to be “right,” 
but the rating you believe will be the one most frequently chosen by the 
other participants in this experiment. Therefore, to maximize your chances 
of receiving the bonus of $ 3, you should report your best possible guess 
about the most frequently given response to the question. 
Control Questions 
Note that answering the control questions correctly is a requirement for a 
successful completion of the task.  
All dollar amounts mentioned refer to bonus payments, which are paid out 
in addition to the fixed participation fee of $ 0.5. 
Please answer the following questions about the rules of the interaction: 
 
1. Suppose B1 takes away $ 0.4 from A. Can B2 take away $ 0.4 from 
A in this case? 
___Yes  ___No 
 
2. Suppose B1 does not take away $ 0.4 from A. What will be B1’s 
bonus payment? 
B1’s bonus payment: ___  
 
3. Suppose B1 takes away $ 0.4 from A. What will be B1’s bonus 
payment, and what will be A’s bonus payment? 
B1’s bonus payment: ____  
A’s bonus payment: ____  
 
Please answer the following question about your incentives to report your 
best possible guess about the most frequently given response by other 
participants: 
 
4. If you give the same response as that most frequently given by 
other participants in this experiment, what will be your bonus 
payment? 
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TAK E  GAME  –  BE L IE F EL ICITATION (TG-2)  
Introduction 
Welcome to this research project! We very much appreciate your 
participation. 
Please read the following instructions very carefully. After you click “OK” 
we will ask you some quiz questions to check your understanding of the 
instructions. You have to answer the questions correctly in order to receive 
your payment. 
All dollar amounts mentioned in the instructions refer to bonus payments, 
which are paid out in addition to the fixed participation fee of $ 0.5. 
Instructions  
Recently we conducted an interactive study on Amazon Mechanical Turk. 
Your task is to make an estimate about the actual behavior of participants 
in this study. The rules of the interaction were as follows: 
 
--- Original instructions of Take Game (TG-2) / player B1--- 
 
Your task is to estimate the behavior of players B2 in the cases in which B1 
did not take away the money from A.  
What do you think: in what percent (%) of these cases was the money 
taken away from A by player B2? 
You will have to type in a guess between 0% - 100%. You will earn a bonus 
of $ 3, if your estimate is not further than 5%-points away from the true 
value. 
Therefore, to maximize your chances of receiving the bonus of $ 3, you 
should report your best possible guess. 
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Control Questions 
Note that answering the control questions correctly is a requirement for a 
successful completion of the task.  
All dollar amounts mentioned refer to bonus payments, which are paid out 
in addition to the fixed participation fee of $ 0.5. 
Please answer the following questions about the rules of the interaction: 
1. Suppose B1 takes away $ 0.4 from A. Can B2 take away $ 0.4 from 
A in this case? 
___Yes  ___No 
 
2. Suppose B1 does not take away $ 0.4 from A. What will be B1’s 
bonus payment? 
B1’s bonus payment: ___  
 
3. Suppose B1 takes away $ 0.4 from A. What will be B1’s bonus 
payment, and what will be A’s bonus payment? 
B1’s bonus payment: ____  
A’s bonus payment: ____  
 
Please answer the following question about your incentives to report your 
best possible guess: 
 
4. If your guess is sufficiently close to the true value (not further 
away than 5%-points), what will be your bonus payment? 
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TAK E  GAME  –  BE L IE F EL ICITATION (TG-3)  
Introduction 
Welcome to this research project! We very much appreciate your 
participation. 
Please read the following instructions very carefully. After you click “OK” 
we will ask you some quiz questions to check your understanding of the 
instructions. You have to answer the questions correctly in order to receive 
your payment. 
All dollar amounts mentioned in the instructions refer to bonus payments, 
which are paid out in addition to the fixed participation fee of $ 0.5. 
Instructions  
Recently we conducted an interactive study on Amazon Mechanical Turk. 
Your task is to make an estimate about the actual behavior of participants 
in this study. The rules of the interaction were as follows: 
 
--- Original instructions of Take Game (TG-3) / player B1--- 
 
Your task is to guess the behavior of players B2 and B3 in the cases in which 
B1 did not take away the money from A.  
What do you think: in what percent (%) of these cases was the money 
taken away from A either by player B2 or, if not by player B2, then finally 
by player B3? 
You will have to type in a guess between 0% - 100%. You will earn a bonus 
of $ 3, if your estimate is not further than 5%-points away from the true 
value. 
Therefore, to maximize your chances of receiving the bonus of $ 3, you 
should report your best possible guess. 
  
B.2 instructions 193
  
Control Questions 
Note that answering the control questions correctly is a requirement for a 
successful completion of the task.  
All dollar amounts mentioned refer to bonus payments, which are paid out 
in addition to the fixed participation fee of $ 0.5. 
Please answer the following questions about the rules of the interaction: 
 
1. Suppose B1 takes away $ 0.4 from A. Can B2 take away $ 0.4 from 
A in this case? 
___Yes  ___No 
 
2. Suppose B1 does not take away $ 0.4 from A. What will be B1’s 
bonus payment? 
B1’s bonus payment: ___  
 
3. Suppose B1 takes away $ 0.4 from A. What will be B1’s bonus 
payment, and what will be A’s bonus payment? 
B1’s bonus payment: ____  
A’s bonus payment: ____  
 
Please answer the following question about your incentives to report your 
best possible guess: 
 
4. If your guess is sufficiently close to the true value (not further 
away than 5%-points), what will be your bonus payment? 
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TAK E  GAME  –  SPE CTATOR TRE ATME NT 
Introduction 
Welcome to this research project! We very much appreciate your 
participation. 
Please read the following instructions very carefully. After you click “OK” 
we will ask you some quiz questions to check your understanding of the 
instructions. You have to answer the questions correctly in order to receive 
your payment. 
All dollar amounts mentioned in the instructions refer to your bonus 
payment, which will be paid out in addition to your fixed participation fee 
of $ 0.5. 
Instructions 
You are participating in a study with three other participants, also recruited 
via Amazon Mechanical Turk. There are players A, B1, B2 and B3. All four 
players start with an endowment of $	0.5 each. (Recall that this money 
comes on top of your fixed participation fee of $	0.5.) You are player [insert 
role here].  
The player B1 has the option to take away $	0.4 from A. Players B2 and B3 
cannot make a decision in this study. 
The following illustration shows the possible moves and payoffs, 
depending on your decision. 
Figure provided to player B1 (figures provided to other participants 
analogous): 
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Control Questions 
Please answer the following questions. 
Note that answering the control questions correctly is a requirement for a 
successful completion of the task.  
All dollar amounts mentioned refer to your bonus payment, which will be 
paid out in addition to your fixed participation fee of $ 0.5. 
 
B: 
3. Suppose you do not take away $ 0.4 from A. What will be your 
bonus payment? 
Your bonus payment: ___  
 
4. Suppose you take away $ 0.4 from A. What will be your bonus 
payment, and what will be A’s bonus payment? 
Your bonus payment: ____  
A’s bonus payment: ____  
 
A: 
3. Suppose B1 does not take away $ 0.4 from you. What will be your 
bonus payment? 
Your bonus payment : ___  
 
4. Suppose B1 takes away $ 0.4 from you. What will be your bonus 
payment and what will be B1’s bonus payment? 
Your bonus payment : ____  
B1’s bonus payment : ____   
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UL TIMATUM GAME  –  UG-1  
Introduction 
Welcome to this research project! We very much appreciate your 
participation. 
Please read the following instructions very carefully. After you click “OK” 
we will ask you some quiz questions to check your understanding of the 
instructions. You have to answer the questions correctly in order to receive 
your payment. 
All dollar amounts mentioned in the instructions refer to your bonus 
payment, which will be paid out in addition to your fixed participation fee 
of $ 0.5. 
Instructions  
You are participating in a study with another participant, also recruited via 
Amazon Mechanical Turk. There are players A and B. You are player [insert 
role here].  
A total amount of $ 1 can be split between player A and player B. (Recall 
that this money comes on top of your fixed participation fee of $	0.5.) 
First, player A decides whether 
- to split the $ 1 equally ($ 0.5 for A and $ 0.5 for B) or 
- to propose an unequal split ($ 0.9 for A and $ 0.1 for B) 
If A opts for the equal split, A and B receive $ 0.5 each.  
If A proposes the unequal split, B has the option to accept or reject the offer. 
If B accepts the offer, A receives $ 0.9 and B receives $ 0.1. If B rejects the 
offer, none of the players (A and B) receive a bonus payment. 
The following illustration shows the possible moves and payoffs, 
depending on the decisions made by yourself and the other participants. 
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Figure provided to player B1 (figures provided to other participants 
analogous): 
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Control Questions 
Please answer the following questions. 
Note that answering the control questions correctly is a requirement for a 
successful completion of the task.  
All dollar amounts mentioned refer to your bonus payment, which will be 
paid out in addition to your fixed participation fee of $ 0.5. 
 
B:  
1. Suppose A offers the unequal split and you reject the offer from A. 
What will be your bonus payment? 
Your bonus payment: ____  
 
2. Suppose A offers the unequal split and you accept the offer from 
A. What will be your bonus payment, and what will be A’s bonus 
payment? 
Your bonus payment: ____  
A’s bonus payment: ____  
 
A: 
1. Suppose you offer the unequal split and B rejects your offer. What 
will be your bonus payment? 
Your bonus payment : ___  
 
2. Suppose you offer the unequal split and B1 accepts your offer. 
What will be your bonus payment and what will be B1’s bonus 
payment? 
Your bonus payment : ____  
B1’s bonus payment : ____  
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UL TIMATUM GAME  –  UG-2  
Introduction 
Welcome to this research project! We very much appreciate your 
participation. 
Please read the following instructions very carefully. After you click “OK” 
we will ask you some quiz questions to check your understanding of the 
instructions. You have to answer the questions correctly in order to receive 
your payment. 
All dollar amounts mentioned in the instructions refer to your bonus 
payment, which will be paid out in addition to your fixed participation fee 
of $ 0.5. 
Instructions 
You are participating in a study with two other participants, also recruited 
via Amazon Mechanical Turk. There are players A, B1 and B2. You are 
player [insert role here].  
A total amount of $ 1 can be split between player A and one of the two 
players B. (Recall that this money comes on top of your fixed participation 
fee of $	0.5.) 
First, player A decides whether 
- to split the $ 1 equally ($ 0.5 for A and $ 0.5 for B1) or 
- to propose an unequal split ($ 0.1 for A and $ 0.9 for one of the 
players B) 
If A chooses the equal split, A and B1 receive $ 0.5 each. 
If A proposes the unequal split, the two players B have the option—one after 
the other—to accept the offer. First, B1 decides whether or not to accept the 
offer and then B2 decides. 
However, the offer can be accepted only once. B2 thus can accept the offer 
only if B1 rejected it.  
If a player B accepts the offer, the accepting player B receives $ 0.1 and A 
receives $ 0.9. If both players B reject the offer, none of the players (A, B1, 
and B2) receive a bonus payment.  
The following illustration shows the possible moves and payoffs, 
depending on the decisions made by yourself and the other participants.  
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Figure provided to player B1 (figures provided to other participants 
analogous): 
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Control Questions 
Please answer the following questions. 
Note that answering the control questions correctly is a requirement for a 
successful completion of the task.  
All dollar amounts mentioned refer to your bonus payment, which will be 
paid out in addition to your fixed participation fee of $ 0.5. 
 
B1:  
1. Suppose A proposes the unequal split and you accept the offer 
from A. Can B2 also accept the offer from A in this case? 
___Yes  ___No 
 
2. Suppose A proposes the unequal split and you reject the offer 
from A. What will be your bonus payment? 
Your bonus payment: ___  
 
3. Suppose A proposes the unequal split and you accept the offer 
from A. What will be your bonus payment, and what will be A’s 
bonus payment? 
Your bonus payment: ____  
A’s bonus payment: ____  
 
B2:  
1. Suppose A offers the unequal split and B1 accepts the offer from 
A. Can you accept the offer from A in this case? 
___Yes  ___No 
 
2. Suppose A offers the unequal split, B1 rejects the offer from A, and 
you reject the offer from A as well. What will be your bonus 
payment? 
Your bonus payment : ___  
 
3. Suppose A offers the unequal split and B1 rejects the offer from A. 
It is thus your move and suppose you decide to accept the offer. 
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What will be your bonus payment, and what will be A’s bonus 
payment? 
Your bonus payment : ____  
A’s bonus payment : ____ 
 
A: 
1. Suppose you offer the unequal split and B1 accepts your offer. Can 
B2 accept your offer in this case? 
___Yes  ___No 
 
2. Suppose you offer the unequal split and B1 rejects your offer. Can 
B2 accept your offer in this case? 
___Yes  ___No 
 
3. Suppose you offer the unequal split and B1 and B2 reject your 
offer. What will be your bonus payment? 
Your bonus payment : ___  
 
4. Suppose you offer the unequal split and B1 accepts your offer. 
What will be your bonus payment and what will be B1’s bonus 
payment? 
Your bonus payment : ____  
B1’s bonus payment : ____  
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UL TIMATUM GAME  –  UG-3  
Introduction 
Welcome to this research project! We very much appreciate your 
participation. 
Please read the following instructions very carefully. After you click “OK” 
we will ask you some quiz questions to check your understanding of the 
instructions. You have to answer the questions correctly in order to receive 
your payment. 
All dollar amounts mentioned in the instructions refer to your bonus 
payment, which will be paid out in addition to your fixed participation fee 
of $ 0.5. 
Instructions  
You are participating in a study with three other participants, also recruited 
via Amazon Mechanical Turk. There are players A, B1, B2 and B3. You are 
player [insert role here].  
A total amount of $ 1 can be split between player A and one of the three 
players B. (Recall that this money comes on top of your fixed participation 
fee of $	0.5.) 
First, player A decides whether 
- to split the $ 1 equally ($ 0.5 for A and $ 0.5 for B1) or 
- to propose an unequal split ($ 0.9 for A and $ 0.1 for one of the 
players B) 
If A chooses the equal split, A and B1 receive $ 0.5 each. 
If A proposes the unequal split, the three players B have the option—one 
after the other—to accept the offer. First, B1 decides whether or not to accept 
the offer, then B2 decides and finally B3. 
However, the offer can be accepted only once. B2 thus can accept the offer 
only if B1 rejected it, and B3 can accept the offer only if both B1 and B2 
rejected it.  
If a player B accepts the offer, the accepting player B receives $ 0.1 and A 
receives $ 0.9. If all three players B reject the offer, none of the players (A, 
B1, B2, and B3) receive a bonus payment.  
The following illustration shows the possible moves and payoffs, 
depending on the decisions made by yourself and the other participants.  
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Figure provided to player B1 (figures provided to other participants 
analogous): 
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Control Questions 
Please answer the following questions. 
Note that answering the control questions correctly is a requirement for a 
successful completion of the task.  
All dollar amounts mentioned refer to your bonus payment, which will be 
paid out in addition to your fixed participation fee of $ 0.5. 
 
B1: 
1. Suppose A proposes the unequal split and you accept the offer 
from A. Can B2 also accept the offer from A in this case? 
___Yes  ___No 
 
2. Suppose A proposes the unequal split and you reject the offer 
from A. What will be your bonus payment? 
Your bonus payment: ___  
 
3. Suppose A proposes the unequal split and you accept the offer 
from A. What will be your bonus payment, and what will be A’s 
bonus payment? 
Your bonus payment: ____  
A’s bonus payment: ____  
 
B2: 
1. Suppose A offers the unequal split and B1 rejects the offer from A. 
It is thus your move and suppose you decide to accept the offer 
from A. Can B3 accept the offer from A in this case? 
___Yes  ___No 
 
2. Suppose A offers the unequal split and B1 accepts the offer from 
A. Can you accept the offer from A in this case? 
___Yes  ___No 
 
3. Suppose A offers the unequal split, B1 rejects the offer from A, and 
you reject the offer from A as well. What will be your bonus 
payment? 
Your bonus payment : ___  
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4. Suppose A offers the unequal split and B1 rejects the offer from A. 
It is thus your move and suppose you decide to accept the offer. 
What will be your bonus payment, and what will be A’s bonus 
payment? 
Your bonus payment : ____  
A’s bonus payment : ____  
 
B3: 
1. Suppose A offers the unequal split and B1 accepts the offer from 
A. Can you accept the offer from A in this case? 
___Yes  ___No 
 
2. Suppose A offers the unequal split, B1 and B2 reject the offer from 
A, and you reject the offer from A as well. What will be your 
bonus payment? 
Your bonus payment : ___  
 
3. Suppose A offers the unequal split, and B1 and B2 reject the offer 
from A. It is thus your move and suppose you decide to accept the 
offer from A. What will be your bonus payment, and what will be 
A’s bonus payment? 
Your bonus payment : ____  
A’s bonus payment : ____  
 
A: 
1. Suppose you offer the unequal split and B1 accepts your offer. Can 
B2 accept your offer in this case? 
___Yes  ___No 
 
2. Suppose you offer the unequal split and B1 rejects your offer. Can 
B2 accept your offer in this case? 
___Yes  ___No 
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3. Suppose you offer the unequal split and B1, B2 and B3 reject your 
offer. What will be your bonus payment? 
Your bonus payment : ___  
 
4. Suppose you offer the unequal split and B1 accepts your offer. 
What will be your bonus payment and what will be B1’s bonus 
payment? 
Your bonus payment : ____  
B1’s bonus payment : ____  
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UL TIMATUM GAME  –  SOCIAL  NORM EL IC ITATI ON (UG-1 /  UG-2 
/  UG-3)  
 
(We elicited social norms for responder and proposer behavior in the lab in the 
same way as on MTurk, except that we used the original instructions and control 
questions of the study by Fehr, Fong, and Fischbacher (2009), and subjects could 
earn a bonus of 10 CHF.) 
Introduction 
Welcome to this research project! We very much appreciate your 
participation. 
Please read the following instructions very carefully. After you click “OK” 
we will ask you some quiz questions to check your understanding of the 
instructions. You have to answer the questions correctly in order to receive 
your payment. 
All dollar amounts mentioned in the instructions refer to your bonus 
payment, which will be paid out in addition to your fixed participation fee 
of $ 0.5. 
Instructions  
Recently we conducted an interactive study on Amazon Mechanical Turk. 
Your task is to evaluate a possible action of a participant in this study and 
to decide whether taking that action would be "socially appropriate" and 
"consistent with moral or proper social behavior" or "socially inappropriate" 
and "inconsistent with moral or proper social behavior" or "neutral," i.e. 
neither socially appropriate nor inappropriate. By socially appropriate, we 
mean behavior that most people agree is the "correct" or "ethical" thing to 
do.  
If you give the same response as that most frequently given by other 
participants in this experiment, then you will receive an additional $ 3 as 
a bonus. 
The rules of the interaction in the recent study were as follows: 
 
--- Original instructions of ultimatum game / UG-1, UG-2 or UG-3 / player 
B1--- 
 
Responder Norms: 
Your task is to evaluate player B1’s decision to accept the unequal offer: 
If B1 accepted the unequal offer, would B1’s action… 
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Proposer Norms: 
Your task is to evaluate player A’s decision to make the unequal offer: If 
player A made the unequal offer, would A’s action… 
 
…be rated by most people as "socially appropriate" and "consistent with 
moral or proper social behavior" or "socially inappropriate" and 
"inconsistent with moral or proper social behavior" or would it be rated as 
"neutral," i.e. neither socially appropriate nor inappropriate?  
You will have to indicate your belief by choosing one of the following five 
options: 
- very socially inappropriate 
- somewhat socially inappropriate 
- neutral: neither socially inappropriate nor appropriate 
- somewhat socially appropriate 
- very socially appropriate 
Note that we do not ask you to provide the rating you believe to be 
“right,” but the rating you believe will be the one most frequently chosen 
by the other participants in this experiment. Therefore, to maximize your 
chances of receiving the bonus of $ 3, you should report your best possible 
guess about the most frequently given response to the question. 
Control Questions 
Note that answering the control questions correctly is a requirement for a 
successful completion of the task.  
All dollar amounts mentioned refer to bonus payments, which are paid 
out in addition to the fixed participation fee of $ 0.5. 
 
UG-1: 
Please answer the following questions about the rules of the interaction: 
1. Suppose A offers the unequal split and B rejects the offer from A. 
What will be B’s bonus payment? 
B’s bonus payment: ____  
 
2. Suppose A offers the unequal split and B accepts the offer from A. 
What will be B’s bonus payment, and what will be A’s bonus 
payment? 
B’s bonus payment: ____  
A’s bonus payment: ____  
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Please answer the following question about your incentives to report your 
best possible guess about the most frequently given response by other 
participants: 
3. If you give the same response as that most frequently given by 
other participants in this experiment, what will be your bonus 
payment? 
 
UG-2 / UG-3: 
Please answer the following questions about the rules of the interaction: 
1. Suppose A proposes the unequal split and B1 accepts the offer 
from A. Can B2 also accept the offer from A in this case? 
___Yes  ___No 
 
2. Suppose A proposes the unequal split and B1 rejects the offer from 
A. What will be B1’s bonus payment? 
 B1’s bonus payment: ___  
 
3. Suppose A proposes the unequal split and B1 accepts the offer 
from A. What will be B1’s bonus payment, and what will be A’s 
bonus payment? 
B1’s bonus payment: ____  
A’s bonus payment: ____  
 
Please answer the following question about your incentives to report your 
best possible guess about the most frequently given response by other 
participants: 
4. If you give the same response as that most frequently given by 
other participants in this experiment, what will be your bonus 
payment? 
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UL TIMATUM GAME  –  BE L IE F EL IC ITATION (UG-2 /  UG-3)  
 
(We elicited beliefs about replacement probabilities in the lab in the same way as 
on MTurk, except that we used the original instructions and control questions of 
the study by Fehr, Fong, and Fischbacher (2009), and subjects could earn a 
bonus of 10 CHF.) 
Introduction 
Welcome to this research project! We very much appreciate your 
participation. 
Please read the following instructions very carefully. After you click “OK” 
we will ask you some quiz questions to check your understanding of the 
instructions. You have to answer the questions correctly in order to receive 
your payment. 
All dollar amounts mentioned in the instructions refer to your bonus 
payment, which will be paid out in addition to your fixed participation fee 
of $ 0.5. 
Instructions 
Recently we conducted an interactive study on Amazon Mechanical Turk. 
Your task is to make an estimate about the actual behavior of participants 
in this study. The rules of the interaction were as follows: 
 
--- Original instructions of ultimatum game / UG-2 or UG-3 / player B1--- 
 
UG-2: 
Your task is to guess the behavior of players B2 in the cases in which A 
proposed the unequal split and B1 rejected the offer.  
What do you think: in what percent (%) of these cases was the unequal 
split accepted by player B2? 
You will have to type in a guess between 0% - 100%. You will earn a bonus 
of $ 3, if your estimate is not further than 5%-points away from the true 
value. 
Therefore, to maximize your chances of receiving the bonus of $ 3, you 
should report your best possible guess. 
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UG-3: 
Your task is to guess the behavior of players B2 and B3 in the cases in which 
A proposed the unequal split and B1 rejected the offer. 
What do you think: in what percent (%) of these cases was the unequal 
split accepted by either player B2 or, if not by player B2, then finally by 
player B3? 
You will have to type in a guess between 0% - 100%. You will earn a bonus 
of $ 3, if your estimate is not further than 5%-points away from the true 
value. 
Therefore, to maximize your chances of receiving the bonus of $ 3, you 
should report your best possible guess. 
Control Questions (UG-2/UG-3) 
Note that answering the control questions correctly is a requirement for a 
successful completion of the task.  
All dollar amounts mentioned refer to bonus payments, which are paid out 
in addition to the fixed participation fee of $ 0.5. 
Please answer the following questions about the rules of the interaction: 
1. Suppose A proposes the unequal split and B1 accepts the offer 
from A. Can B2 also accept the offer from A in this case? 
___Yes  ___No 
 
2. Suppose A proposes the unequal split and B1 rejects the offer from 
A. What will be B1’s bonus payment? 
 B1’s bonus payment: ___  
 
3. Suppose A proposes the unequal split and B1 accepts the offer 
from A. What will be B1’s bonus payment, and what will be A’s 
bonus payment? 
B1’s bonus payment: ____  
A’s bonus payment: ____  
 
Please answer the following question about your incentives to report your 
best possible guess: 
4. If your guess is sufficiently close to the true value (not further 
away than 5%-points), what will be your bonus payment? 
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C
APPENDIX – THE SUPER IOR ITY OF
DECENTRAL IZAT ION IN SOC IAL NORM
ENFORCEMENT
c.1 additional analyses
In this section we show that the superiority of decentralization in sus-
taining cooperation cannot be explained by different reactions to pun-
ishment or by different punishment behavior. To analyze the effects
of punishment on contribution decisions we estimate the following
Probit regression model.
Pr(Cooperator = 1|X) =  ( X)
where   is the cdf of the standard normal distribution and X is a
matrix that includes the variables shown in Table C.2. The labels of
these variables are explained in Table C.1.
Table C.2 depicts the estimated coefficients and standard errors of the
Probit regression model. The interaction terms lag1RecLPun_CEN
and lag1RecHPun_CEN show how receiving low and high punish-
ment (as compared to no punishment) affects the next period’s con-
tribution decision of defectors in the centralized social norm enforce-
ment institution (as compared to the decentralized social norm en-
forcement institution). The coefficients are not significantly different
from zero under both exogenous and endogenous monitoring; hence,
defectors’ reaction to punishment does not differ between the decen-
tralized and centralized settings. Moreover, based on a Wald test1, we
cannot reject the hypothesis that cooperators do not react differently
to receiving low punishment in decentralized and centralized punish-
ment institutions, under both exogenous and endogenous monitoring
(exogenous monitoring, p=0.4845; endogenous monitoring, p=0.1146).
Similarly, cooperators do not react differently to receiving high pun-
ishment in the Ex-DEC and Ex-CEN treatments (Wald test2, p=0.3933).
Under endogenous monitoring, cooperators seem to be less likely to
defect in the decentralized institution as a reaction to high punish-
ment than in the centralized institution (Wald test, p<0.001). However,
1 lag1RecLPun_CEN + lag1Coop_lag1RecLPun_CEN = 0
2 lag1RecHPun_CEN + lag1Coop_lag1RecHPun_CEN = 0
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variable description
Cooperator 1 if endowment was contributed to PG, else 0
TypeSocial 1 if Cooperator = 1 in t = 1, else 0
CEN 1 if treatment I-CEN or C-CEN, else 0
lag1Coop 1 if Cooperator = 1 in previous period, else 0
lag1RecLPun 1 if received low punishment in previous pe-
riod, else 0
lag1RecHPun 1 if received high punishment in previous pe-
riod, else 0
lag1SumLastInfo Sum of last received signals stating “coopera-
tor”
Y_Z interaction of variable Y and Z
Table C.1: Variables of the Probit model
the analysis is based on a limited sample size - cooperators received
high punishment in only 8 instances (0.74%) in the End-DEC treat-
ment and in only 21 instances (1.81%) in the End-CEN treatment.
Next, we compare the Ex-DEC and Ex-CEN treatments with respect
to the probabilities that subjects who hold punishment power exert
punishment, depending on the received signal. Table C.3 shows, for
each possible signal, the probabilities that either a player P in case
of Ex-DEC or a player A in case of Ex-CEN makes a positive punish-
ment decision. If the underlying signal stated "cooperator", Ps chose
to punish in 6.2% of the cases and As chose to punish in 6.0% of the
cases. Similarly if the underlying signal stated "defector", Ps chose
to punish in 47.6% of the cases and As chose to punish in 49.3% of
the cases. Since, the propensity to punish, given an underlying sig-
nal, does not differ between the centralized and decentralized social
norm enforcement institutions, different effects of the punishment in-
stitutions on cooperation rates cannot be explained by punishment
behavior.
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exogenous endogenous
Intercept -0.8424*** 0.2096
[0.2164] [0.4893]
TypeSocial 0.6523*** 0.3311
[0.1036] [0.2033]
CEN -0.3374 -0.9423*
[0.2321] [0.5270]
lag1Coop 1.3101*** 0.8756***
[0.1645] [0.1958]
lag1Coop_CEN -0.1841 0.1828
[0.2245] [0.3940]
lag1RecLPun 0.1977* 0.4580
[0.1191] [0.2862]
lag1RecHPun 0.5264** 1.0215***
[0.2080] [0.1824]
lag1RecLPun_CEN 0.0104 0.0523
[0.1951] [0.3474]
lag1RecHPun_CEN 0.0679 -0.5540
[0.2595] [0.4112]
lag1Coop_lag1RecLPun -0.3831*** -0.2909
[0.1411] [0.3199]
lag1Coop_lag1RecHPun -0.7767** 2.7091***
[0.3716] [0.2615]
lag1Coop_lag1RecLPun_CEN -0.1427 -0.5620
[0.2856] [0.5040]
lag1Coop_lag1RecHPun_CEN -0.2894 -4.2732***
[0.4131] [0.5695]
lag1SumLastInfo 0.4632** 0.2685
[0.1915] [0.2492]
lag1SumLastInfo_CEN 0.2973 0.7416**
[0.2367] [0.3350]
Period -0.0128*** -0.0171***
[0.0032] [0.0051]
Observations 4896 2496
Pseudo R2 0.1923 0.1040
Table C.2: Probit model estimations for cooperation decision
Note: This table reports the Probit model estimations for the dependent variable
Cooperator. Standard errors are clustered at the group level.
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ex-dec ex-cen
Signal
Cooperator 0.062 0.060
Defector 0.476 0.493
Table C.3: Positive punishment decisions depending on signal (in %)
Note: This table shows the fraction of subjects, among those who have punishment
power, who exert punishment depending on the received signal.
c.2 instructions
In the following section we present English translations of all written
instructions used in this study. Subjects were provided with instruc-
tions in German.
  
OVE RVIE W OF INSTRUC TIONS 
 
EX-DEC ........................................................................................................... 220 
EX-CEN ........................................................................................................... 226 
END-DEC ........................................................................................................ 232 
END-CEN ........................................................................................................ 239 
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Instructions Ex-DEC
Welcome to Econ-Lab!
Please read the following instructions carefully. If you have any ques-
tions, please raise your hand. An assistant will approach you imme-
diately.
General remarks
Today you are taking part in a study at the Department of Economics
of the University of Zurich. You will receive a fixed payment of 15
CHF for your participation. Depending on the course of the study,
you can earn an additional amount of money. You will receive your
payment at the end of the study in cash. Please note that these instruc-
tions are exclusively for your private information and that communi-
cation is absolutely prohibited during the whole study. If you have
any questions, please direct them towards the experimenters. Violat-
ing these rules leads to exclusion from this study and all payments.
Data collected in this study will at no time be linked to your identity.
Your name will be used exclusively for issuing the acknowledgment
of your payment. Hence, your anonymity is guaranteed at all times.
Short description of the procedures of the study
At the beginning of the experiment you will be assigned to a group
of five participants. Hence, in addition to you, there are four other
members in your group. The group composition does not change
over the course of the experiment. A group consists of four par-
ticipants A and one participant B. The assignment to one of these
two roles is determined randomly at the beginning of the experiment.
Each participant sticks to his/her assigned role until the end of the
experiment. The experiment consists of 25 periods. Each period is
composed of three phases:
1. In the first phase participants A can decide whether or not to
contribute to a common project of the group.
2. In the second phase all group members receive an information
about the decisions that the participants have made. This indi-
vidual information is accurate with a certain probability only.
It is therefore possible that the information about the decision
of certain group members is false. The specific pieces of infor-
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mation conveyed to participants are independent of each other
and can therefore be different from one another.
3. In the third phase each participant A can spend money in order
to reduce the income of other participants A of the group. At
the end of each period group members are informed about how
much their income was reduced in total.
On the next pages we describe the exact procedures of the experi-
ment.
PROCEDURES OF THE STUDY
At the beginning of the experiment you are informed about your ran-
domly assigned role. There are four participants A and one partici-
pant B in your group. You are either a participant A or the partic-
ipant B. The assignment to one of those two roles is fixed for the
whole duration of the experiment.
You will receive experimental currency units (so-called Token) over
the course of the experiment. 1 Token corresponds to 0.05 CHF. The
experiment consists of 25 periods. At the end of the experiment, the
sum of all the Token you have collected over the 25 periods is con-
verted to CHF and paid out to you. You receive this amount in ad-
dition to your fixed payment. The income of a single period may be
negative. You receive an additional payment of 0 CHF if the sum of
all your period incomes is negative (your fixed payment of 15 CHF
remains unaffected).
Participant B
As participant B you do not make any decisions during the experi-
ment. However, in each period you receive a share of the project’s
profit, which depends on the decisions of participants A. The profit
of the project is split equally among all five group members. In each
period you receive information about whether the participants A con-
tributed to the project. Details can be found below in the section
"phases of the experiment".
Participant A
As one of the four participants A you decide in each of the 25 periods
whether or not you want to contribute to the common project. In each
period you receive a share of the project’s profit that depends on the
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decisions of all participants A. The profit of the project is split equally
among all five group members. Furthermore, like participant B, you
receive information about whether or not the other participants A
contributed to the project. Afterwards, you can punish particular par-
ticipants A by reducing their income. Details can be found below in
the section "phases of the experiment".
Phases of the experiment
Phase 1 – Decision about the contribution to the project
As participant A you are endowed with an amount of 15 Token at the
beginning of each period. You have to choose one of two options:
1. Either you contribute the 15 Token to the common project or
2. You keep the 15 Token.
All group members (participants A as well as participant B) profit
equally from contributions to the common project. The sum of con-
tributions is first doubled and then split equally among all group
members.
If a group member contributes the 15 Token to the project, the income
from the project increases by (15⇤2)5 = 6 Token for each group member.
As participant B you receive a share of the project’s income, but you
do not make any decisions yourself.
In this phase, you are not informed about the actual income from
the project - neither as participant A nor as participant B. Only at
the end of the experiment (i.e. after 25 periods) all participants are
informed about their total earnings in each period.
project income per group member
=
number of contributing participants x 6 Token
Examples:
• Suppose all participants A contribute 15 Token to the common
project. Then each group member gets 6 Token * 4 = 24 Token
from the project.
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• Suppose no one contributes to the project. Then all participants
A keep their 15 Token and participant B receives 0 additional
Token.
• Suppose you are participant A and you do not contribute to
the project. Each of the other three participants A contributes
15 Token to the project. Then you keep your 15 Token and you
receive an additional 3*6 Token = 18 Token from the project.
Hence, in total you get 33 Token. Each other group member
receives 3*6 Token = 18 Token from the project.
Phase 2 – Information about contributions of other participants:
In this phase all group members (participants A and B) individu-
ally receive an independent information about each participant A’s
contribution decision. Each piece of information is correct with a
probability of 90% and false with a probability of 10%. Hence,
• when a participant A actually contributes 15 Token, then you
receive the information "15 Token" with 90% probability and
the information "0 Token" with 10% probability.
• when a participant A actually contributes 0 Token, then you
receive the information "0 Token" with 90% probability and the
information "15 Token" with 10% probability.
The pieces of information are provided individually and are indepen-
dent of each other. Therefore, it is possible that two group members
receive different information about the actions of one and the same
participant A. You do not learn the information received by other
group members.
The labels of participants A are randomly reassigned each period.
For example, "participant A2" in the first period is not necessarily the
same person as “participant A2” in the second period.
Phase 3 – Decision about punishment of other participants:
In this phase participants A have the possibility to punish other par-
ticipants A by reducing their period income.
If you as a participant A decide to punish another participant A,
then 8 Token are deducted from his/her period income. You have
to pay 2 Token in order to punish another participant A. For that
purpose you are endowed with an additional 6 Token in this phase.
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Hence, you can punish a) no participant A, b) one participant A, c)
two participants A or d) all three participants A.
Participant B has to bear costs of 2 Token for each exerted punishment
as well. For that purpose participant B is endowed with additional
24 Token. However, participant B does not make any punishment
decisions. At the end of each period all participants A are informed
about the punishment they have received. They learn by how many
participants they were punished and by how much their income was
reduced in total.
Overview of total income within one period
period income of a participant A
=
(15 Token) – (contribution to project)
+
(6 Token x number of contributing participants)
+
(6 Token) – (2 Token x number of assigned punishments)
-
(8 Token x number of received punishments)
period income of participant B
=
(6 Token x number of contributing participants)
+
(24 Token) – (2 Token x sum of all assigned punishments)
Control questions
Please answer the following questions and raise your hand.
1. Question
Suppose you are participant A and no participant A has contributed
to the common project. Suppose further that no participant A makes
use of the possibility to punish. What is you period income (please
keep in mind that you are endowed with an additional 6 Token in
phase 3)
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Your period income (in Token)
2. Question
Suppose you are a participant A and you have contributed to the
common project. In addition to you, two other participants A have
contributed to the project. Suppose further that you punish one par-
ticipant A and that you do not receive any punishment yourself.
a) What is your period income? Your period income (in Token)
b) Now suppose that you are punished by two participants A. What
is your period income in this case?
Your period income (in Token)
3. Question
Suppose you receive the information that participant A2 has not con-
tributed to the project.
a) What is the probability that this information about participant A2
is correct?
b) Do all group members necessarily receive the same information
about the contribution of participant A2?
YES NO
c) Next period you receive new information about the contribution of
participant A2. Does participant A2 necessarily correspond the same
actual person as in the previous period?
YES NO
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Instructions Ex-CEN
Welcome to Econ-Lab!
Please read the following instructions carefully. If you have any ques-
tions, please raise your hand. An assistant will approach you imme-
diately.
General remarks
Today you are taking part in a study at the Department of Economics
of the University of Zurich. You will receive a fixed payment of 15
CHF for your participation. Depending on the course of the study,
you can earn an additional amount of money. You will receive your
payment at the end of the study in cash. Please note that these instruc-
tions are exclusively for your private information and that communi-
cation is absolutely prohibited during the whole study. If you have
any questions, please direct them towards the experimenters. Violat-
ing these rules leads to exclusion from this study and all payments.
Data collected in this study will at no time be linked to your identity.
Your name will be used exclusively for issuing the acknowledgment
of your payment. Hence, your anonymity is guaranteed at all times.
Short description of the procedures of the study
At the beginning of the experiment you will be assigned to a group
of five participants. Hence, in addition to you, there are four other
members in your group. The group composition does not change
over the course of the experiment. A group consists of four par-
ticipants A and one participant B. The assignment to one of these
two roles is determined randomly at the beginning of the experiment.
Each participant sticks to his/her assigned role until the end of the
experiment. The experiment consists of 25 periods. Each period is
composed of three phases:
1. In the first phase participants A can decide whether or not to
contribute to a common project of the group.
2. In the second phase all group members receive an information
about the decisions that the participants have made. This indi-
vidual information is accurate with a certain probability only.
It is therefore possible that the information about the decision
of certain group members is false. The specific pieces of infor-
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mation conveyed to participants are independent of each other
and can therefore be different from one another.
3. In the third phase each participant B can spend money in order
to reduce the income of participants A of the group. At the end
of each period group members are informed about how much
their income was reduced in total.
On the next pages we describe the exact procedures of the experi-
ment.
PROCEDURES OF THE STUDY
At the beginning of the experiment you are informed about your ran-
domly assigned role. There are four participants A and one partici-
pant B in your group. You are either a participant A or the partic-
ipant B. The assignment to one of those two roles is fixed for the
whole duration of the experiment.
You will receive experimental currency units (so-called Token) over
the course of the experiment. 1 Token corresponds to 0.05 CHF. The
experiment consists of 25 periods. At the end of the experiment, the
sum of all the Token you have collected over the 25 periods is con-
verted to CHF and paid out to you. You receive this amount in ad-
dition to your fixed payment. The income of a single period may be
negative. You receive an additional payment of 0 CHF if the sum of
all your period incomes is negative (your fixed payment of 15 CHF
remains unaffected).
Participant B
As participant B you do not make any decisions during the first two
phases of the experiment. However, in each period you receive a share
of the project’s profit, which depends on the decisions of participants
A. The profit of the project is split equally among all five group mem-
bers. In each period you receive information about whether the partic-
ipants A contributed to the project. In the third phase of each period
you can punish participants A by reducing their income. Details can
be found below in the section "phases of the experiment".
Participant A
As one of the four participants A you decide in each of the 25 periods
whether or not you want to contribute to the common project. In each
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period you receive a share of the project’s profit that depends on the
decisions of all participants A. The profit of the project is split equally
among all five group members. Furthermore, like participant B, you
receive information about whether or not the other participants A
contributed to the project. In the third phase you do not make any
decision. You are, however, informed whether and how severe you
were punished by participant B. Details can be found below in the
section "phases of the experiment".
Phases of the experiment
Phase 1 – Decision about the contribution to the project
As participant A you are endowed with an amount of 15 Token at the
beginning of each period. You have to choose one of two options:
1. Either you contribute the 15 Token to the common project or
2. You keep the 15 Token.
All group members (participants A as well as participant B) profit
equally from contributions to the common project. The sum of con-
tributions is first doubled and then split equally among all group
members.
If a group member contributes the 15 Token to the project, the income
from the project increases by (15⇤2)5 = 6 Token for each group member.
As participant B you receive a share of the project’s income, but you
do not make any decisions yourself.
In this phase, you are not informed about the actual income from
the project - neither as participant A nor as participant B. Only at
the end of the experiment (i.e. after 25 periods) all participants are
informed about their total earnings in each period.
project income per group member
=
number of contributing participants x 6 Token
Examples:
• Suppose all participants A contribute 15 Token to the common
project. Then each group member gets 6 Token * 4 = 24 Token
from the project.
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• Suppose no one contributes to the project. Then all participants
A keep their 15 Token and participant B receives 0 additional
Token.
• Suppose you are participant A and you do not contribute to
the project. Each of the other three participants A contributes
15 Token to the project. Then you keep your 15 Token and you
receive an additional 3*6 Token = 18 Token from the project.
Hence, in total you get 33 Token. Each other group member
receives 3*6 Token = 18 Token from the project.
Phase 2 – Information about contributions of other participants:
In this phase all group members (participants A and B) individu-
ally receive an independent information about each participant A’s
contribution decision. Each piece of information is correct with a
probability of 90% and false with a probability of 10%. Hence,
• when a participant A actually contributes 15 Token, then you
receive the information "15 Token" with 90% probability and
the information "0 Token" with 10% probability.
• when a participant A actually contributes 0 Token, then you
receive the information "0 Token" with 90% probability and the
information "15 Token" with 10% probability.
The pieces of information are provided individually and are indepen-
dent of each other. Therefore, it is possible that two group members
receive different information about the actions of one and the same
participant A. You do not learn the information received by other
group members.
The labels of participants A are randomly reassigned each period.
For example, "participant A2" in the first period is not necessarily the
same person as “participant A2” in the second period.
Phase 3 – Decision about punishment of other participants:
In this phase participant B has the possibility to punish participants
A by reducing their period income.
As a participant B you decide in every period whether to reduce
a participant A’s income by a) 0 Token, b) 8 Token, c) 16 Token or
d) 24 Token. You have to pay 1 Token per every 4 Token that are
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deducted from a participant A’s income. For that purpose you are
endowed with additional 24 Token in this phase.
The other three participants A have to bear total costs of 1 Token per
4 Token that are deducted from the fourth participant A. These total
costs are split equally among the three other participants A. For that
purpose each participant A is endowed with an additional 6 Token.
If for example, participant B reduces the income of one participant A
by 24 Token then the other three participants A have to pay 6 Token
in total, i.e. 2 Token each.
At the end of each period all participants A are informed about the
punishment they have received. They do not learn about the punish-
ment of other participants A.
Overview of total income within one period
period income of a participant A
=
(15 Token) – (contribution to project)
+
(6 Token x number of contributing participants)
+
(6 Token)
-
(14x
1
3 Token x sum of punishment of other participants A by B)
-
(received punishments by participant B)
period income of participant B
=
(6 Token x number of contributing participants)
+
(24 Token)
–
(14 Token x sum of all assigned punishments to A)
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Control questions
Please answer the following questions and raise your hand.
1. Question
Suppose you are participant A and no participant A has contributed
to the common project. Suppose participant B does not make use of
the possibility to punish.
What is you period income (please keep in mind that you are en-
dowed with an additional 6 Token in phase 3)
Your period income (in Token)
2. Question
Suppose you are a participant A and you have contributed to the com-
mon project. The other three participants A have also contributed to
the project. Suppose further that you are punished with 24 Token
(your income is reduced by 24 Token) by participant B and that no
other participant A is punished.
What is your period income? Your period income (in Token)
3. Question
Suppose you receive the information that participant A2 has not con-
tributed to the project.
a) What is the probability that this information about participant A2
is correct?
b) Do all group members necessarily receive the same information
about the contribution of participant A2?
YES NO
c) Next period you receive new information about the contribution of
participant A2. Does participant A2 necessarily correspond the same
actual person as in the previous period?
YES NO
4. Question Suppose you are participant B and two participants A have
contributed to the common project. Suppose further that you punish
two participants with 24 Token (you reduce the income of two partic-
ipants A by 24 Token).
What is your period income? Your period income (in Token)
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Instructions End-DEC
Welcome to Econ-Lab!
Please read the following instructions carefully. If you have any ques-
tions, please raise your hand. An assistant will approach you imme-
diately.
General remarks
Today you are taking part in a study at the Department of Economics
of the University of Zurich. You will receive a fixed payment of 15
CHF for your participation. Depending on the course of the study,
you can earn an additional amount of money. You will receive your
payment at the end of the study in cash. Please note that these instruc-
tions are exclusively for your private information and that communi-
cation is absolutely prohibited during the whole study. If you have
any questions, please direct them towards the experimenters. Violat-
ing these rules leads to exclusion from this study and all payments.
Data collected in this study will at no time be linked to your identity.
Your name will be used exclusively for issuing the acknowledgment
of your payment. Hence, your anonymity is guaranteed at all times.
Short description of the procedures of the study
At the beginning of the experiment you will be assigned to a group
of five participants. Hence, in addition to you, there are four other
members in your group. The group composition does not change
over the course of the experiment. A group consists of four par-
ticipants A and one participant B. The assignment to one of these
two roles is determined randomly at the beginning of the experiment.
Each participant sticks to his/her assigned role until the end of the
experiment. The experiment consists of 25 periods. Each period is
composed of three phases:
1. In the first phase participants A can decide whether or not to
contribute to a common project of the group.
2. In the second phase all group members receive an information
(free of charge) about the decisions that the participants have
made. This individual information is accurate with a certain
probability only. It is therefore possible that the information
about the decision of certain group members is false. The spe-
cific pieces of information conveyed to participants are inde-
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pendent of each other and can therefore be different from one
another. In order to improve your information base you can buy
further information about other group members. The new infor-
mation is also accurate with a certain probability only.
3. In the third phase each participant A can spend money in order
to reduce the income of other participants A of the group. At
the end of each period group members are informed about how
much their income was reduced in total.
On the next pages we describe the exact procedures of the experi-
ment.
PROCEDURES OF THE STUDY
At the beginning of the experiment you are informed about your ran-
domly assigned role. There are four participants A and one partici-
pant B in your group. You are either a participant A or the partic-
ipant B. The assignment to one of those two roles is fixed for the
whole duration of the experiment.
You will receive experimental currency units (so-called Token) over
the course of the experiment. 1 Token corresponds to 0.05 CHF. The
experiment consists of 25 periods. At the end of the experiment, the
sum of all the Token you have collected over the 25 periods is con-
verted to CHF and paid out to you. You receive this amount in ad-
dition to your fixed payment. The income of a single period may be
negative. You receive an additional payment of 0 CHF if the sum of
all your period incomes is negative (your fixed payment of 15 CHF
remains unaffected).
Participant B
As participant B you do not make any decisions during the experi-
ment. However, in each period you receive a share of the project’s
profit, which depends on the decisions of participants A. The profit
of the project is split equally among all five group members. In each
period you receive information about whether the participants A con-
tributed to the project. Details can be found below in the section
"phases of the experiment".
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Participant A
As one of the four participants A you decide in each of the 25 periods
whether or not you want to contribute to the common project. In each
period you receive a share of the project’s profit that depends on the
decisions of all participants A. The profit of the project is split equally
among all five group members. Furthermore, like participant B, you
receive information about whether or not the other participants A
contributed to the project. Afterwards, you can acquire further infor-
mation about the behavior of other participants A in order to improve
your information base. Finally, you can punish particular participants
A by reducing their income. Details can be found below in the section
"phases of the experiment".
Phases of the experiment
Phase 1 – Decision about the contribution to the project
As participant A you are endowed with an amount of 15 Token at the
beginning of each period. You have to choose one of two options:
1. Either you contribute the 15 Token to the common project or
2. You keep the 15 Token.
All group members (participants A as well as participant B) profit
equally from contributions to the common project. The sum of con-
tributions is first doubled and then split equally among all group
members.
If a group member contributes the 15 Token to the project, the income
from the project increases by (15⇤2)5 = 6 Token for each group member.
As participant B you receive a share of the project’s income, but you
do not make any decisions yourself.
In this phase, you are not informed about the actual income from
the project - neither as participant A nor as participant B. Only at
the end of the experiment (i.e. after 25 periods) all participants are
informed about their total earnings in each period.
project income per group member
=
number of contributing participants x 6 Token
C.2 instructions 235
Examples:
• Suppose all participants A contribute 15 Token to the common
project. Then each group member gets 6 Token * 4 = 24 Token
from the project.
• Suppose no one contributes to the project. Then all participants
A keep their 15 Token and participant B receives 0 additional
Token.
• Suppose you are participant A and you do not contribute to
the project. Each of the other three participants A contributes
15 Token to the project. Then you keep your 15 Token and you
receive an additional 3*6 Token = 18 Token from the project.
Hence, in total you get 33 Token. Each other group member
receives 3*6 Token = 18 Token from the project.
Phase 2 – Information about contributions of other participants:
In this phase all group members (participants A and B) individu-
ally receive an independent information about each participant A’s
contribution decision. Each piece of information is correct with a
probability of 90% and false with a probability of 10%. Hence,
• when a participant A actually contributes 15 Token, then you
receive the information "15 Token" with 90% probability and
the information "0 Token" with 10% probability.
• when a participant A actually contributes 0 Token, then you
receive the information "0 Token" with 90% probability and the
information "15 Token" with 10% probability.
The pieces of information are provided individually and are indepen-
dent of each other. Therefore, it is possible that two group members
receive different information about the actions of one and the same
participant A. You do not learn the information received by other
group members.
Afterwards, all four participants A have the possibility to acquire up
to two further pieces of information about each of the other three
participants A. Hence, in total each participant A can buy 6 additional
pieces of information (2 pieces of information x 3 other participants
A). One new piece of information costs 1 Token for the acquiring
participant A. Participant B also has to bear costs of 1 Token for each
new piece of information that is acquired.
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Like the initial three pieces of costless information, all new pieces of
information are independent of each other and with 90% probability
true and with 10% probability false. New pieces of information are ac-
quired sequentially, i.e. one after another. You can stop to buy further
information at any time.
The labels of participants A are randomly reassigned each period.
For example, "participant A2" in the first period is not necessarily
the same person as “participant A2” in the second period.
Phase 3 – Decision about punishment of other participants:
In this phase participants A have the possibility to punish other par-
ticipants A by reducing their period income.
If you as a participant A decide to punish another participant A,
then 8 Token are deducted from his/her period income. You have
to pay 2 Token in order to punish another participant A. Hence,
you can punish a) no participant A, b) one participant A, c) two
participants A or d) all three participants A.
Participant B has to bear costs of 2 Token for each exerted punish-
ment as well. However, participant B does not make any punishment
decisions.
At the end of each period all participants A are informed about the
punishment they have received. They learn by how many participants
they were punished and by how much their income was reduced in
total.
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Overview of total income within one period
period income of a participant A
=
(15 Token) - (contribution to project)
+
(6 Token x number of contributing participants)
+
(6 Token) - (1 Token x number of acquired pieces of information)
-
(2 Token x number of assigned punishments)
-
(8 Token x number of received punishments)
period income of participant B
=
(6 Token x number of contributing participants)
+
(24 Token)
-
(1 Token x total number of acquired pieces of information)
–
(2 Token x sum of all assigned punishments)
Control questions
Please answer the following questions and raise your hand.
1. Question
Suppose you are participant A and no participant A has contributed
to the common project. Suppose further that no participant A makes
use of the possibility to punish. What is you period income if no
further information is acquired (please keep in mind that you are en-
dowed with an additional 6 Token in phase 3)?
Your period income (in Token)
2. Question
Suppose you are a participant A and you have contributed to the
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common project. In addition to you, two other participants A have
contributed to the project. Suppose further that you punish one par-
ticipant A and that you do not receive any punishment yourself. Fur-
thermore, you buy one additional piece of information for each of the
other three participants A.
a) What is your period income? Your period income (in Token)
b) Now suppose that you are punished by two participants A. What
is your period income in this case?
Your period income (in Token)
3. Question
Suppose you receive the information that participant A2 has not con-
tributed to the project.
a) What is the probability that this information about participant A2
is correct?
b) Do all group members necessarily receive the same information
about the contribution of participant A2?
YES NO
c) Suppose you want to acquire one additional piece of information
about participant A2.
Howmuch do you have to pay for that? TokenWhat
is the probability that this newly acquired information about partici-
pant A2 is correct?
d) Next period you receive new information about the contribution of
participant A2. Does participant A2 necessarily correspond the same
actual person as in the previous period?
YES NO
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Instructions End-CEN
Welcome to Econ-Lab!
Please read the following instructions carefully. If you have any ques-
tions, please raise your hand. An assistant will approach you imme-
diately.
General remarks
Today you are taking part in a study at the Department of Economics
of the University of Zurich. You will receive a fixed payment of 15
CHF for your participation. Depending on the course of the study,
you can earn an additional amount of money. You will receive your
payment at the end of the study in cash. Please note that these instruc-
tions are exclusively for your private information and that communi-
cation is absolutely prohibited during the whole study. If you have
any questions, please direct them towards the experimenters. Violat-
ing these rules leads to exclusion from this study and all payments.
Data collected in this study will at no time be linked to your identity.
Your name will be used exclusively for issuing the acknowledgment
of your payment. Hence, your anonymity is guaranteed at all times.
Short description of the procedures of the study
At the beginning of the experiment you will be assigned to a group
of five participants. Hence, in addition to you, there are four other
members in your group. The group composition does not change
over the course of the experiment. A group consists of four par-
ticipants A and one participant B. The assignment to one of these
two roles is determined randomly at the beginning of the experiment.
Each participant sticks to his/her assigned role until the end of the
experiment. The experiment consists of 25 periods. Each period is
composed of three phases:
1. In the first phase participants A can decide whether or not to
contribute to a common project of the group.
2. In the second phase all group members receive an information
(free of charge) about the decisions that the participants have
made. This individual information is accurate with a certain
probability only. It is therefore possible that the information
about the decision of certain group members is false. The spe-
cific pieces of information conveyed to participants are inde-
240 appendix – superiority of decentralization
pendent of each other and can therefore be different from one
another. In order to improve your information base participant
B can buy further information about other group members. The
new information is also accurate with a certain probability only.
3. In the third phase each participant B can spend money in order
to reduce the income of participants A of the group. At the end
of each period group members are informed about how much
their income was reduced in total.
On the next pages we describe the exact procedures of the experi-
ment.
PROCEDURES OF THE STUDY
At the beginning of the experiment you are informed about your ran-
domly assigned role. There are four participants A and one partici-
pant B in your group. You are either a participant A or the partic-
ipant B. The assignment to one of those two roles is fixed for the
whole duration of the experiment.
You will receive experimental currency units (so-called Token) over
the course of the experiment. 1 Token corresponds to 0.05 CHF. The
experiment consists of 25 periods. At the end of the experiment, the
sum of all the Token you have collected over the 25 periods is con-
verted to CHF and paid out to you. You receive this amount in ad-
dition to your fixed payment. The income of a single period may be
negative. You receive an additional payment of 0 CHF if the sum of
all your period incomes is negative (your fixed payment of 15 CHF
remains unaffected).
Participant B
As participant B you do not make any decisions during the first phase
of the experiment. However, in each period you receive a share of the
project’s profit, which depends on the decisions of participants A. The
profit of the project is split equally among all five group members. In
each period you receive information about whether the participants
A contributed to the project. Afterwards, you can acquire further in-
formation about the behavior of other participants A in order to im-
prove your information base. In the third phase of each period you
can punish participants A by reducing their income. Details can be
found below in the section "phases of the experiment".
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Participant A
As one of the four participants A you decide in each of the 25 periods
whether or not you want to contribute to the common project. In each
period you receive a share of the project’s profit that depends on the
decisions of all participants A. The profit of the project is split equally
among all five group members. Furthermore, like participant B, you
receive information about whether or not the other participants A
contributed to the project. In the third phase you do not make any
decision. Details can be found below in the section "phases of the
experiment".
Phases of the experiment
Phase 1 – Decision about the contribution to the project
As participant A you are endowed with an amount of 15 Token at the
beginning of each period. You have to choose one of two options:
1. Either you contribute the 15 Token to the common project or
2. You keep the 15 Token.
All group members (participants A as well as participant B) profit
equally from contributions to the common project. The sum of con-
tributions is first doubled and then split equally among all group
members.
If a group member contributes the 15 Token to the project, the income
from the project increases by (15⇤2)5 = 6 Token for each group member.
As participant B you receive a share of the project’s income, but you
do not make any decisions yourself.
In this phase, you are not informed about the actual income from
the project - neither as participant A nor as participant B. Only at
the end of the experiment (i.e. after 25 periods) all participants are
informed about their total earnings in each period.
project income per group member
=
number of contributing participants x 6 Token
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Examples:
• Suppose all participants A contribute 15 Token to the common
project. Then each group member gets 6 Token * 4 = 24 Token
from the project.
• Suppose no one contributes to the project. Then all participants
A keep their 15 Token and participant B receives 0 additional
Token.
• Suppose you are participant A and you do not contribute to
the project. Each of the other three participants A contributes
15 Token to the project. Then you keep your 15 Token and you
receive an additional 3*6 Token = 18 Token from the project.
Hence, in total you get 33 Token. Each other group member
receives 3*6 Token = 18 Token from the project.
Phase 2 – Information about contributions of other participants:
In this phase all group members (participants A and B) individu-
ally receive an independent information about each participant A’s
contribution decision. Each piece of information is correct with a
probability of 90% and false with a probability of 10%. Hence,
• when a participant A actually contributes 15 Token, then you
receive the information "15 Token" with 90% probability and
the information "0 Token" with 10% probability.
• when a participant A actually contributes 0 Token, then you
receive the information "0 Token" with 90% probability and the
information "15 Token" with 10% probability.
The pieces of information are provided individually and are indepen-
dent of each other. Therefore, it is possible that two group members
receive different information about the actions of one and the same
participant A. You do not learn the information received by other
group members.
Afterwards, participant B has the possibility to acquire up to two
further pieces of information about each of the four participants A.
Hence, in total each participant A can buy 8 additional pieces of in-
formation (2 pieces of information x 3 other participants A). One new
piece of information costs 3 Token for participant B.
Information acquired by participant B is conveyed to the other three
participants A. Each participant A also has to bear costs of 1 Token
for each new piece of information that he or she receives.
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Like the initial three pieces of costless information, all new pieces of
information are independent of each other and with 90% probability
true and with 10% probability false. New pieces of information are ac-
quired sequentially, i.e. one after another. You can stop to buy further
information at any time.
The labels of participants A are randomly reassigned each period.
For example, "participant A2" in the first period is not necessarily the
same person as “participant A2” in the second period.
Phase 3 – Decision about punishment of other participants:
In this phase participant B has the possibility to punish participants
A by reducing their period income.
As a participant B you decide in every period whether to reduce
a participant A’s income by a) 0 Token, b) 8 Token, c) 16 Token or
d) 24 Token. You have to pay 1 Token per every 4 Token that are
deducted from a participant A’s income. For that purpose you are
endowed with additional 24 Token in this phase.
The other three participants A have to bear total costs of 1 Token per
4 Token that are deducted from the fourth participant A. These total
costs are split equally among the three other participants A. For that
purpose each participant A is endowed with an additional 6 Token.
If for example, participant B reduces the income of one participant A
by 24 Token then the other three participants A have to pay 6 Token
in total, i.e. 2 Token each.
At the end of each period all participants A are informed about the
punishment they have received. They do not learn the punishment of
other participants A.
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Overview of total income within one period
period income of a participant A
=
(15 Token) – (contribution to project) +
(6 Token x number of contributing participants)
+
(6 Token)
–
(1 Token x further pieces of information about participants A)
-
( 112 Token x sum of total punishment of other participants A by B)
-
(received punishment by participant B)
period income of participant B
=
(6 Token x number of contributing participants)
+
(24 Token)
-
(3 Token x number of acquired pieces of information)
–
(14 Token x sum of all assigned punishment to participants A)
Control questions
Please answer the following questions and raise your hand.
1. Question
Suppose you are participant A and no participant A has contributed
to the common project. Suppose further that no participant A makes
use of the possibility to punish. What is you period income if partici-
pant B does not acquire further information (please keep in mind that
you are endowed with an additional 6 Token in phase 3)?
Your period income (in Token)
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2. Question
Suppose you are a participant A and you have contributed to the com-
mon project. In addition to you, the other three participants A have
also contributed to the project. Suppose further that you are punished
by participant B with 24 Token (your period income is reduced by 24
Token). Furthermore no other participant A is punished.
What is your period income? Your period income (in Token)
3. Question
Suppose you receive the information that participant A2 has not con-
tributed to the project.
a) What is the probability that this information about participant A2
is correct?
b) Do all group members necessarily receive the same information
about the contribution of participant A2?
YES NO
c) Next period you receive new information about the contribution of
participant A2. Does participant A2 necessarily correspond the same
actual person as in the previous period?
YES NO
4. Question
Suppose you are participant B and two participants A have contributed
to the common project. Suppose further that you punish two partici-
pants with 24 Token (you reduce the income of two participants A by
24 Token). Additionally you acquire one further piece of information
for each participant A.
a) What is your period income? Your period income (in Token)
b) What is the probability that the newly acquired piece of informa-
tion about participant A2 is correct?
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